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AN INTEGRATIVE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
CHAPTER I 
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
According to the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (1978, p. 6), the objective of the attestation 
function provided by public accountants is to facilitate the 
efficient operation of capital markets. This is accomplished 
by providing users of financial statement data with some de­
gree of assurance that the information upon which their in­
vestment decisions are presumably based, has been prepared in 
a fair and consistent manner. If this service were not pro­
vided by auditing firms, the presumption is that the capital 
markets would not operate as efficiently as they do today. 
Individual investors would be required to expend substantially 
more of their resources to obtain reliable information for de­
cision-making purposes.
In the last few years considerable skepticism has 
arisen concerning the degree to which the auditor is fulfil­
ling his societal obligations. Probably the most convincing 
confirmation of the existence of this skepticism is found in
1
2the recent reports of two U.S. congressional committees, one 
in the House of Representatives (1976) which was chaired by 
Congressman Moss and the other in the Senate (1976) which was 
chaired by the late Senator Metcalf (and after his death by 
Senator Eagleton). This latter committee made the following 
comment.
This study finds that public doubts concerning the per­
formance of independent auditors of major corporations 
are well founded. Moreover, the problems causing an 
erosion of confidence in the "Big Eight" accounting firms 
and other independent auditors are inherent in their 
present system of practice, the procedure by which they 
are chosen, and their relationship to standard-setting 
bodies. Restoration of public confidence in the indepen­
dence and competence of such auditors depends upon re­
forming the manner in which they perform their responsi­
bilities. (p. 7)
Several academics and practitioners have also called 
for changes in the auditor's professional role. According to 
Causey (1976) , the auditor should insist that financial state­
ments portray as clearly as possible the economic realities 
of the client's financial position and operations irrespective 
of the dictates of generally accepted accounting principles. 
Philip Chenok, the current president of the AICPA, has stated 
that the profession must strive to strengthen its role as an 
intermediary between the business community and the investing 
public. "If we don't, the mood in this land for change could 
transform into irrational action. Government could set rules 
for all of us. They'll tell us what to audit - when to au­
dit - how to audit - and then set the fee" (1978, p. 36).
Mautz and Sharaf (1961) warned the profession that unless
3changes were initiated to broaden the auditor's responsibil­
ities, his role would probably be assumed by other parties, 
most likely professional security analysts.
In response to the serious criticism addressed toward 
auditors and auditing firms, the profession in 1974 estab­
lished the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities (CAR) 
which was instructed to analyze the auditor's professional 
role and suggest ways in which it needed to be changed in 
order to provide an improved level of professional service to 
the public. In 1978 the Cohen Commission, the name by which 
the above body was more commonly known, released a lengthy re­
port of its findings and recommendations.
Because of the overall reasonableness of its recommenda­
tions and strong endorsement given by Congress and the 
SEC, the CAR report essentially became a mandate for the 
profession. And, the profession has responded vigorously 
and affirmatively to this mandate in several areas.
(Lea, 1981, p. 65)
The need to strengthen auditor independence was one of 
the key issues which the Cohen Commission addressed. In Lea's 
analysis of the profession's responses to the recommendations 
of the Cohen Commission, he had the following to say concern­
ing auditor independence : "In my opinion, the most signifi­
cant area of non,-response or inadequate response [ by the pro­
fession] has been with respect to independence issues. . ."
(p. 65). Thus, the Cohen Commission adds its voice to those 
of other unheeded observers who have noted that the structure 
of the relationship between the auditing firm and client does
4not seem to provide the auditor with an independent, pressure- 
free context in which to carry out his professional responsi­
bilities.
In a 1977 interview with editors of the Journal of Ac­
countancy , the then chairman of the SEC, Harold Williams, ex­
pressed concern with the harsh criticism of the profession by 
external parties and indicated his belief that the primary 
cause of the controversy was the lack of independence in the 
audit context. "I believe the crux of the whole problem is 
independence. Most of the other pieces fall into place as 
ways to safeguard and assure the existence of independence."
(p. 42). The concern of Commissioner Williams for promoting 
the independence of external auditors as well as the conclu­
sions expressed by Lea above provide substantial justification 
for further study of this dimension of the auditor's role. A 
final measure of justification in this regard is provided by 
Professor Edward Stamp who sees independence as an indispen­
sable element of the auditor's role.
If the auditor is not independent then the sole justifi­
cation for his existence simply disappears. . .his func­
tion and his credibility as an auditor depends so 
completely upon his independence that an auditor who is 
not independent is no longer an auditor. (1978, p. 108)
There are several approaches that could be employed to 
study auditor independence, a few of which were discussed in 
a recent article by Amernic and Aranya (1981). Two of their 
recommendations were an analysis of the structural factors 
bounding and/or defining auditor independence, and an
5examination of the psychological attributes prerequisite to 
the formation of a mental state of independence in an audit 
context. In the next chapter, the distinction between the 
two recognized dimensions of auditor independence is dis­
cussed. At this time, it is sufficient to say that one dimen­
sion, apparent or perceived independence, is primarily a 
structural phenomenon that is bounded or defined by ex­
plicit guidelines or policies established by relevant parties 
in the financial reporting process. The other dimension, in­
dependence in fact, is primarily of a psychological nature. 
Thus, the structural approach to the study of independence 
suggested by Amernic and Aranya is the most appropriate method 
for examining the perceived independence of auditors while 
their second method is better suited for investigating audi­
tors' ^  facto independence.
The focus of this study is upon the apparent indepen­
dence of auditors. Two basic research approaches are involved. 
First, the relevance of numerous recommendations which have 
been brought before the profession in recent years concerning 
the strengthening and preserving of auditor independence are 
systematically evaluated. The primary research interests in 
this case are 1) to determine how financial statement users 
would redefine the auditor's role and/or responsibilities in 
order to provide for a greater degree of independence, and 2) 
to determine how well partners of national public accounting 
firms agree with financial statement users on this same issue.
6The necessity for pursuing the first of these two re­
search interests was provided by the Metcalf Committee's 
strong call for increased participation by the public in the 
standard-setting processes. "Again, participation by all 
segments of the public is necessary to develop auditing stan­
dards that will restore public confidence in the integrity of 
corporate reports" (p. 12). With respect to the second re­
search interest, the Metcalf Committee implied (p. 153) that 
the large national accounting firms have a major and dispro­
portionate influence in standard-setting processes. If 
this is the case, then it seems important to determine if 
there is a lack of consensus between the large accounting 
firms and financial statement users concerning how to "legis­
late" the independence of auditors.
The second approach taken in this study is an examin­
ation of a specific context identified in the professional 
literature as having the potential to seriously undermine the 
otherwise apparent independence of the external auditor, 
namely, auditor-client conflict episodes. This avenue of 
research focuses on determining how knowledge of such conflict 
may impact financial statement users' perceptions of auditor 
independence. Auditor-client conflict has several times been 
hypothesized to be capable of seriously impairing the objec­
tivity of auditors. However, past researchers have not at­
tempted to verify or dispute this presumption empirically.
In the following chapters, the specific objectives of
7this study are developed more fully. Chapter II contains an 
overview of the relevant literature concerning independence 
and auditor-client conflict. In Chapter III the specific re­
search questions and hypotheses addressed are developed. Chap­
ter IV describes the particulars of the research techniques 
employed while Chapter V contains the statistical and intui­
tive analysis of the data compiled from the empirical research. 
Finally, Chapter VI presents the overall research conclusions 
as well as suggestions for future research emanating from this 
study.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
In the next several pages, the relevant literature 
related to perceived auditor independence and auditor-client 
conflict is reviewed. For clarity purposes, the literature 
review is organized into four sections. The first section 
is a discussion of the two officially recognized dimensions 
of auditor independence. This dichotomy has important im­
plications for the manner in which auditor independence 
should be , and has been, historically studied. The second sec­
tion reviews several proposals that have been discussed in 
the professional literature to strengthen the perceived in­
dependence of auditors. The third section addresses the 
relevant literature which has examined the sources and impli­
cations of auditor-client conflict. Finally, the fourth 
section contains an overall review of the professional litera­
ture concerning auditor independence including an analysis of 
the specific areas needing further research.
Perceived vs. De Facto Auditor Independence 
Prior to examining the relevant professional literature 
related to the issues selected for examination, it seems
8
9pertinent to address a fundamental question in this context 
which most researchers have either ignored or dealt with only 
superficially. The question at hand is: Which of the two
officially defined types or dimensions of auditor indepen­
dence, perceived or ^  facto, should be the focal topic of 
experimental inquiry? The technical standards for auditing 
recognize that the independence of the auditor is of para­
mount importance, . .he must be without bias with re­
spect to the client since otherwise he would lack that im­
partiality necessary for the dependability of his findings, 
however excellent his technical proficiency may be" (AICPA 
Professional Standards, AU 220.03). The standards go on to 
say that it is not sufficient for the auditor to possess a 
true state of judicial impartiality toward his clients for 
third parties may lose confidence in the auditor's profes­
sional opinion if the auditor is in a position where his 
independence appears to be impaired even though in reality 
it is not. Accordingly, the auditor must continually ques­
tion not only whether circumstances in relationships with 
his client affect his independence in fact, but also whether 
they adversely impact third parties' perceptions of his in­
dependence .
A brief review of the empirical work which has investi­
gated auditor independence will quickly reveal that the audi­
tor's perceived independence has received practically all of 
the attention of researchers at the exclusion of independence
10
in fact. Behavioral researchers have been much maligned by 
other researchers for measuring subjects' perceptions of, or 
attitudes toward, a phenomenon rather than measuring the actual 
phenomenon or subjects' actual behavioral responses to the 
phenomenon. This problem was addressed in detail by Schumann 
and Johnson (1976) , two prominent social psychologists. How­
ever, in this particular context, the controversy is apparent­
ly a moot one since the issue of relevant parties' perceptions 
of auditor independence may be just as critical as the ^  facto 
level of auditors' independence, " . . .  for credibility [of 
the auditor] depends ultimately on the perception rather than 
on the fact of independence" (Shockley, 1981, p. 785). Com­
missioner Williams was quoted in the previously referenced 
interview as saying that, "A major problem of the accounting 
profession is that it lacks the appearance of independence in 
an area where appearances are as important as realities" (p. 
42). The conclusions reached by Shockley and Williams provide 
the rationale for researchers to place heavy emphasis on ap­
parent independence at the exclusion of ^  facto independence. 
However, instead of entirely ignoring facto independence, 
it seems necessary to more clearly define that phenomenon 
and its relationship to independence in appearance.
Berryman (1974) presented an excellent synopsis of 
the historical development of the auditor independence con­
struct including how the profession came to distinguish be­
tween perceived and de facto independence. He noted that
11
historically the primary emphasis in defining auditor inde­
pendence has been from a financial or economic interest per­
spective. De Angelo (1980) outlined the rationale underlying 
this approach.
The 'economic interest' concept presumes that the auditor 
is not independent with respect to a client in which he 
possesses a material economic interest. In fact, 'eco­
nomic interest' is a necessary, but not sufficient, con­
dition for auditor opportunism to occur. An economic 
interest in the client sets up the incentive for misrep­
resentation; in order for 'cheating'to actually occur, 
it is also necessary that auditors perceive the marginal 
benefits from misrepresentation to exceed the marginal 
costs. (p. 69)
As De Angelo noted, the profession wants to avoid those situ­
ations where the auditor has an economic incentive to 'cheat'. 
However, in studying the evolution of this construct we can 
see that the profession's thinking has changed drastically.
Until 1862 in Great Britain, the auditor was not only 
permitted to have an equity interest in his clients but was 
required by law to have such^. Apparently, the argument was 
that an auditor without an economic interest in his clients 
might be lackadaisal in examining the financial records. By 
having a direct equity interest in his clients, the auditor 
was presumed to have a sufficient motivation to determine 
that the auditees were disclosing all relevant information in 
a fair and consistent manner. Most relatively new members of 
the accounting profession are probably not aware that the
^This stipulation was found in the Companies Clauses 
Consolidation Act of 1845, Section 102.
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AICPA did not prohibit auditors from having direct equity 
interests in their clients in this country until 1962.
In early pronouncements the profession did not diffe­
rentiate between the two types of auditor independence. The 
technical literature continually used such terms as 'intel­
lectual honesty', 'judicial impartiality', or 'integrity and 
objectivity' in defining auditor independence. Clearly, the 
intention was to promote independence in fact. With the 
leadership of the SEC (Berryman, p. 6), the profession came 
to realize that do facto independence was not alone suffi­
cient since certain characteristics of the auditor's role 
and the auditor-client relationship made third parties doubt 
the auditor's impartiality, thus began the move to protect 
the perceived independence of the auditor.
Barrett's analysis of auditor independence is one of 
the few cases where a clear distinction has been made between 
the two dimensions of auditor independence, ". . . the audit 
profession's ethical notion of apparent independence can be 
operationally defined as a sociological role construct, and 
. . . its conception of real independence can be operationally 
defined as a personality construct" (p. iii). According to 
Barrett, ^  facto independence is not an attribute of the pro­
fession as a whole but rather of individual auditors. Either 
the auditor has the prerequisite psychological traits to be­
have in an independent fashion within the pressurized context 
of the audit engagement or he does not. Essentially this
13
same argument was made a few years later by Fritzmeyer and 
Carmichael (1972) . Barrett went on to define the personality 
characteristics that a de facto independent auditor would 
possess, e.g., a low need for social approval. He then pre­
sented an argument that the tendency to be independent in 
fact can be measured empirically given the appropriate bat­
tery of psychological tests.
Perceived independence is not an attribute of indivi­
dual auditors, according to Barrett, but rather is a charac­
teristic of audit environments, " . . .  [perceived indepen­
dence] describes functional situations which promote or dys­
functional situations which impair the profession's auditor 
image as perceived by reasonable observers" (p. iii) . Once 
dysfunctional situations in the audit context are identified, 
the appropriate measures should be taken to restructure the 
auditor's role. For instance, as users became more sensi­
tized to the possible adverse effects of auditors simulta­
neously providing MAS and audit services, the requirements of 
the auditor's role were modified accordingly, i.e., the nature 
and amount of MAS provided to clients was required to be 
disclosed. Applying this rationale, the audit profession 
should provide financial statement users with as much accu­
rate information as possible about all aspects of the envi­
ronment within which audits are carried out.
Perceived auditor independence will be the focal topic 
of this research study. However, hopefully, there exists a
14
close relationship between those variables which result in 
financial statement users doubting auditor's independence and 
the factors which may result in auditors actually behaving 
in a less than independent manner. Consequently, by studying 
perceived independence, a more comprehensive understanding of 
the ^  facto dimension of auditor independence should also 
be obtained.
Analysis of the Structural Parameters 
of Auditor Independence 
This section reviews notable recommendations for 
strengthening the apparent independence of external auditors. 
An emphasis has been placed on current works; however, when 
the findings of the less recent studies are still of consid­
erable importance, they have been included also.
The MAS Controversy 
A structural facet of auditor independence which has 
received considerable attention in the professional literature 
is the provision of management advisory services (MAS) to 
audit clients. Schulte (1965) was one of the first researchers 
to address this issue directly. In a survey study, he found 
that one-third of his respondents disagreed with the official 
position of the AICPA that providing MAS to audit clients does 
not constitute a conflict of interest. Two years later, 
Schulte, Hoenemeyer, and Devore (1967) pointed out that the 
issue is not only whether the provision of MAS creates a
15
conflict of interest problem, and thus, an impairment of the 
auditor's independence, but also whether such a situation 
adversely impacts third-party financial statement users' per­
ceptions of the independence of the auditor. One recommenda­
tion of Schulte and his co-authors was that the auditor should 
obtain approval for an MAS engagement from the client's audit 
committee which would review each case for impairment of in­
dependence. Schulte, et al, felt their recommendation could 
serve as a temporary measure to reduce the severity of the 
problem while the profession studied the issue in more detail.
Milano (1979) and Shockley (1981) also studied the 
relationship between auditor independence and the provision 
of MAS. Milano's survey study found that CPAs and financial 
statement users agreed that auditors' independence would be 
promoted by restricting their right to provide executive 
search and placement services to audit clients. However, 
there was a lack of consensus among CPAs and users as to 
whether the benefits provided by such a prohibition would 
exceed the tangible and intangible costs of such action. 
Shockley's recent study presented strong evidence that the 
provision of MAS to audit clients impairs the perceived in­
dependence of auditing firms.
The MAS issue has been examined extensively in other 
countries as well. In a 1979 Australicin study, Francis and 
Pollard concluded that if providing audit services and MAS to 
the same client is deemed a conflict of interest, then a
16
significant problem exists in that economy. Those research­
ers found that 74.5% of publicly-owned firms in Australia 
receive significant non-audit services from their auditors. 
Michael Firth of Great Britain in a 1981 study found that 
financial statement users generally considered an auditor's 
independence to be impaired if consulting services are pro­
vided to the client by the auditor. Dykxhoorn and Sinning 
(1981) comprehensively assessed the current status of the 
auditor independence construct in the West German economy.
They noted that approximately 30% of Wirtschaftspruder, Ger­
man auditing firms, revenue comes directly from the provision 
of consulting services. Those same authors noted a 1976 sur­
vey which found that more than two-thirds of that country's 
business journalists believed consulting and auditing were 
incompatible services while only one-third of the auditor 
subjects held such an opinion.
Titard (1971) as well as Hartley and Ross (1972) con­
cluded that perceptions of auditor independence were not ma­
terially affected as a result of the provision of MAS to a 
client. The empirical findings of these researchers is incon­
sistent with more recent studies. A speculative explanation 
for the apparent contradictory results of these two studies is 
that in the early 1970's, prior to the Moss and Metcalf in­
vestigations, the financial community was simply not aware of 
the possible impact that the simultaneous performance of MAS 
and auditing services can have upon auditor independence.
17
Subsequent to that time, the public has become more aware of 
the problems that can arise from such a situation, and con­
sequently, this 'education' would explain why more recent 
studies have typically not agreed with Titard or Hartley and 
Ross.
Finally, a recent study by Reckers and Stagliano (1981) 
found that relatively sophisticated financial statement users 
were less likely to perceive auditors' independence to be 
impaired when providing MAS than were naive financial state­
ment users. These researchers defined the subject classes 
for relatively sophisticated and naive financial statement 
users as chartered financial analysts and MBA students, re­
spectively. When each subject class was presented a scenario 
in which an audit firm received consulting fees equal to 38% 
of the annual audit fee (the mean percentage for a random 
sample of one hundred firms selected by the researchers from 
SEC registrants), the composite confidence level of the 
'sophisticated' group in the ability of the audit firm to 
maintain its independence was approximately 70% while the 
same figure for the naive group was around 58%. Reckers 
and Stagliano concluded that the above levels of confidence 
were not indicative of a serious problem with respect to 
the impairment of auditors' independence, a conclusion that 
certainly seems debatable given other recent research find­
ings. Additionally, the researchers imply that the judgments 
of relatively sophisticated financial statement users such as
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chartered financial analysts should be weighted more heavily 
in deciding issues such as the MAS controversy. That pre­
sumption will be re-examined later.
Obviously, no consensus has been reached on how or 
whether the provision of MAS impairs the ability of auditors 
to retain the appearance of independence in the audit engage­
ment. This issue will be addressed by both halves of the 
research design used in this study. Hopefully, the empirical 
results of this study will contribute to the resolution of 
this issue.
Auditor Rotation as a Means to Preserve 
Apparent Independence 
Next to the MAS issue, the rotation of auditing firms 
has probably received more attention in the professional 
literature than any other proposed action for strengthening 
auditor independence. The empirical results of the studies 
which have examined this policy alternative have generally 
been quite consistent and are fairly well summarized by 
two recent studies. Both Shockley and Dawkins (1978) ad­
dressed the issue of auditor rotation, the former indirectly 
in an experimental context and the latter directly in a sur­
vey study. Dawkins found that corporate controllers were 
very adamant in rejecting a policy of mandatory auditor ro­
tation, however, she did not consider such a policy's effect 
upon auditor independence. Shockley's empirical results 
demonstrated that the tenure of audit firms with clients
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did not significantly influence financial statement users' 
views of the auditor's independence in either direction. In 
fact, Shockley presented an argument that the long tenure of 
an auditing firm may actually improve its independence. The 
auditing firm with a long tenure is more valuable to the 
client since that factor should presumably lead to a higher 
quality and more cost-efficient audit. This means that the 
auditing firm would be in a better position to stave off 
attempts by the client to influence its behavior. Given 
the results of these two studies, the rotation of auditing 
firms does not appear to be a move which would significantly 
improve auditors' ability to retain their appearance of 
independence nor is it an action user groups would like to 
see adopted.
Audit Committees and Apparent Independence 
Another structural facet of the auditor's role related 
to preserving and strengthening his independence is the for­
mation of audit committees. Although audit committees have 
received a great deal of attention in recent years, the AICPA 
has never directly endorsed their use within the technical 
standards of the profession. Mautz and Neary (1979) argued 
that even though the concept of having a highly impartial 
body serve as a liasion between management and the external 
auditor is a positive step toward protecting the independence 
and integrity of the attestation function, certain forces in
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the financial environment may have unrealistic expectations 
with respect to the overall utility of audit committees.
The primary concern of these authors is that audit committees 
were originally intended to spend a minimal amount of time in 
carrying out their responsibilities, however, now with the 
pressure to expand the role of such committees, and con­
sequently, an increase in the amount of time to be spent by 
committee members in performing their duties, it may well be 
that qualified individuals will be less willing to serve on 
them.
Milne and Weber (1981) in an article intended to rebut 
many of the recommendations made by the Metcalf Committee, 
expressed special displeasure for the suggestion of that 
body to expand the role of audit committees in the financial 
reporting process. These authors argued very sternly against 
the government taking any further regulatory action with re­
gard to the audit function being provided by public accounting 
firms in our economy. Their non-interventionist approach 
precluded them from accepting any form of government control 
over the auditor's role since such action, in their eyes, 
would further disturb the efficient interaction of supply 
and demand forces in the audit market. According to their 
normative argument, the role audit committees should play 
in the economy, if any, should be determined wholly by the 
free marketplace. Their second reason for disputing the 
Metcalf Committee's position on audit committees has been
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expressed by other individuals as well.
If corporate audit committees become mandatory, we pre­
dict that the behaviour of these committees will be 
explained best by their ability to achieve what cor­
porate management wants them to achieve and not by 
their motivations to maximise the welfare of all con­
sumers of auditing services or the society in general.
(p. 203).
Another highly respected member of our profession, 
Frederick Neumann, in a 1981 article did not express the 
same concern of Mautz and Neary nor that of Milne and Weber 
with regard to the possible overuse or misuse of audit com­
mittees. He views audit committees as a very effective tool 
to employ in the profession's struggle against more govern­
mental intrusion. "In fact, such a committee may very well 
be a company's best bulwark against governmental regulation 
in general and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 in 
particular" (p. 78).
There has been but a very modest amount of empirical 
research carried out with regard to the impact of audit 
committees on the independence of auditors. Milano found 
that CPAs and financial statement users both believed that 
having the client's audit committee make all of the fee nego­
tiations and other arrangements with the auditing firm would 
provide the latter with more independence.
How Does the Client's Financial Condition 
Impact Perceived Independence?
Schultz and Gustavson (1978) employed a research 
design very similar to the one used by Shockley, but these
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researchers investigated the factors affecting the auditor's 
risk of legal liability rather than independence. Quite 
likely, the determinants of these latter two variables over­
lap to a certain extent. One of the independent variables 
Schultz and Gustavson manipulated in their experiments was 
the financial condition of the client. They found that a 
client in relatively poor financial condition increased 
actuaries' perceptions of the legal risk the auditor had to 
assume. This conclusion is certainly not earth-shaking but 
it does raise an issue in the context of the research study 
proposed in this paper, which is: How does the client's fin­
ancial condition affect the auditor's perceived independence? 
Intuitively, a mutuality of interests situation might occur in 
an audit engagement in which the client is in relatively 
poor financial health. The auditor most likely perceives 
the higher level of audit risk associated with such a client 
and, as a result, may consciously or unconsciously attempt 
to divert financial statement users' attention away from the 
factors indicative of the client's financial problems. An­
other possibility is that the auditor would extend his exam­
ination to be certain that all aspects of the client's 
condition are fully communicated in the financial statements. 
If financial statement users perceive this latter situation 
to be more likely, rather than being jeopardized, the audi­
tor's apparent independence would actually be improved. Of 
course, the financial condition of the client is one variable
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in the audit context which is not subject to a great deal 
of control. However, if this factor is highly influential in 
determining the apparent independence of auditors, then this 
knowledge will at least alert public accountants as well as 
the regulatory bodies to take additional precautions in the 
necessary circumstances.
Auditor Competition and Independence 
An inherent structural feature of the independent audit 
engagement is the free enterprise nature of the market for 
audit services. As in any free market, competition prevails 
within the audit market. The last few years have seen a 
significant controversy arise over the level as well as the 
effect of competition on the audit function. The Metcalf 
Committee argued that one of the major problems with the 
auditing profession was the lack of significant price com­
petition between auditing firms. The Cohen Commission also 
took issue with the level of competition between auditing 
firms but, surprisingly, reached a conclusion diametrically 
opposed to the position of the Metcalf Committee.
It is not lack of competition, however, but excessive 
competition that appears to present a problem to the 
public accounting profession today. The Commission's 
research on cases involving auditors and its survey 
of partners' and staff members' attitudes provide 
persuasive evidence that time and budget pressures 
frequently cause substandard auditing. Time pres­
sures are often the result of unrealistic and un­
necessary deadlines for completion of audits. How­
ever, there are substantial, sometimes destructive, 
pressures to reduce the total time to complete audits, 
without regard to particular deadlines. (p. 109)
24
The Commission went on to say that there appear to be 
several factors contributing to this problem, one being the 
degree of price competition in the audit market. "We be­
lieve one probable cause is excessive price competition - 
that is, excessive competition among firms to offer lower 
fees - but the Commission has been unable to document this 
relationship" (p. 110). Recent professional literature tends 
to be more supportive of the Cohen Commission rather than the 
Metcalf Committee's viewpoint on price competition within 
auditing. Simunic's 1980 empirical study provided evidence 
supporting the presumption of price competition within audit­
ing. In another relevant article, Bernstein (1978) did not 
provide empirical support for all of his arguments but he 
did discuss very candidly the aggressive pricing structures 
of the large national firms and the implications this has for 
the future of the profession.
An analytical study of the economics of the auditor- 
client relationship by DeAngelo addressed the issue of 'low- 
bailing' by auditors, i.e., lowering current audit fees below 
current engagement costs. Low-balling is at the heart of the 
competition issue as it relates to auditor independence and 
raises another mutuality of interests question. If an audi­
tor's fee restricts the number of hours that can be incurred 
on an engagement to less than the number that is required to 
do a professional, "state-of-the-art" audit, the auditor has
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an incentive to join with the client and work toward limiting 
the risk of liability being imposed against them by third- 
party financial statement users. This possibility may have 
been one factor contributing to Shockley's empirical finding 
that a high level of competition in the audit market seriously 
impairs the perceived independence of an audit firm.
One final reference to the problem of excessive com­
petition in the auditing discipline was found in the July 1982 
Wall Street Journal article quoted in the first chapter. The 
author of that article implied that the eagerness of auditors 
to please their clients may be heightened by the intense level 
of competition among auditing firms in recent years. According 
to that article, the number of auditor changes is at an all- 
time high with the turnover rate of 1982 running 30% higher 
than that of 1981. The message to auditing firms seems to 
be that if they do not acquiesce to the client's demands in 
the engagement, they may find themselves with a higher amount 
of unutilized staff time in the coming year.
Other Issues
Several other structural features of the auditor inde­
pendence phenomenon have been studied by researchers and will 
be briefly reviewed. Pany and Reckers (1980) as well as Milano 
found that perceived auditor independence, as could be expec­
ted, was impaired by the granting of discounts or giving of 
gifts to auditors. Pany and Reckers also found that the rela­
tive size of the audit client, operationalized as the percentage
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of total audit office revenues received from the given client, 
did not have a negative effect on stockholders' perceptions 
of the auditing firm's independence. On the other hand, Shock­
ley's study demonstrated that audit firm size was a signifi­
cant determinant of perceived independence. Small audit firms 
face a higher risk of having this critical attribute endan­
gered than do relatively large firms. Finally, two other 
issues Milano studied were the effect on independence of dis­
closing auditor changes in financial statements and of dele­
gating the responsibility for selection and payment of audi­
tors to the government. In each case the three classes of re­
spondents; CPAs, financial analysts, and corporate lawyers; 
agreed that the proposed action would increase the auditor's 
independence, but, at the same time, the general consensus was 
that the benefits provided by such an action would be less 
than the costs required to affect the changes.
Auditor-client Conflict and 
Auditor Independence 
The nature of the audit engagement is such that con­
flict between client management and the auditing firm is prac­
tically inevitable. Common types of disputes center around 
such points as the degree to which the client's personnel will 
be utilized in the audit engagement, the scheduling of audit 
tasks conflicting with the client's period-end closing proce­
dures, and the percentage of new auditors' time which should
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be charged to the client. Of course, the conflicts which have 
more serious implications for the successful completion of 
the audit concern such items as the need to make certain ad­
justments to the financial statements, the propriety of the 
client's accounting principles, and the adequacy of disclosure 
of all pertinent items in the client's financial report.
Before looking in detail at the various antecedents and 
outcomes of this phenomenon, it should first be instructive to 
define specifically what is implied by the term 'dyadic con­
flict'. For this purpose we turn to Kenneth Thomas (1976), 
an organizational behavioralist.
Conflict - the process which begins when one party (in a 
social dyad) perceives that the other has frustrated or 
is about to frustrate, some concern of his. (p. 891)
The existence of significant conflict between the auditor and 
client, regardless of whether the conflict centers around dis­
agreements about the audit fee, the disclosure of certain in­
formation in the financial statements, or the timing of audit 
procedures, can impair the auditor's ability to exercise his 
professional judgment in a totally objective manner. An es­
sential element of professional independence in an audit con­
text is the maintenance by the auditor of an unbiased rela­
tionship with the management of the firm he is engaged to au­
dit. If client management is continually attempting to in­
fluence the auditor's performance of his responsibilities, 
the result will likely be a loss of some degree of the audi­
tor's independence as well as a lower quality audit.
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Negative Consequences of Conflict;
Empirical Support 
A very pertinent issue is whether or not evidence ex­
ists supporting the presumption that auditor-client conflict 
diminishes auditor independence as well as the quality of au­
dit services. Rhode (1978) carried out a study for the Cohen 
Commission which was intended to determine the influence of 
selected facets of the auditor's work environment on the pro­
fessional performance of CPAs.
The critical questions investigated whether certain as- 
spects of an auditor's work environment, such as pressures 
from time budgets and concerns over job survival or ad­
vancement within the firm, affect the professional integ­
rity and objectivity of auditors to an extent that chal­
lenges or compromises the independence of CPAs or impairs 
the quality of professional performance in other ways.
(p. 175)
Rhode accumulated considerable evidence indicating that audi­
tors' independence is frequently compromised as a result of 
such factors as time budget and client imposed deadline pres­
sure. Lea (1981, p. 64) concisely summarized the most damag­
ing evidence accumulated by Rhode.
1. Fifty percent of the respondents believed that time 
budgets have a negative effect on the auditor's per­
formance .
2. Fifty-eight percent of the respondents still in public 
practice at the time of the survey had signed off for 
completing audit steps (not covered by another compen­
sating step) when they had not performed the work.
3. Fifty-six percent of those in the profession and six­
ty-five percent of those who had left the profession 
believed that audit programs and time budgets are un­
duly influenced by client-negotiated fees.
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4. Fifty-five percent of the respondents reported yield­
ing to pressures to meet time budgets by completing 
work on their own time without recording chargeable 
hours.
5. Fifty percent of the respondents believed that the 
trend in time budget pressure is increasing.
Rhode's findings at first reading appear to be a serious in­
dictment of the way in which the auditor performs his societal 
function, however, since Rhode used a nation-wide survey to 
collect his data and since his response rate was less than 
one-third of the original sample selected, his results have 
not been given a high level of credibility by the profession 
as a whole, or seemingly, by significant parties external to 
the profession.
Other empirical studies which employed more defensible 
research designs and which also arrived at conclusions reflec­
ting poorly on the auditor's independence include Kida (1980); 
File (1981); Uecker, Brief, and Kinney (1981); and finally, 
Alderman and Dietrick (1982). These studies did not use a 
broad research scope such as that of the Rhode study. Rather, 
these researchers generally concentrated on one particular 
facet of the auditor's role and demonstrated, sometimes unin­
tentionally, dysfunctionalities of that role which related di­
rectly or indirectly to the phenomenon of auditor independence. 
Kida experimentally investigated the ability of auditors to 
predict going-concern problems for business firms. His re­
sults demonstrated that auditors are generally as accurate in 
predicting possible insolvency problems as the discriminant
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model devleoped by Altman in 1968, however, auditors appar­
ently many times refuse to recognize the continuity question 
in their report due to the likely unfavorable consequences of 
such action.
. . . auditors who qualified least had slightly stronger 
beliefs that they would lose the client, the client would 
sue, the accounting firm's reputation would be negatively 
affected, and deteriorated relations with the client would 
occur, if the opinion were qualified for a firm without 
problems. (p. 516)
Thus, the auditor's perceptions of the client's reaction to 
the type of opinion he may issue may in fact influence his 
final reporting decisions, a result in direct contravention to 
the presumed objectivity and independence of the auditor. In 
a similar study. Pile (1981) also concluded that the auditor's 
judgment and reporting decisions are sometimes improperly in­
fluenced by client actions or anticipated actions.
Uecker, Brief, and Kinney used an 'in-basket' exercise 
to investigate the extent to which internal and external audi­
tors are perceived by management to be deterrents to the per­
petration of corporate irregularities. External auditors were 
not perceived to be significant preventive controls in that 
regard. According to the Cohen Commission, the overall pur­
pose of the independent audit function is to facilitate the 
operation of the capital markets, however, a secondary but 
related purpose should be to serve as an economy-wide internal 
control mechanism to deter the perpetration of irregularities. 
Given the findings of Uecker, et al, this objective does not
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appear to be well satisfied, and although the argument is ten­
uous, the inability of the auditor to provide that function 
may be due to the lack of independence in his client relation­
ships. The results of the Kida and File studies as well as 
that of Rhode's seem to indicate that clients have a measure 
of control, at least in some cases, over the auditor's exer­
cise of professional judgment. If clients feel they can in­
fluence the reporting decisions of their auditors, then it is 
unlikely they will have much respect for the auditor's latent 
power to communicate internal control weaknesses or other de­
ficiencies in their financial reporting process to the public. 
Of course, such a presumption needs to be subjected to empiri­
cal study before it can be accepted as valid.
Finally, the 1982 study by Alderman and Dietrick was 
both a replication and an extension of Rhode's investigation 
of dysfunctional facets of the auditor's role. As mentioned 
earlier, the findings of Rhode's study have not been given a 
high level of credibility primarily because critics of his 
work argued that his research design was flawed in a number of 
ways. Alderman and Deitrick made several improvements in 
Rhode's research design but the results of the two studies 
were still quite comparable. The primary finding of the lat­
ter researchers was that, due to time budget pressures, there 
exists a considerable risk of "premature sign-off" of audit 
program procedures especially in the critical area of review 
and testing of internal accounting controls.
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Only a limited amount of research has focused upon the 
relationship between auditor-client conflict and auditor in­
dependence , but there does exist substantial intuitive support 
to at least tentatively assume the existence of an inverse 
relationship between the two variables. Accordingly, research 
intended to determine the particulars of this relationship 
seems to be in order if we accept the presumption that auditor 
independence is an attribute of the financial reporting pro­
cess that should be preserved.
A Structural Analysis of 
Auditor-client Conflict 
Structural and Processual Models of Conflict. One of 
two broad approaches is usually taken when studying dyadic 
conflict, regardless of the context. The first approach is 
structural in nature, the second employs a processual perspec­
tive of conflict. Thomas characterizes these two approaches 
as follows :
The process model focuses upon the sequence of events 
within a conflict episode, and is intended to be of use 
when intervening directly into the stream of events of 
an ongoing episode. The structural model focuses upon 
the conditions which shape conflict behavior in a rela­
tionship, and is intended to help in restructuring a situ­
ation to facilitate various behavior patterns, (p. 889)
The two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive since 
they can be used jointly to resolve conflict situations. How­
ever, the process approach is more useful as a short-run tech­
nique for dealing with conflict in a specific situation while 
the structural perspective is more of a long-run tool most
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useful for providing permanent resolutions. In this context,
2
the latter appears to be the most appropriate approach to 
utilize since the research focus primarily relates to the 
structural parameters of the auditor independence phenomenon. 
The intent of this part of the study is to analyze the para­
meters of the audit context in order to determine how they can 
be changed in order to remedy the problem of auditor-client 
conflict.
The initial objective in applying the structural ap­
proach of conflict management is to identify those conditions 
which tend to influence conflict behavior. These conditions 
can include a wide range of elements such as the behavioral 
predispositions of each party, pressure applied to the parties 
from external reference groups, and the legal or quasi-legal 
structural boundaries prescribed by external entities within 
which the parties must interact. Once the primary conditions 
influencing the occurence of this type of behavior have been 
identified, one can go about analyzing the basic interrela­
tionships in order to identify the sources of the conflict.
Once the causes or sources of the conflict have been isolated, 
then one can employ a number of available action alternatives 
to work toward its elimination. Two recent analytical articles 
in the accounting literature have addressed many of these pre­
liminary theoretical issues surrounding the phenomenon of
2
For an application of Thomas' process model to auditor- 
client conflict, see M.C. Knapp and B.H. Ward, "Conflict in the 
Audit Context: An Analysis of Its Sources and an Approach to 
Managing It," unpublished working paper. University of Okla­
homa, October, 1982.
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dyadic conflict in an audit context.
Goldman and Bariev vs. Nichols and Price. In 1974 Gold­
man and Bariev (GB) analyzed auditor-client conflict in order 
to determine its impact upon the independence of professional 
auditors and to recommend actions to alleviate its presumed 
negative consequences. The other major work along these same 
lines was an article written by Nichols and Price (1976) which 
was in some respects a rebuttal of arguments made in the GB 
paper and in other respects an extension and confirmation of 
the latter authors' analyses. Both sets of authors utilized 
the structural approach to conflict management defined by 
Thomas, but their analyses of the basic parameters of conflict 
behavior in an audit context and their views of the auditor's 
primary source of power.
According to GB, the ability of the auditor to with­
stand client pressure to act in a manner inconsistent with 
professional standards is a function of the relative amounts 
of power possessed by the two parties in an audit engagement.
GB argue that the auditor is at a disadvantage to the client 
since there is an asymmetrical distribution of power in the 
favor of the latter in these relationships. This is not to 
imply that the auditor will be under the subjugation of the 
audited firm. In some cases, if not most, the client may have 
no need to exercise the latent power available and even if the 
choice is made to use this power, the auditor will still have 
the freedom to choose the most appropriate action; however,
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the opportunity cost of such action will be much higher than 
otherwise. Proper professional behavior may result in less 
client cooperation, pressure in other areas such as in manage­
ment consulting projects being carried out by the auditor for 
the client, or even in complete dismissal of the auditor.
Tjosvold and Okun (1979) in an article entitled "Effects 
of Unequal Power on Cooperation in Conflict" note that the less 
powerful party in a dyadic situation is, of course, at a seri­
ous disadvantage. "Research suggests that persons of low power 
may be more likely to establish mutual cooperation if they can 
credibly threaten to pursue an alternative relationship or 
they can collaborate with another to devise effective strate­
gies" (p. 239). Unfortunately, in the case of the auditor, 
threatening to pursue an alternative relationship is typically 
an ineffective means to counterbalance the client's more power­
ful position since a large pool of ready, willing, and capable 
audit firms is ever present and since clients have shown little 
hesitation in exercising their right to dismiss their auditors. 
Additionally, one of the strategies that the SEC has deemed 
effective to offset the possibility of an uncooperative client 
exercising its power to dismiss an audit firm, namely, the 
filing of a publicly available 8-K report in which the auditor 
is allowed to disclose any significant disagreements with the 
client that may have led to his dismissal, has been shown to 
be given little attention by the investing public (Fried and 
Schiff, 1981).
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In order to gain a clear picture of the problems stem­
ming from the asymmetrical distribution of power between audi­
tors and their clients, there is first a need to identify the 
primary sources or bases of power for each of these parties. 
According to GB, the power of the auditor is a function of 
three conditions : the general complexity of the problem he
has been assigned to resolve, the identity of the party who 
is the primary beneficiary of his examination, and the extent 
to which the profession's code of ethics is vigorously and 
visibly enforced. Of these three, GB argue that the first 
is the primary source of power that the auditor employs to 
act in a consistent manner with his behavioral predispositions. 
However, since the typical audit is usually not a complex un­
dertaking, i.e., the degree of expertise required of the audi­
tor is not substantial, the amount of expert power that can 
be wielded by the auditor is usually not significant. Given 
this argument, GB conclude that the primary obstacle to the 
auditor being able to affect a more symmetrical distribution 
of power in the dyadic relationship with the client is the 
high degree of routinism in the audit engagement.
In direct contravention to the above perspective of 
auditor-client conflict, Nichols and Price (NP) constructed 
an argument utilizing the posited power-dependence relation­
ships =of Emerson (1962) illustrating that the auditor's abil­
ity to withstand threats of replacement by the client is posi­
tively related to the degree of routinism in the auditor's
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services.
. . . with highly routine or structured auditing proce­
dures and accounting principles we would argue that the 
firm would be less likely to pressure the auditor, and 
the auditor would be less likely to comply with the firm's 
wishes. . . The reason is simply that the costs to each 
party associated with such action, both internal in terms 
of guilt and external because of possible sanction admini­
stered by third parties, are likely to be greater than 
rewards. (p. 340)
Ironically, a comparison of the specific recommendations of 
NP and GB for dealing with auditor-client conflict reflects 
agreement on all major points. The principal difference be­
tween the two sets of authors centers around their disagree­
ment on how the auditor derives his power in the audit context. 
GB argue that routinism in the audit function reduces the power 
of the auditor. This is true because they see the primary 
source of the auditor's power as professional expertise. NP 
implicitly assert that the major source of the auditor's power 
is coercive in nature, in which case the more prescribed au­
diting and accounting procedures are, i.e., routine, the more 
power the auditor will have to force the client to accept the 
audit results. The structural changes recommended by the two 
sets of authors are very similar, but GB emphasize those changes 
which would decrease the routinism of the audit while NP place 
more emphasis on those recommendations intended to accomplish 
just the reverse.
Monger's Contribution. Monger (1981) is one of the few 
researchers who has empirically studied auditor-client con­
flict, however, he was not interested in the relationship
38
between that phenomenon and auditor independence. Monger 
wanted to determine whether certain characteristics of the 
auditor-client relationship lead to differing perceptions of 
conflict by those two parties. Specifically, he examined the 
following nine attributes of the relationship between auditor 
and client: the proportion of routine issues in the engage­
ment, quantity of MAS provided, size of the client, amount 
of audit team experience, length of engagement, degree of 
environmental uncertainty, financial position of the client, 
use of the collaborating mode of conflict resolution, and 
use of the competing mode of conflict resolution. Of numer­
ous hypotheses tested. Monger's empirical evidence supplied 
support for only four. Audit team experience tended to be in­
versely related to the amount of conflict perceived by audi­
tors and management while there was a direct relationship 
between this latter variable and the degree of environmental 
uncertainty. The use of a collaborating mode of conflict res­
olution resulted in a decrease in the perceptions of conflict 
by auditors. Finally, the codification of GAAP in such a way 
that less subjectivity would be required to interpret them was 
found to be the one action most likely to reduce perceptions 
of conflict by both parties in an audit context. This latter 
conclusion provides some measure of indirect support for the 
Nichols and Price position on auditor-client conflict.
Summary. The existence of conflict in the audit en­
gagement most likely impairs the de facto independence of
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the auditor and may impair his ability to determine whether 
client financial statements are fairly presented. It is quite 
unlikely that most financial statement users are fully aware 
of the high level of conflict existing in the typical audit 
context. Consequently, this phenomenon is not a factor which 
users would incorporate into their evaluation of the apparent 
independence of an audit firm. Nevertheless, if Barrett's 
concept of apparent independence as a sociological role con­
struct is accepted, users should immediately be made aware of 
this factor so that they can adjust their evaluative proces­
ses accordingly. The interesting issue at hand is; How would 
such knowledge impact financial statement users' perceptions 
of the auditor's ability to retain his professional impartial­
ity?
Summary
The preceding literature review has focused upon three 
distinct but closely related issues surrounding the auditor 
independence phenomenon. It was concluded that the majority 
of past research in this area has addressed the perceived di­
mension of auditor independence. One of the benefits of study­
ing perceived independence is that the researcher may indir­
ectly learn a great deal about the determinants of the de 
facto dimension of auditor independence at the same time. 
Second, several actions that have been proposed to strengthen 
the auditor's professional independence were reviewed. It 
seems obvious that there is no overall policy framework guiding
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the development of technical pronouncements in this regard 
and, as a result, the rules that are in effect are not compre­
hensive in scope nor totally coherent. Contributing to this 
situation is the lack of agreement among scholars on what ac­
tions are necessary in order to promote the independence of 
auditors and a lack of serious empirical inquiry to determine 
the views of financial statement users on many of these impor­
tant issues. The primary research objective in this area 
seemingly should be to determine user groups' views on how 
auditor independence should be 'legislated'. Not until com­
prehensive and integrative research studies are undertaken to 
gather such data will it be possible for promulgatory bodies 
to piece together a cogent theoretical framework to guide 
the development of specific technical pronouncements.
The final section of the literature review was devoted 
to analyzing auditor-client conflict and how it may affect 
the auditor's actual and apparent ability to retain an objec­
tive point of view in fulfilling his professional responsi­
bilities. A valid issue to raise at this point is why should 
auditor independence be studied in a very specific context 
prior to our obtaining a better grasp of its overall struc­
ture? First, the specific set of circumstances in which audi­
tor independence will be studied poses a serious threat to 
the viability of the external auditor's role. Research is 
needed to determine how the auditor's true as well as apparent 
objectivity and impartiality can be preserved in conflict
41
episodes with clients. Second, there already exists suffi­
cient a priori justification to analyze certain variables 
or parameters of auditor-client conflict which means that the 
research design to be employed in this regard does not have 
to be strictly of an exploratory nature.
There has been almost a total dearth of empirical re­
search with respect to the broad issue of auditor-client con­
flict. This seems surprising since two analytical articles 
concerning this topic have developed several testable pro­
positions in this regard as well as a general framework or 
paradigm explaining the sources and correlates of this pheno­
menon. The exception to this rule is the recent study by 
Monger, however, the focal point of his endeavor was not 
oriented around the relationship between conflict in the 
audit context and the ability of the auditor to retain his 
independence. Hopefully, this research project will encourage 
other researchers to address this important topic.
The preceding literature review provides a background 
against which to develop research questions and testable hypo­
theses concerning the basic issues raised in each of the two 
major research areas. In the next chapter, the specific re­
search questions and research hypotheses to be investigated 
will be delineated, and then in the following chapter, the 
methods to be used to operationalize those propositions will 
be discussed.
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
The issues surrounding auditor independence appear to 
require research on two levels. At a general level there is 
a need for research leading to the development of a theoreti­
cal framework for policy statements defining perceived auditor 
independence. The first part of this research is intended to 
satisfy that need. On a more specific level, there is a need 
for research to determine how the auditor's independence can 
be promoted or is jeopardized by particular circumstances. One 
such set of circumstances involving auditor-client conflict is 
studied in the second part of this research.
Barrett (1969) defined perceived independence as a so­
ciological construct which is formed on a collective and dy­
namic basis by financial statment users. The first part of 
this research project is intended to roughly outline the boun­
daries of that construct. The data collected in this respect 
should assist promulgatory authorities in developing policy 
statements concerning auditor independence.
The objective of the second part of the research is to 
determine how financial statement users' perceptions of auditor 
independence would vary in a particular engagement as the level
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and nature of conflict between auditor and client varies. As 
indicated in the previous chapter, auditor-client conflict 
has apparently not yet been fully incorporated into the role 
construct of perceived independence. Knowledge of the conflict 
which occurs regularly between audit firms and their clients 
would more than likely alter user groups' perceptions of audi­
tor independence. Accordingly, it seems very pertinent to ex­
perimentally investigate the causal relationship between auditor- 
client conflict and perceived independence.
Partners and User Groups : Examining Their 
Views on Independence Issues 
The first part of the research design is exploratory. 
Specific research hypotheses concerning the causes of percep­
tions about independence are not tested. Rather the purpose 
is to specify which of many variables are perceived by rele­
vant parties to significantly influence auditor independence.
A discussion of the specific objectives and associated re­
search questions used to accomplish this purpose follows im­
mediately. The description of this part of the research con­
cludes with a discussion of the rationale for the selection 
of the sixteen items to be used as the independent variable 
set.
Research Objectives and Research Questions 
One of the objectives of this part of the research is 
to examine a broad set of relevant variables on a comparative
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basis. In contrast, research efforts such as Milano (1981), 
Shockley (1981) , and Dawkins (1978) approached auditor inde­
pendence in a piecemeal fashion. Accordingly, the results of 
such studies have not provided a comprehensive view of the 
relative importance of the determinants of perceived auditor 
independence. The first part of this research study is aimed 
at avoiding this problem. The specific research question as­
sociated with this objective can be stated as follows:
1. Which structural changes in the auditor's role do 
relevant parties consider the most significant deter­
minants of perceived auditor independence?
The second objective of the first part of this research 
study is to determine which policies relevant parties in the 
financial reporting process want to see adopted. Milano noted 
the need to differentiate between actions users feel would 
strengthen the auditor's independence and those actions that 
user groups want to see adopted. That is, financial statement 
users (and presumably, other interested parties) may hold that 
a particular policy would improve the auditor's ability to act 
in a professionally autonomous manner, but might disapprove of 
adopting such a policy due to some overriding normative or af­
fective concern. The second research question addresses this 
issue:
2. Which structural changes in the auditor's role do 
relevant parties believe should be adopted?
The final objective of the first part of this research 
regards determining the degree of consensus, on the previously 
raised questions, between two important groups in the financial
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reporting process. Financial statement users are neither the 
sole nor even the most influential group involved in estab­
lishing policies concerning auditor independence (Metcalf Com­
mittee, 1976, p. 153). Rather, members of the accounting pro­
fession dominate policy-setting bodies. Consequently, a final 
objective of the first part of this research study is to de­
termine the degree of consensus on independence issues between 
representatives of one important user group, commercial lend­
ing officers, and representatives of the accounting profession, 
partners of national accounting firms. Thus, the final re­
search question is stated in the following manner ;
3. How much consensus exists between an important finan­
cial statement user group and partners of national 
accounting firms on the issues raised in the two pre­
vious research questions?
If there is a significant lack of consensus between these two
groups, further research should be conducted to determine
the causes of such differences, and to determine which views
should prevail.
Variable Selection 
Before turning to the second part of the research de­
sign, a word about the structural change variables used in the 
first part of the research is in order. The most prominent 
of these structural changes were discussed in the literature 
review. However, there are numerous other recommendations 
that have been suggested to improve the auditor's indepen­
dence. These include the right of auditors to advertise.
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public disclosure of audit fees, restrictions on client solic­
itation, and the periodic rotation of audit personnel on an 
engagement. In addition, there are many other modifications 
in the auditor's role which, while they have not been widely 
discussed in the professional literature in recent years, 
could possibly provide for the strengthening of perceived 
independence. In this category would fall such actions as 
the establishment of an arbitration board to settle disputes 
between auditors and clients on financial reporting issues, 
disclosure of proposed adjustments to client financial state­
ments by the auditing firm which were not incorporated in 
the publicly released statements, and governmental posting of 
suggested hourly audit fees. From the set of possible struc­
tural change variables, sixteen items were selected to be used 
in this part of the research and are listed in Table I. This 
group includes all of those actions addressed in the litera­
ture review as well as a number of other judgmentally selected 
items which have not been as prominently discussed in the pro­
fessional literature. (Appendix I contains a brief discussion 
of where each of the items in Table I have been addressed in 
the professional literature.)
The eventual objective of this line of research is to 
provide sufficient data to authorities to allow them to de­
velop an overall policy statement concerning auditor inde­
pendence. This policy statement could then be used as the 
cornerstone of a set of deductively formulated policy
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1. Restricting the amount of management consulting services 
provided by an auditing firm to audit clients to a maxi­
mum of 10% of the total annual audit fee.
2. Giving the SEC total responsibility for the external 
audit function. Auditors of financial statements of 
publicly-held companies would be government employees 
much like 1RS auditors.
3. Requiring that any proposed auditor adjustments not 
incorporated by the client in its financial statements 
be disclosed within the footnotes to the statements.
4. Prohibition of executive search services by auditing 
firms.
5. Selection of auditors for SEC registrants by the SEC 
with fee negotiations within guidelines established 
by the SEC.
6. Requiring auditors to report on the preferability of 
all the client's accounting policies.
7. Requiring that the nature and amount of consulting ser­
vices provided by the auditor to the client be disclosed 
within the client's financial statements.
8. Establishment of an arbitration board to settle disputes 
between auditors and clients involving financial report­
ing issues.
9. A ban on any form of advertising by auditing firms.
10. Requiring the mandatory use of audit committees composed 
of non-employee and non-management members of the client's 
board of directors.
11. Required disclosure in client financial statements of 
all major audit-client disagreements occurring in the 
eighteen months prior to an auditing firm's dismissal.
12. Prohibiting an auditing firm from accepting an engagement 
if the total revenue from the prospective client would
be greater than 10% of the auditing firm's total annual 
revenues.
13. Re-instatement of the AICPA's ethical standard prohibiting 
client solicitation.
14. Requiring that audit fee negotiations be the complete 
responsibility of the client's audit committee rather 
than the client's management.
15. Mandatory rotation of all audit engagement personnel 
every three years.
16. Annual publication by the SEC of suggested audit fees 
per hour by staff level, e.g., staff, senior, manager, 
etc.
TABLE I
The sixteen variables employed in the first section of 
the empirical research design.
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pronouncements concerning all of the specific issues raised 
in the preceding literature review.
Conflict and Independence; Delineating 
the Critical Issues
While the purpose of the initial part of this research 
design is exploratory, this latter part is designed to deter­
mine the veracity of explicit research hypotheses. This is 
possible because previous researchers have developed a ten­
tative, but testable, theoretical framework to explain the 
sources and outcomes of auditor-client conflict.
The second part of the research design also differs 
from the initial part with respect to scope. In the first 
part of this research a very broad scope was demanded by 
the exploratory nature of the research objectives and the 
pervasiveness of the issues studied. In this latter part 
of the research the scope is quite limited since only one 
facet of the independence construct is addressed, i.e., the 
relationship between perceived independence and auditor-client 
conflict.
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the 
overriding objective of this segment of the research design is 
to determine how perceptions of auditor independence can be 
promoted (or is jeopardized) in especially critical sets of cir­
cumstances. There are a number of different contexts within 
the audit environment which could have been selected for this 
purpose. The rationale for selecting auditor-client conflict
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as a focus of the second part of this study was twofold.
Firut, aside from the formal requirement of SEC Accounting 
Series Release #247 which covers only the most radical con­
flicts (i.e., severance of relationship), user groups have no 
way of obtaining knowledge of the level or nature of conflict 
in an audit engagement. Second, conflict has been suggested 
to be an important determinant of perceived independence 
(Goldman and Bariev). If users' perceptions of independence 
do vary with the degree of conflict in the audit context, then 
policy makers should be advised. Authorities could use these 
findings to call for more complete disclosure of conflict 
as well as for further research to determine which structural 
changes in the audit engagement should be made to reduce the 
frequency and severity of conflict.
The primary motivation for the seminal study of audi­
tor-client conflict by Goldman and Bariev (1974) was to deter­
mine the effect of auditor-client conflict on the capacity and 
willingness of the auditor to retain his de facto independence. 
That particular analysis, as well as the related subsequent 
work by Nichols and Price (1976), has a great deal of rele­
vance for the research issues addressed in this study. The 
major difference between this empirical study and the two 
previous analytical articles is that the research focus in 
this case is upon the perceived (rather than ^  facto) indepen­
dence of the external auditor from the perspective of the finan­
cial statement user. In this section of the project, the primary
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research objective is to investigate auditor-client conflict 
in order to more precisely specify how this phenomenon interacts 
with certain contextual variables of the audit engagement in de­
termining the perceived independence of auditing firms. Specifi­
cally, the research question in this part of the study can be ex­
pressed as follows; How does knowledge by financial statement 
users of auditor-client conflict interact with their knowledge of 
the specific structural characteristics of a given audit context 
in determining their perceptions of auditor independence?
Given the analysis of the independence literature in 
the previous chapter, four of these structural characteristics 
were selected for study in the context of auditor-client con­
flict. These four independent variables along with the dis­
crete levels of each used in this research include:
1. The degree of competition for auditing services in 
the immediate auditor-client environment.
a. immediate environment is characterized by a number 
of large firms that are aggressively pursuing 
practice development programs
b. other audit firms in the immediate environment are 
not perceived to be aggressive competitors
2. Whether or not the audit firm provides a significant 
amount of management advisory services to the client.
a. the audit firm will provide consulting services _
in the current year equal to 40% of the audit fee
b. the audit firm will provide no consulting services
to the client during the current year
Q
For a random sample of 100 SEC registrants used in the 
Reckers and Stagliano study, the mean percentage of the annual 
audit fee paid to audit firms for MAS rendered was 38%.
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3. The current financial condition of the client.
a. the client's overall financial condition is quite 
good, all of their solvency and profitability 
ratios compare favorably with industry averages 
and net income has shown a modest but steady 
growth pattern over the last few years
b. the client's overall financial condition is poor, 
the last few years have brought considerable de­
terioration in their solvency and profitability 
ratios and net income has shown a modest but 
steady decline over the last five years
4. The nature of the conflict issue.
a. the issue in dispute between the audit firm and
client is the materiality of unrecorded liabili­
ties discovered during the performance of year- 
end audit procedures (Note: Technical standards 
do not explicitly define materiality.)
b. the issue in dispute between the audit firm and
client is the need to disclose a significant
event occurring after the balance sheet date but 
prior to the release of the financial statements 
(Note: Technical standards specifically define 
the treatment of subsequent events.)
The above variables were selected for two closely related 
reasons : 1) The researcher's presumption that they have a
high degree of relevance in influencing third parties' per­
ceptions of auditor independence; and 2) the significant im­
pact they may have in influencing how conflict episodes are 
eventually resolved.
Derivation of Research 
Hypotheses #1 and #2 
As noted in the literature review, the Metcalf Committee 
and the Cohen Commission disagreed on whether a high level of 
competition is good or bad for the auditing profession. In 
fact, those two prominent bodies could not agree on the actual
52
level of competition existing in audit markets. By incorpor­
ating both levels of this variable in the research, it should 
be possible to determine user groups' views on this issue. 
These views, since they are those of the primary benefactors 
of the financial reporting process, may be more consequential 
in the long-run than the opinions of either the Metcalf Com­
mittee or the Cohen Commission. The literature review also 
revealed that there has been substantial disagreement concern­
ing the impact on the auditor's perceived independence of 
providing MAS to the client. Hopefully, the results of this 
study contribute to clarifying the confusion which currently 
exists with respect to this variable's relationship to per­
ceived independence. Following are the two research hypo­
theses which were developed to address these initial vari­
ables.
H, : Financial statement users will perceive that con­
flict episodes are more likely to be resolved in 
favor of the client's position when the environ­
ment in which the audit firm is operating is 
characterized by a high rather than a low level 
of competition.
Eji Financial statement users will perceive that con­
flict episodes are more likely to be resolved in 
favor of the client's position when the audit firm 
provides management advisory services to the client 
as opposed to providing no such services.
Derivation of Research 
Hypothesis #3 ,
The financial condition of the client is a variable 
which could influence perceived as well as de facto- auditor
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independence in either direction. In the preceding chapter, 
arguments supporting both positions were outlined. For in­
stance, with respect to a client in poor financial condition, 
the audit firm may intentionally or unintentionally try to 
help avoid its collapse. On the other hand, in such a situa­
tion, the audit firm may be especially careful that an objec­
tive assessment of the client's position is made so that 
the audit firm's risk of legal liability is reduced. In­
tuitively, the most defensible position seems to be that users 
will perceive that auditors are more likely to capitulate to 
demands of clients in good rather than poor financial condi­
tion. Regardless, this variable is such a pervasive factor 
in the audit context that empirically determining both the 
magnitude and direction of its influence would be a signifi­
cant contribution to the body of knowledge involving auditor 
independence. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is posi­
ted.
H,: Financial statement users will perceive that con­
flict episodes are more likely to be resolved in 
favor of the client's position when the client 
is in a healthy as opposed to a poor financial 
condition.
Derivation of Research 
Hypothesis #4 
Finally, Monger's primary conclusion was that tech­
nical standards should be codified in such a way as to reduce 
the degree of subjectivity required to interpret them. He 
argued that this move would diminish the frequency with which
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conflict is perceived by auditors and their clients. His 
study directly focused on the important routinism issue raised 
by Goldman and Bariev as well as by Nichols and Price. The 
fourth and final variable of this study also focused on that 
issue. This independent variable relates to the degree of 
subjectivity required to interpret the point of contention in 
the conflict episode.
H .: Financial statement users will perceive that con­
flict episodes are more likely to be resolved in 
favor of the client's position when the issue at 
the center of the dispute is not precisely treated 
by technical standards as opposed to the situation 
where the central issue is dealt with very specifi­
cally in the technical standards.
Summary
In this chapter, the basic research questions and hypo­
theses emanating from the literature review have been pre­
sented for each of the two major research areas. ‘ The follow­
ing chapter describes in detail the research method used in 
operationalizing these directives.
CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH METHOD
Review of Viable Research Strategies 
For Auditor Independence 
Research problems can be studied either empirically or 
non-empirically. Although there does not appear to be total 
agreement on exactly what the term "empirical" implies in a 
research context, most researchers would probably agree that 
an empirical study involves the collection of some type of 
data or evidence to resolve research questions or test re­
search hypotheses. A non-empirical approach would involve 
the application of logical reasoning to some identified re­
search issue or problem without an attempt to collect data 
to support or refute the researcher's presumptions. Both 
empirical and non-empirical approaches have been used to 
study auditor independence.
Attitudinal survey questionnaire techniques appear to 
have been employed more widely than any other empirical method 
in this context. The researchers who have used such an ap­
proach have typically addressed auditor independence in a 
piecemeal fashion, one issue at a time. A good example of 
this approach can be found in the studies of the relationship
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between the provision of MAS and auditor independence by 
Titard (1971) and Hartley and Ross (1972). Attitude surveys 
can provide important information concerning a research issue 
that has not received much in-depth study. Data collected 
via this technique can be used to help clarify and redefine 
the research problem and/or issues and to identify fruitful 
avenues of future research. For instance, the study by Hart­
ley and Ross was one of the first to report a lack of consen­
sus between financial statement users and CPAs concerning 
whether the provision of MAS threatens an audit firm's inde­
pendence. Later researchers, e.g., Milano (1979) and Firth 
(1980), pursued that issue but employed more precise research 
designs in doing so, and thus, provided more conclusive and 
defensible empirical data in that regard.
More rigorous types of research techniques, full-fac­
torial ANOVA (analysis-of-variance) or MANOVA (multivari- 
ate-analysis-of-variance) designs, have been employed recently 
in the study of auditor independence. In studies where ANOVA 
or MANOVA is used, the researcher usually has some strong a 
priori justification for examining the relationship between 
two or more predictor variables and one or more dependent or 
criterion variables. Libby (1981, p. 32) concisely reviewed 
the ANOVA model and how it has been applied in accounting re­
search. Kerlinger, in a detailed discussion of the opera­
tional aspects of ANOVA and the wide-ranging ways in which 
it can be employed, had the following to say concerning the
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benefits provided by this technique.
[.ANOVA ] frees us from working with only one independent 
variable at a time and gives us a powerful lever for 
solving measurement problems. It increases our possi­
bilities of making our experiments exact and precise.
The analysis of variance also permits us to test hypo­
theses that cannot be tested in any other way, at least 
with precision. (p. 238)
Shockley used an ANOVA design in his study of variables im­
pacting the perceived independence of auditors as did Schultz 
and Gustavson in their study of the variables affecting ac­
tuaries ' perceptions of the legal risk of auditors, a topic 
closely related to auditor independence.
Typically, analytical or non-empirical studies are 
used to develop or refine testable models of some research 
issue or problem. After such models have been established, 
they can then be subjected to empirical verification. With 
regard to non-empirical or analytical studies of auditor in­
dependence, Nichols and Price (1976) as well as Goldman and 
Bariev (1974) used this approach in their studies of auditor- 
client conflict. These researchers addressed the phenomenon 
of auditor independence from a social-psychological stand­
point by analyzing the power-dependence relationships in the 
audit dyad. DeAngelo (1980) analyzed the economic nature of 
the auditor-client relationship and its implications for au­
ditor independence by employing agency theory.
In this study, a two-part empirical research strategy 
was employed. The objectives of the individual segments of 
the research design varied markedly with respect to the depth
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with which individual issues were investigated. Correspond­
ingly, there was a wide variance in the degree of rigor of 
the specific research techniques that were employed. For in­
stance, the analytical work concerning auditor-client conflict 
laid a fairly solid framework upon which to define and empir­
ically test explicit research hypotheses. In the case of the 
first research area, the degree of rigor of the research tech­
nique was somewhat less. Explicit research hypotheses were 
not examined because, even though there did exist consider­
able a priori justification for selecting the variables used 
in that part of the study, there is not yet available a theory 
of independence which integrates those variables into a com­
prehensive testable framework.
The remainder of this section outlines in detail the 
various procedures used in each part of the research design. 
Hopefully, this discussion provides additional insight con­
cerning why the specific research techniques were selected.
Research Technique No. 1 
Description of Research Tasks 
Table I in Chapter III lists the sixteen independent 
variables employed in this part of the research. These six­
teen items were presented to subjects drawn from two differ­
ent populations: financial statement users and partners of 
national public accounting firms. Each subject sample was 
asked to rate the items in Table I twice using five-point
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scales with descriptive anchors. In the first ranking, the 
subjects were instructed to rate the sixteen items on the ba­
sis of the degree to which each would contribute toward safe­
guarding the independence of auditors. Using this criterion, 
the subjects were asked to place each of the items in one of 
the following classes.
5 - Actions contributing a very high degree of assurance 
that auditors' independence will be safeguarded.
4 - Actions contributing a high degree of assurance that 
auditors' independence will be safeguarded.
3 - Actions contributing a modest degree of assurance 
that auditors' independence will be safeguarded.
2 - Actions contributing a very modest degree of assur­
ance that auditors' independence will be safeguarded.
1 - Actions contributing no assurance that auditors' in­
dependence will be safeguarded.
In the second rating task, the subjects were asked to 
apply a strictly affective or normative criterion to the items 
in Table I. Each subject was asked to evaluate, based upon 
his/her personal judgment, whether each item should be adopted 
or retained. The following five-point scale was provided to 
the subjects for this purpose.
5 - 1  feel very strongly that this particular action 
should be adopted or retained.
4 - 1  feel that this particular action should be adopted 
or retained.
3 - I am neutral with respect to whether or not this
particular action should be adopted or retained.
2 - 1  feel that this particular action should not be 
adopted or retained.
1 - I feel very strongly that this particular action 
should not be adopted or retained.
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As Milano has noted, relevant parties may feel that 
certain actions would strengthen auditor independence but 
would not support their adoption for some affective reason.
For example, Milne and Weber have argued against further 
governmental intervention in the auditing profession. Ac­
cordingly, subjects sharing those researchers' views might 
conceivably rate an item calling for more SEC involvement in 
the audit process as a measure significantly strengthening 
auditor independence, but then in the second rating, place 
a low priority on whether the profession should move to adopt 
the particular action. An analysis of subjects' responses to 
the two evaluative criteria should disclose whether such a 
result occurred with respect to any of the items in this 
study.
Rationale for Choice of 
Scales Employed 
From this point on, for clarity purposes, the initial 
scale depicted above is referred to as the positive scale 
while the second is referred to as the normative scale. The 
meaning of the two terms "positive" and "normative" is defined 
by analogy. In the study of economics, one can differentiate 
between "positive" economics and "normative" economics. In 
the former case, researchers attempt to answer such questions 
as "What is the marginal productivity of an hour of skilled 
labor?" or "What is the price elasticity coefficient for crude 
oil?" In normative economics, scholars address such issues
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as "Should we have a negative income tax?" or "Should rent 
controls be abolished in inter-urban housing projects?" In 
using a "positive" approach to a research issue the objective 
is to define reality whereas in a normative endeavor the 
motivating research interest is to determine how reality 
should be changed to provide for an optimal or at least an 
improved state of affairs. Accordingly, in the normative- 
scale rating task, the objective is not to find out how audi­
tor independence can be maximized, but, rather, to determine 
what actions should be adopted to provide for an optimal level 
of auditor independence from the standpoint of financial state­
ment users.
The two scales used in this part of the study were se­
lected from a large number of available scales. It seems only 
reasonable to justify why these two Likert-scales were se­
lected as well as to explain why they were structured in the 
given manner. The normative scale is a bi-polar scale with 
a definite midpoint while the positive scale is not bi-polar 
but rather uni-directional. In the first rating task, the 
subjects were instructed to employ the provided scale to re­
cord their perceptions of the effectiveness of each item with 
respect to promoting auditor independence. Since each item in 
the variable set was developed with that objective in mind, it 
was not necessary to supply subjects with a bi-polar scale 
(that is, with a scale including narrative anchors indicating 
the possibility of the actions promoting as well as detracting
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from auditors' independence). In the second rating task, 
the subjects were instructed to employ the provided scale to 
indicate whether or not they supported each action's adoption. 
Thus, a bi-polar scale was needed since it was expected that 
there would be considerable support for some actions while 
there would be considerable antagonism for others.
Each of the scales employed in the two rating tasks 
are Likert-type scales. Kerlinger (p. 496-499) discussed the 
relative merits and weaknesses of this broad category of 
scales as well as those of several other scaling methods and 
concluded that, overall, the Likert-scale " . . .  seems to be 
the most useful in behavioral research" (p. 499). Likert- 
scales have been used widely by behavioral researchers in 
accounting, e.g., Shockley, Libby (1979), and Ashton.
Finally, there were several other available approaches 
which could have been used in evaluating the actions included 
in the variable set of the initial research technique. Two 
of the most obvious alternatives would have been a Q-sort or 
a paired-comparisons procedure. Each of these alternatives 
have definite merits but they are both quite time-consuming 
and can be difficult to operationalize. These disadvantages 
are magnified in a self-administered survey study such as 
this initial research technique.
Other Operational Features of the First 
Research Technique 
Choice of Subject Classes. Firth (1980) noted that
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perceptions of auditor independence may vary widely among
relevant parties in the financial reporting process. His
empirical study found that financial statement users were
much more skeptical of auditor's independence than were CPAs.
Thus, those with the most to lose from the implementation 
of restrictions, accountants in practice, thought that 
auditors could maintain independence in many situations 
where others thought independence would be impaired.
(p. 462)
In order to analyze the possible differential effect of these 
sixteen variables on the perceptions of practicing auditors 
and financial statement users, the experimental application 
was administered to two classes of subjects. The first group 
consisted of partners of ten national public accounting firms 
(see Appendix II) while the second group consisted of senior 
loan officers of commercial banks.
As mentioned in Chapter II, Reckers and Stagliano 
raised the issue of whether relatively sophisticated finan­
cial statement users or more naive users should be used in 
establishing standards against which to measure auditors' 
perceived independence. In a closely related vein, the True- 
blood Commission in the AICPA publication Objectives of Finan­
cial Statements implied that financial statement information 
should be understandable by even naive investors (p. 17) ; how­
ever, the more recent Statement of Financial Accounting Con­
cepts No. 1 of the Financial Accounting Standards Board con­
cluded that such information should be addressed to rela­
tively sophisticated financial statements users (para. 34).
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Accordingly, if one wants to follow the precedent established 
by the FASB, Reckers and Stagliano's decision to use rela­
tively sophisticated financial statement users in their study 
of auditor independence was appropriate. The FASB defined re­
latively sophisticated financial statement users as "having 
a reasonable understanding of business and economic activi- 
ites". The surrogate class chosen in this study to represent 
the universe of relatively sophisticated financial statement 
users was senior loan officers of commercial banks.
Choice of Sample Size. In many, if not most cases, 
researchers faced with choosing a sample size simply follow 
the precedents established in previous studies. In the 1981 
study by Shockley, which used a research design very similar 
to the second part of this study, approximately seventy sub­
jects were chosen from each relevant universe. Due to the 
closely related objectives of the second half of this research 
design with those of the Shockley study, a sample of approxi­
mately seventy subjects was determined to be the most appro­
priate sample size for that research technique. For purposes 
of parsimony, the same sample size was used for each of the 
two subject classes involved in the first portion of this 
research.
Selection of Subjects. The subject samples for this 
study were drawn from the Oklahoma subsets of the universal 
populations for two reasons. The first reason being the 
high cost of obtaining a truly representative sample of the
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two universes, and the second reason being that using Okla­
homa subjects might increase the likelihood of having a fa­
vorable response rate (i.e., out-of-state subjects might be 
less willing to respond to a University of Oklahoma study than 
subjects who are state residents). Of course, in return for 
the benefits provided by using such an approach, some degree 
of the generalizability of the research results was forfeited.
In the December 1981 roster of the Oklahoma State Board 
of Public Accountancy, there are 141 individuals listed as 
being partners in the ten national accounting firms operating 
in Oklahoma. Using random number tables, seventy-one of these 
individuals were selected as subjects for the two rating tasks 
included in the first research technique. An equal number of 
loan officer subjects were selected for participation in the 
first research technique and an additional seventy loan of­
ficers were selected to serve as the subject sample of the 
second research technique. The sampling frame employed in 
this latter case was the 1981 directory of the Oklahoma Bank­
ing Association which lists four hundred and fifty-one banks. 
Obviously, the smaller the bank the less experience its loan 
officers are likely to have in dealing with matters involving 
complicated financial reporting and/or accounting issues. 
Therefore, in order to provide for a higher overall level of 
expertise in the loan officer subject sample, the sampling 
frame was limited to those banks with total assets exceeding 
twenty million dollars. Two hundred and fifty-six banks
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surpassed that limit.
Instrumentation and Mailing Procedures. Appendix III 
contains a copy of the research instrument used in this first 
research technique. Also included in that appendix is a copy 
of the original cover letter and the second request letters. 
The second requests were mailed approximately three weeks 
after the initial mailing. As was the case in the instrument 
employed in the second half of the research design, a few 
supplemental biographical questions were asked of the sub­
jects. In order to ensure that the subjects would employ the 
second rating scale in the second rating task (rather than 
simply copying their responses to the first task), the six­
teen items were presented in a different randomized order.
The order of the items in the first rating task was also ran­
domly determined.
Statistical Measures Employed. Finally, to statisti­
cally determine the degree of consensus between the two sam-
2
pies on each rating criterion. Hotelling's T statistic was 
used. This statistic analyzed the location of the two vectors 
of mean values for the two subject classes and determined if 
there was an overall significant difference between them. In 
all cases where such a difference was found, multiple t-tests 
were performed in order to determine which of the sixteen 
items the two subject groups did not agree upon. The Hotel- 
ling's T test is important because when a variable set is 
quite large, such as is the case in the initial research
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technique, a few random significant differences would be ex-
2
pected. If Hotelling's T is significant, then one can be 
assured that differences disclosed in the multiple t-tests are 
not simply random differences. (For a discussion of Hotel­
ling's test see Afifi and Azen, 1979, p. 285-288.) All of 
this analysis was done via the BMDP statistical package de­
veloped by the University of California, Los Angeles. The 
specific program employed was BMDPBD.
Research Technique No. 2 
Description of Research Task 
One of the problematic aspects of studying an issue 
involving behavioral conflict is the difficulty of operation­
alizing such a phenomenon in an experimental context. One 
obvious option would be to study conflict disputes on a case- 
by-case basis in the field as they occur. However, several 
inherent features of conflict, e.g., spontaneity and volatil­
ity, preclude this alternative as a feasible approach. Shock­
ley's study of perceived independence provided a research meth­
od which could be readily adapted to the needs of this study.
He employed hypothetical scenarios, which were simply combina­
tions of treatment levels of four independent variables, to 
determine how certain parameters of the audit context influence 
financial statement users' perceptions of auditor independence. 
For illustrative purposes, one of his scenarios is reproduced 
below.
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Scenario 1;
Level of competition................... High
Size of audit f i r m ..................... Large
Auditors' tenure (years) ............... More than five
Are MAS r e n d e r e d ? ..................... No
Very Very
Low High
Risk 1______ 2 3______ 4______ 5______ 6______ 7 Risk
He simply instructed his subjects to indicate on the seven-
point scale the level of risk they perceived of the auditor's
independence being impaired given the information provided for
each scenario.
Unlike Shockley's work, this research addressed a spe­
cific context or situation rather than a general, unspecified 
context. To determine how users' perceptions of auditor inde­
pendence are affected in auditor-client conflict episodes, 
several parameters of such episodes were varied systematically 
in hypothetical scenarios. The subjects of this study were 
also provided with a concise, narrative explanation of each 
hypothetical context. These two modifications in Shockley's 
design should provide for a higher level of mundane realism 
and, as a result, enhance the validity of the data gathered.
A copy of the research instrument used in this part of 
the research is included in Appendix IV. Also found in that 
appendix are copies of the cover letters for the instruments 
as well as a copy of the second request cover letter. The 
second requests were mailed approximately three weeks after 
the initial mailing.
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Controlling the Ordering Effect 
Actually, two versions of the instrument shown in Ap­
pendix IV were used in the second research technique. In 
order to determine if the subjects' responses were partial­
ly the result of the ordering of the variables within the 
hypothetical scenarios, two different instruments were pre­
pared. One-half of the subject sample received one version 
while the other one-half received the second version. In 
both instances, the ordering of the cases was determined ran­
domly as was the ordering of the variables within each case.
In addition, the second version of the research instrument 
intentionally began with the conflict episode involving the 
disclosure controversy whereas the first version began with 
the scenario involving the materiality controversy. In ana­
lyzing the subjects' responses, a nominal two-class (dummy) 
variable representing the two different orderings of items 
within the instruments was used. If this variable had proved 
to be statistically significant, then an ordering effect would 
have been inferred. To totally eliminate an ordering effect, 
it would have been necessary to randomly order all items in 
every instrument mailed to the subjects. Given the length 
of the instrument, such an undertaking would have been ex­
tremely burdensome.
Definition of the Dependent Variable 
The operational definition of the dependent variable 
was the subjects' perceived likelihood of the conflict issue
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being resolved in favor of the client. In the case of the 
controversy involving the unrecorded liabilities, the hypo­
thetical client favored not incorporating the adjustment for 
those items in the financial statements. In the second con­
flict episode, the client did not want a substantial loss on 
an account receivable to be disclosed in the footnotes of 
their annual statements.
Of course, the conflict episodes could be resolved in 
favor of the client without any negative reflection on the 
integrity of the auditing firm if the appropriate disclosures 
were made in the auditor's report. To preclude subjects from 
considering this possibility and thus confusing the purpose 
of the task, the scenarios specifically asked the subjects 
to record their perceived likelihood that the disputes would 
be resolved in favor of the client's position without any 
mention of the conflict issue being made in the auditor's re­
port. A seven-point Likert scale, very similar to that em­
ployed by Shockley, was used by subjects to record re­
sponses.
Other Operational Features of the 
Second Research Technique 
In the previous discussion of the first research tech­
nique, the rationale for using loan officers as the subject 
class to represent financial statement users was outlined.
For the same reasons, loan officers were used in this part of 
the research. Additionally, the sample selection procedures
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and sample size decision variables for both halves of the re­
search design were outlined within the discussion of the first 
research technique.
Evaluation of the ANOVA Results
The results of this task were evaluated by employing
the Statistical Analysis System's (SAS) general linear model 
(GLM) procedures. The GLM procedures provide the necessary
statistics to evaluate the data generated by this full-fac­
torial ANOVA design. First of all, the GLM procedures report 
2
the R or coefficient of determination for the overall ANOVA 
model. This statistic is simply the percentage of variation 
in the dependent variable explained by the independent vari­
ables and interaction effects specified in the ANOVA model.
For each of the independent variables and interaction effects, 
the GLM procedures also report the F statistic, the signifi­
cance level of that statistic, and the degrees of freedom.
The marginal means by treatment level are not reported by the 
GLM procedures but that information along with some other re­
levant information which the researcher might want can be ob­
tained by using other procedures provided by SAS.
One of the advantages of employing the ANOVA model is 
that the impact of the interactions between independent vari­
ables can be isolated and the statistical significance of each 
measured. In this particular study, no a priori hypotheses 
were posited with respect to such interaction effects; how­
ever, the statistical analysis of the empirical results
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included a determination of whether any of these factors were 
statistically significant.
In Figure I, the overall research design for this study 
is summarized. That graphic shows how the research objec­
tives, questions, and hypotheses raised in the first three 
chapters relate to the research and analytical techniques 
discussed in this chapter.
Validity and Reliability Considerations 
Figure II summarizes the major threats to the validity 
and reliability of this study's findings, defines the pre­
cautionary measures which were taken in order to prevent 
the realization of these threats, and the statistical tests 
which were performed to determine whether and/or the extent 
to which the threats were realized.
In a research context, Kerlinger defined reliability 
as the "accuracy of precision of a measuring instrument" (p. 
443). Selltiz (1959) expanded somewhat on this definition.
The evaluation of the reliability of any measurement pro­
cedure consists in determining how much of the variation 
in scores among individuals is due to inconsistencies in 
measurement. When independent but comparable measures of 
the same thing are obtained, they will yield the same re­
sults to the extent that the measurements are free from 
random or variable errors. (p. 155)
Regarding validity, Kerlinger noted that this attribute of ex­
perimental research is epitomized by the question: "Are we
measuring what we think we are measuring?" (p. 457). A now 
classic discussion of experimental validity is found in Camp­
bell and Stanley (1963) in which validity vas dichotomized
FIGURE I 
Summary of research design
Research
Objectives
Research
Technique
#1
To assist promulga- 
tory authorities in 
developing a compre­
hensive and integra­
tive policy state­
ment concerning 
auditor independence.
Research Questions 
or Hypotheses
1. Which of the 
structural changes 
in the auditor's 
role, which have 
either been imple­
mented or proposed, 
are the most impor­
tant determinants of 
perceived auditor 
independence ?
2. Which of these 
proposed or imple­
mented changes 
would financial 
statement user 
groups like to see 
adopted?
3. How well do fi­
nancial statement 
user groups and 
partners of national 
accounting firms 
agree on the above 
two issues?
Research
Techniques
A survey research 
instrument was de­
veloped and admini­
stered to two sam­
ples of subjects; 
loan officers, used 
as surrogates for 
the universe of fi­
nancial statement 
users, and partners 
of 'Big 8' accoun­
ting firms. Each 
subject was asked to 
twice rate a set of 
sixteen policy ac­
tions related to 
promoting auditor 
independence. The 
first rating task 
required the sub­
jects to evaluate 
the perceived abil­
ity of each action 
to promote the in­
dependence of audi­
tors . The second 
rating task re­
quired subjects to 
express their own 
personal opinion of 
whether or not each 
action should be 
adopted or retained.
Analytical
Techniques
Statistical
Measures
For purposes of the 
first and second re­
search questions, 
the mean ratings of 
the actions by the 
loan officers were 
computed. Addition­
ally, the ordinal 
rankings of the ac­
tions' mean ratings 
by loan officers 
were determined. To 
satisfy the final 
research question 
the mean ratings of 
the loan officers 
were compared to 
those of the part­
ner subjects as well 
as to those of the 
subset of partners 
involved in the 
audit practices of 
their firms.
Hotelling's T^ was 
employed to deter­
mine if there was a 
statistically signi­
ficant difference be­
tween the vectors of 
loan officers and 
partners' mean ra­
tings of the sixteen 
actions as well as 
the pairing of vec­
tors for loan officers 
and audit partners. 
When significant 
differences were 
found, multiple t- 
tests were performed 
to determine on 
which specific 
actions each pairing 
of subject groups had 
significant differ-
w
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Research
Objectives
Research
Technique
#2
To determine the im­
pact of auditor- 
client conflict on 
user groups' percep­
tions of auditor 
independence as well 
as to determine how 
such an impact is 
mitigated or exacer­
bated by important 
contextual variables 
in the audit context.
Research Questions 
or Hypotheses____
Finemcial statement 
users will perceive 
that conflict epi­
sodes are more likely 
to be resolved In 
favor of the client's 
position when —
H,: the environment
in which the audit 
firm is operating is 
characterized by a 
high rather than a 
low level of compe­
tition ;
Hj: the audit firm
provides management 
advisory services to 
the client as oppo­
sed to providing no 
such services;
H,s the client is 
in a healthy as oppo­
sed to a poor finan­
cial condition;
Research
Techniques
A full-factorial 
ANOVA design was em­
ployed. The research 
instrument contained 
two hypothetical 
auditor-client con­
flict scenarios.
Each scenario was 
followed by eight in­
dependent cases in 
which specific facets 
of the audit context 
were varied, e.g., 
amount of MAS pro­
vided by the audit 
firm. Loan officer 
subjects used a 
Likert-scale to re­
cord their percep­
tions of the like­
lihood of the audit 
firm's independence 
being impaired in 
each case.
Analytical
Techniques
Statistical
Measures
H .; the issue at the 
center of the dispute 
is not precisely 
treated by the techni­
cal standards as oppo­
sed to the situation 
where the central is­
sue is dealt with very 
specifically in the 
technical standards.
The Statistical 
Analysis System's 
general linear model 
procedures were em­
ployed to determine 
the statistical sig­
nificance of each 
main effect and in­
teraction specified 
in the ANOVA model. 
Additionally, ANOVA 
models were con­
structed for each 
subject in order to 
evaluate the degree 
of judgment consensus 
among the subjects.
F-statistics were com­
puted to determine the 
statistical signifi­
cance of the main 
effects and inter­
actions in the composite 
model as well as in the 
individual ANQva 
models. The r2 or co­
efficient of determina­
tion was also calculated 
for the composite and 
individual models.
FIGURE II
Summary of the threats to the validity and reliability of the research 
results and the preventive and detective measures taken in this regard.
Internal Validity; 
Both Research 
Techniques
Threats to Validity 
and Reliability of 
Research Results_____
Lack of uniformity in ad­
ministration of research 
instruments.
Existence of a social 
desirability bias influ­
encing subjects' respon­
ses.
Precautionary
Measures
A single researcher was 
responsible for all con­
tact with subjects.
The research instruments 
were worded in as neutral 
and objective a manner as 
possible.
Statistical Tests 
Performed
None
None
Ln
Lack of comprehension by 
subjects concerning how 
to complete the research 
instruments.
The research instruments 
were pre-tested on sub­
jects from each relevant 
population.
None
External Validity; 
Both Research 
Techniques
Response bias resulting 
from the self-selection 
process which occurs in 
a survey study.
Subjects were randomly 
selected.
Subjects who responded to 
the second requests for par­
ticipation were used as sur­
rogates for the non-respon­
dents. An equal number of 
the earliest respondents to 
the first requests were then 
selected. Multiple t-tests 
were used to determine if 
there existed significant 
differences between the 
paired groups' responses.
Subject samples being 
unrepresentative of rele­
vant populations.
Subjects were randomly 
selected.
None
FIGURE II, Cont'd
External Validity: 
Research 
Technique #2
Reliability: Both
Research Techniques
Threats to Validity 
and Reliability of 
 Research Results
Lack of mundane realism 
in research instrument.
Lack of subject conscien­
tiousness in completing 
research instruments.
Precautionary
Measures
Hypothetical scenarios 
were designed to be as 
realistic representations 
of actual auditor-client 
conflict episodes as 
possible.
Research instruments were 
made as concise as pos­
sible .
Statistical Tests 
Performed
None
Two small sub-samples of sub­
jects who participated in the 
research tasks were re-admini- 
stered the research instru­
ments. The correlations be­
tween these subjects' paired 
responses, both individually 
and as groups, were computed 
and compared to benchmarks 
established by previous 
studies.
-J
0\
Reliability: 
Research 
Technique #2
Lack of judgment consen­
sus among subjects in 
evaluating the importance 
of the independent vari­
ables included in the 
hypothetical scenarios.
None The R , when considering only 
the significant main effects 
and interactions in the com­
posite model, was found for 
each subject. Then, the mean 
and distribution of this sta­
tistic was determined for the 
subject sample. These measures 
of consensus were them compared 
to the benchmarks established 
by the Shockley (1981) study.
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as follows.
Internal validity is the basic minimum without which any 
experiment is uninterpretable: Did in fact the experi­
mental treatments make a difference in this specific 
experimental instance. External validity asks the ques­
tion of generalizability; To what populations, settings, 
treatment variables, and measurement variables can this 
effect be generalized. (p. 15)
Threats to the Reliability of the 
' Research Results
The most obvious threat to the reliability of the re­
sults of the first research technique is the possibility that 
subjects performed the rating tasks in less than a conscien­
tious manner. To assess the likelihood of lack of subject 
conscientiousness in performing the experimental rating tasks, 
a small sub-sample of the original subjects was selected and 
asked to repeat the tasks at a subsequent date. If the cor­
relation between these respondents' two rank orderings of the 
sixteen items is relatively high, then the original responses 
to the tasks were most likely made in a thoughtful and re­
sponsible manner.
With regard to the ANOVA design, the two dimensions of 
reliability that past researchers have been most concerned 
with in such an experimental application are interrater re­
liability and test-retest reliability. Essentially, inter­
rater reliability is an index of the degree of consensus among 
subjects within each subject group. One would hope that the 
degree of consensus would be rather high since the subject 
groups are composed of individuals with fairly similar
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backgrounds. A low degree of interrater reliability leads 
one to question whether subjects tended to interpret the scen­
arios in a consistent manner.
There exist several different methods available to as­
sess this characteristic and some past researchers have used 
more than one approach. Ashton (1974) and Joyce (1976) calcu­
lated the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients be­
tween paired judgments of individual subjects and then reported 
the range of such correlations and the mean. A similar ap­
proach was used in the study of radiologists' judgments by 
Hoffman, Slovic, and Rorer (1968) except that these researchers 
used the median correlation within the subject group to assess 
the overall degree of interrater reliability. The general na­
ture of this research effort is more closely related to the 
ANOVA design utilized by Shockley than to the three studies 
referenced above. Accordingly, Shockley's approach to mea­
suring interrater reliability was used and the magnitude of 
that attribute for his study was the benchmark against which 
this study's degree of subjects' judgment consensus was eval­
uated. Shockley measured interrater reliability by summing 
2
the R statistic across all significant effects for each in­
dividual to yield an estimate of the proportion of variance 
which the model explained for each individual. Generally, 
a relatively low degree of variance explained is consistent 
with low within-group consensus.
Again, to determine the conscientiousness of subjects'
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responses to the experimental instruments in the auditor- 
client conflict research design, a small sub-sample of the 
original subject pool was selected. The instrument was re­
administered to these individuals at a subsequent date. The 
higher the correlation between the sub-sample's two sets of 
responses, the greater the degree of inferred interest and 
attention given to the experimental task by subjects.
Preventive Measures Taken to Protect the 
Internal Validity of Research Findings 
As indicated above, there are two general dimensions of 
validity that need to be considered in an experimental context. 
External validity concerns the relative degree of reality cap­
tured by the research design while internal validity relates 
to the degree to which the experimental treatments made a 
difference in subjects' responses. Three actions were taken- 
to enhance the internal validity of the subjects' responses. 
First, in each application an emphasis was placed on uniform­
ity in administration of the instruments. Reinforcing this 
strength was the fact that a single investigator was respon­
sible for all contact with the subjects. Second, the possi­
bility of a social desirability bias occurring in the subjects' 
responses was reduced substantially by wording the instruments 
in as neutral a manner as possible. Finally, since it is prac­
tically impossible to identify all threats to internal valid­
ity prior to administering a research instrument, the instru­
ments were pre-tested on large samples of subjects drawn from
80
the relevant populations. As a result of the pre-testing, 
several changes were made in the instruments.
External Validity Tests 
and Control Measures 
With respect to external validity, the first research 
task appears to be fairly strong. The sixteen items in­
cluded in that application represent a substantial number of 
all recent suggestions discussed in the professional litera­
ture to strengthen perceived independence. A more proble­
matic situation exists with regard to the external validity 
of the scenarios used in the ANOVA application. In construct­
ing the scenarios, a serious effort was made to design de­
scriptively realistic auditor-client conflict episodes. To 
the extent that the scenarios are not deemed representative 
of reality, the generalizability of the research results is 
limited. Nonetheless, the empirical data provided by this 
ANOVA study may provide a theoretical framework that can be 
used to investigate the research issues in more true-to-life 
experimental settings in the future.
In any survey study, one of the most critical challenges 
to the external validity of the results is the bias introduced 
by obtaining less than a 100% response rate from the randomly 
selected subjects. The issue is whether or not the study ten­
ded to attract a certain subset of the sample with views or 
opinions significantly different from those of the non-re­
spondents. As in the case of interrater reliability, there
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exist several alternative methods for measuring this feature 
of a study. The most obvious and effective approach would 
be to somehow determine non-respondents' views on the issues 
being studied. As Shockley indicated, this is typically im­
possible. These individuals have already refused to respond 
to the initial and second requests to participate in the study 
so it is very unlikely they would answer a third request. 
Frequently, those subjects who responded to the second request 
(but, of course, not the first request) are used as a surro­
gate class for the set of non-respondents. Then various stat­
istical tests are performed to determine if significant dif­
ferences exist between the responses of the initial respon­
dents and those of the surrogate class of non-respondents.
If there are no such differences, the risk of response bias 
influencing the research results is probably quite small.
The specific response bias test employed in this study 
has been used in several previous studies including that of 
Shockley. In both research techniques, multiple t-tests were 
performed between the mean responses on each data item for two 
subsets of subjects. The first subset consisted of all sub­
jects responding to the second request letters while the other 
subset consisted of an equal number of the earliest respon­
dents. If the t-tests show a substantial amount of disparity 
in these groups' judgments, then the conclusion must be that 
response bias has influenced the results. Typically, such 
is not the case, otherwise the use of a survey research
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methodology would be a questionable practice.
A final aspect of the external validity issue is the 
representativeness of the subjects used in the research design. 
Again, an effort was made to choose subject classes represen­
tative of the relevant universal populations, realizing of 
course, that truly random or representative samples are not a 
feasible possibility in a research study such as this.
One remaining issue in this context is the use of a 
non-metric scale to measure the dependent variable in the au­
ditor-client conflict research design. According to Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham, and Grablowsky (1979), there are two basic 
classes of data: "non-metric (qualitative) and metric (quan­
titative)" (p. 12). Non-metric data includes such items as 
attributes or categorical variables (sex, race, etc.), while 
metric data typically reflects relative quantity, mass or 
distance. Non-metric data can be divided into two sub-classes, 
nominal and ordinal, while metric data can be divided into 
two categories as well, interval and ratio. According to some 
statisticians, including Hair, et al (p. 14), the scale of 
data required for a dependent variable in an ANOVA study is 
interval or ratio, however, ordinal data such as that to be 
collected from the subjects in the second half of the research 
design is often used. As Kerlinger noted (p. 440), this par­
ticular issue has created a long-standing controversy among 
researchers. Researchers in the hard sciences generally ar­
gue that ordinal data should not be treated as equivalent to
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interval data while researchers in the behavioral sciences 
assert that such an approach makes little difference if sub­
jects are informed that the distances between points on an 
instrument, such as the one used in this study, are assumed 
to be equal intervals. This question of robustness will most 
likely never be completely resolved but certainly the support 
of such prominent behavioral researchers as Kerlinger and 
Guilford (1954) for the practice of treating ordinal data as 
being measured on an interval scale provides a large measure 
of justification in that regard. In an accounting context, 
such an approach has been used by several researchers in­
cluding Shockley in his study of perceived auditor indepen­
dence .
yCHAPTER V 
DATA ANALYSIS
This chapter presents results derived from conducting 
the empirical investigation described in the preceding chapter. 
This chapter has three major sections. The first section con­
tains the results of the two tasks in which loan officers and 
partners of public accounting firms were asked to evaluate the 
desirability of adopting a number of actions which might 
strengthen perceptions of auditors' independence. The second 
section contains the results of the task aimed at determining 
the impact of conflict in the audit context on third parties' 
perceptions of auditors' independence. This chapter concludes 
with a discussion of certain threats to the integrity of the 
research project as well as a review of the steps taken to 
control and measure the impact of these threats.
The First Research Technique 
Response Rates 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the instrument 
used in this half of the research project was mailed to sev­
enty-one loan officers and an equal number of partners in 
national public accounting firms. The overall response rates
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for these subject classes were 63.4% (forty-five respondents) 
and 66.2% (forty-seven respondents), respectively. These re­
sponse rates are quite comparable to those obtained in other 
survey studies involving auditor independence, a few of which 
are summarized by the following:
Shockley (1981)
Partners of Big Eight firms 62.3%
Commercial loan officers 67.2
Chartered financial analysts 60.9
Firth (1981)
Bankers 74.0
Firth (1980)
Partners of Big Eight firms 53.0
Loan officers 54.0
Financial analysts 57.0
Respondent Demographics 
The average number years of experience in the banking 
profession for the loan officer respondents was 15.0 with a 
maximum of 35 years and a minimum of 4 years. With respect to 
commercial lending experience, the mean was 9.4 years with a 
maximum of 34 years and a minimum of zero (apparently, one sub­
ject had recently moved into a loan officer position without 
any prior experience in commercial lending).
Concerning the public accounting partner sample, 74.4% 
of those respondents (thirty-five individuals) worked within 
the auditing practice of their firms while the remainder 
(twelve individuals) were tax practitioners. The mean number 
of years of public accounting experience for the partners was 
18.7 with a maximum of 34 years and a minimum of nine years.
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The average number of years of non-public accounting experi­
ence was .7 with a maximum of five years and a minimum of zero 
years.
Results of Positive Criterion 
Rating Task
Table II summarizes the subjects' responses to the ini­
tial rating task in which the positive criterion rating scale 
was used. The mean ratings for each variable are reported for 
three subject groups; all partner subjects, all loan officer 
subjects, and the partner subjects working in the auditing 
practices of their firms. Included parenthetically in Table II 
are the ordinal rankings of the mean ratings of each variable 
for each of the above three subject groups. An indication is 
made in Table II of those items on which the two subject groups 
had statistically significant differences of opinion. The sta­
tistical significance of the differences was determined via
2
multiple t-tests. The overall Hotelling's T statistic which 
was computed to determine if there was a statistically signif­
icant difference between the location of the two paired vectors 
(loan officers & partners, loan officers & audit partners) of 
mean responses proved to be highly significant (p < .001) in 
each case.
The first two columns of Table II compare the loan of­
ficers' responses in the positive-scale rating task to those 
of the entire set of partner respondents; however, it seems 
that rather than comparing those two groups' responses.
TABLE II
1 .
2.
3.
4.
5.
6. 
7.
Comparison of the group means and the relative ordinal rankings of 
those means for all partner subjects, loan officers, and 
audit partners - positive evaluative criterion.
* - .01 significance level 
+ - .001 significance level
Item f Description
Perceived Effectiveness Ratings: Test of Differences
Restricting the amount of management consulting services provided by 
an auditing firm to audit clients to a maximum of 10% of the total 
annual audit fee.
Giving the SEC total responsibility for the external audit function. 
Auditors of financial statements of publicly-held companies would 
be government employees much like 1RS auditors.
Requiring that any proposed auditor adjustments not Incorporated by 
the client In Its financial statements be disclosed within the 
footnotes to the statements.
Prohibition of executive search services by auditing firms.
Selection of auditors for SEC registrants by the SEC with fee nego­
tiations within guidelines established by the SEC.
Requiring auditors to report on the preferability of all the client's 
accounting policies.
Requiring that the nature and amount of consulting services provided 
by the auditor to the client be disclosed within the client's finan­
cial statements.
Establishment of an arbitration board to settle disputes between 
auditors and clients Involving financial reporting Issues.
All
Partners
Loan
Officers
Audit
Partners
Loan Officers 
vs. All 
Partners
Loan Officers 
vs. Audit 
Partners
1.30 (14) 2.20 (12) 1.29 (15) + +
2.49 (3) 1.91 (15) 2.40 (3)
1.47 (13) 
2.06 (6)
3.58 (1) 
2.20 (12)
1.40 (12) 
2.11 (5)
+ +
1.72 (10) 2.36 (11) 1.83 (9)
1.79 (8) 2.87 (5) 1.66 (10) + +
1.49 (12) 2.60 (7) 1.40 (12) + +
1.79 (8) 2.76 (6) 1.86 (8) + +
œ
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TABLE II, Conk'd
Item # Description
Perceived Effectiveness Rstlngs: 
Group Means (Relative Ranklnesl
All
Partners
Loan
Officers
Audit
Partners
Test of Differences
______ In Group Means_______
Loan Officers Loan Officers 
vs. All vs. Audit
Partners Partners
9. A ban on any form of advertising by auditing firms.
10. Requiring the mandatory use of audit committees composed of non­
employee and non-management members of the client's board of 
directors.
11. Required disclosure In client financial statements of all major 
audltor-cllent disagreements occurring In the eighteen months 
prior to an auditing firm's dismissal.
12. Prohibiting an auditing firm from accepting an engagement If the 
total revenue from the prospective client would be greater than 
10% of the auditing firm's total revenues.
13. Re-lnstatement of the AICPA's ethical standard prohibiting client 
solicitation.
14. Requiring that audit fee negotiations be the complete responsi­
bility of the client's audit committee rather than the client's 
management.
15. Mandatory rotation of all audit engagement personnel every three 
years.
16. Annual publication by the SEC of suggested audit fees per hour by 
staff level, e.g., staff, senior, etc.
1.19 (16) 1.69 (16) 1.09 (16) * *
3.30 (1) 3.04 (4) 3.37 (1)
2.06 (6) 3.16 (3) 2.03 (7) + +
2.57 (2) 2.60 (7) 2.57 (2)
1.70 (11) 2.42 (10) 1.60 (11) +
2.47 (4) 2.51 (9) 2.31 (4)
2.28 (5) 3.33 (2) 2.09 (6) + +
1,28 (15) 1.93 (14) 1.34 (14) + *
00
00
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more enlightening results would be yielded by contrasting and 
comparing the responses of loan officers and those of partners 
involved strictly in the functional area of auditing. A pre­
sumption of this section of the study is that the partners of 
national accounting firms have a significant amount of input 
in the process culminating in policy pronouncements concerning 
auditor independence. It seems only logical to make one fur­
ther presumption; audit partners more than likely have a 
greater degree of influence in the above promulgatory process 
than would non-audit partners. Accordingly, the following 
analysis of the positive-scale data will focus primarily on 
the loan officers' and audit partners' responses. Table II 
indicates that loan officers and audit partners had highly sig­
nificant (p < .001) differences on eight of the sixteen vari­
ables while on two additional variables differences which 
would have to be considered at least moderately significant 
(p <.01) were found.
Analysis of Positive Criterion Rating 
Task Results
Cross-sample Comparisons of Subject Groups' Ratings.
In examining the ten variables in Table II on which signifi­
cant differences were found between audit partners and loan 
officers, the most obvious pattern discernible is the tendency 
of the partners to rank the items more conservatively (lower) 
than the loan officers. A possible explanation for this result
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can be found in a voluntary comment written on an instrument re­
turned uncompleted by an audit partner. The audit partner 
said this task was not very relevant since "auditor indepen­
dence cannot be legislated." Apparently, some audit partners 
may be skeptical of the ability of ethical and/or governmental 
regulations to promote the independence of individual auditors. 
An alternative position is provided by De Angelo (1980). She 
argued that the auditor is strictly an economic creature. If 
the marginal revenues of unprofessional/non-independent be­
havior exceed the marginal costs, De Angelo asserts that un­
professional behavior will occur. According to her argument, 
the only way to provide for auditor independence is to legis­
late it, i.e., impose sanctions that would make the marginal 
cost of non-independent/unprofessional behavior on the part 
of the auditor financially disastrous.
There exist at least two other alternative explana­
tions for the relatively conservative ratings given the pro­
posed actions by the audit partners. First, the partners' re­
sponses may be due primarily to a self-serving motivation. 
Naturally, the partners would like to minimize the amount of 
governmental intervention in their profession. However, the 
partners did appear to quite objectively evaluate the action 
which would place the attestation function totally under the 
purview of a governmental agency. (As shown by Table II, 
that particular action was ranked the third highest by audit 
partners in terms of strengthening auditor independence.) The
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second explanation for the partners' low ratings would simply 
be that they are so deeply involved in the auditing discipline 
that they were unable to objectively evaluate the variable set 
of this first empirical task.
In all fairness, it is also necessary to consider the 
possibility that the audit partners' perceptions are accurate, 
i.e., that adopting the actions would not strengthen the in­
dependence of auditors. Certainly, audit partners' extensive 
active experience in the auditor's role have made them well 
aware of how contextual and noncontextual variables influence 
the ability and/or desire of an auditor to retain his indepen­
dence. However, of the sixteen policy actions included in the 
rating tasks only four have actually been in force at one or 
more points in time. Accordingly, it is difficult to determine 
whether, in fact, most of the actions would be effective in 
promoting the independence of auditors. Additionally, if 
there does exist a disparity between the preferences of user 
groups and audit partners in this respect, it seems that the 
preferences of the former should prevail since they are the 
primary benefactors of the audit function.
The largest absolute difference between the two sub­
ject classes' ratings in Table II is on the item calling for 
the disclosure of auditor adjustments not incorporated by 
the client in its financial statements. Audit partners rated 
the item as contributing to the safeguarding of auditor inde­
pendence to only a minimal degree while the loan officers'
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believed the action would contribute fairly substantially to 
that end. As indicated in Appendix I, this is the only vari­
able included in the first section of the research design for 
which no direct support was found in the professional litera­
ture. This variable was used because it has direct relevance 
to the second half of the research project. One of the most 
frequent sources of conflict in the auditor-client dyad are 
disputes centering around the necessity to incorporate audi­
tor-proposed adjustments in the financial statements. Specu­
lating on why the item was rated as it was by the audit part­
ners, they may have perceived that its adoption would simply 
shift the focus of client attempts to influence auditor be­
havior. Rather than pressuring the auditing firm to ignore 
adjustments, the client might simply try to coerce the auditing 
firm not to propose an adjustment. Alternatively, the audit 
partners may have deemed this action to be relatively ineffec­
tual because they believe that all material adjustments are 
incorporated into the client's financial statements. Thus, 
this policy would simply force clients to disclose immaterial 
passed adjustments, a move which could confuse rather than 
enlighten financial statement readers.
The one policy alternative which was ranked higher by 
audit partners than loan officers in the first rating task was 
the mandatory use of audit committees composed of non-employee 
and non-management members of the client's board of directors. 
There was not a statistically significant difference between
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the two group's mean responses since the loan officers rated 
this item relatively high also. This finding confirms the re­
sults of the Milano study with respect to the use of audit 
committees. His empirical results demonstrated that both CPAs 
and financial statement users believe that using such commit­
tees in the audit engagement would strengthen auditors' inde­
pendence .
Audit committees have been used in the audit context 
for quite some time, accordingly, the audit partners' famil­
iarity with them (and, hopefully, the positive results of 
their use) may have contributed to the high rating given this 
particular item. Another contributing factor may have been 
that the New York Stock Exchange already requires their regi­
strants to use audit committees. Since a moderate percentage 
of the audit partners' clientele likely consists of NYSE firms, 
adopting this requirement would not pose any significant addi­
tional regulatory burden.
Next to the action requiring disclosure of passed ad­
justments, the following three items resulted in the largest 
absolute differences between the loan officers and audit part­
ners on the initial rating task: 1) requiring auditors to re­
port on the preferability of their clients' accounting poli­
cies, 2) the mandatory rotation of individuals assigned to 
audit engagements, and 3) requiring that the type and amount 
of auditor-provided consulting services be disclosed in finan­
cial statements.
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An In-depth Analysis of the Loan Officers' Positive 
Criterion Ratings. In analyzing the mean ratings of just the 
loan officers, it seems apparent that they believe most of the 
available policy alternatives would have at best a modest im­
pact upon the ability of an auditor to retain his professional 
independence. The two possible exceptions to that generaliza­
tion would be with respect to the disclosure of 'passed' ad­
justments and the mandatory rotation of audit engagement per­
sonnel. One possible explanation for the relatively high 
mean rating given the former item is that the loan officers 
believe such a requirement would provide an auditing firm a 
certain amount of leverage in disagreements with the client 
over the necessity of adopting auditor-proposed adjustments.
As noted above, this view is obviously not held by the audit
partner subjects.
One of the most recent empirical studies investigating 
auditor rotation was by Dawkins (1978) whose empirical data 
indicated that corporate controllers were heavily against the 
adoption of such a measure. Rather than addressing the basic 
issue of audit firm rotation, an issue which has been studied 
quite comprehensively and with relatively consistent results, 
this study examined the effect on apparent independence of ro­
tating individual auditors on each engagement. Table II shows 
that the mandatory rotation of individuals on an audit engage­
ment was evaluated very favorably by the loan officers with 
regard to promoting auditor independence. As will be seen
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shortly, these subjects also ranked this variable relatively 
high on the normative criterion. At first, these results may 
seem to contradict the findings of the Dawkins study. However, 
rather than creating confusion, these results may actually 
clarify how users feel on the related issues of firm versus 
individual auditor rotation. A factor which most likely con­
tributed to the negative evaluation given the firm rotation 
variable in the Dawkins study is the incremental cost which it 
would bring to the audit engagement, a cost which would by and 
large is the responsibility of corporate controllers, the universe 
from which her subjects were dravm. By just rotating individual 
auditors rather than the entire firm, a large percentage of the 
incremental set-up costs for a new audit engagement would be 
avoided; however, this action would still provide the positive 
benefit of introducing individuals with a fresh, and perhaps, 
more objective perspective on the engagement. Thus, one of 
the major advantages provided by rotating audit firms is 
gained but a large portion of the costs of such an action 
would be eliminated.
Table II shows all of the actions ordinally ranked ac­
cording to the mean rating given them by the loan officers.
The third most highly ranked item, disclosure of significant 
auditor-client disagreements occurring prior to an auditing 
firm's dismissal, was the central focus of a 1981 empirical 
study by Fried and Schiff. Those researchers carried out an 
ex post study of the stock market's reaction to 8-K filings
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required by the SEC when a registrant changes auditors (Note: 
Fried and Schiff's study was not concerned with the relation­
ship between this policy and auditor independence.). One of 
the requirements of this filing is that the registrant dis­
close all major disagreements with the auditing firm in the 
eighteen months prior to the dismissal. In Fried and Schiff's 
study, approximately one-fourth of their sample of firms which 
had filed such a report disclosed information concerning disa­
greements with their former auditors. Utilizing the capital 
asset pricing model, the researchers found that the 8-K dis­
closures did not significantly impact the stock prices of 
sample firms. In the current study, the loan officers ex­
pressed their view that disclosing auditor-client disagree­
ments in instances of auditor dismissal should provide at 
least a modest degree of protection for the independence of 
auditing firms. If clients know that such information will 
be disclosed, then the argument is that they should be more 
hesitant to dismiss their auditors for fear of repercussions 
by the investing public. That is, the stock of traded firms 
which do not provide a totally free investigative and reporting 
environment might be discounted by the capital markets. How­
ever, Fried and Schiff’s results do not provide even an in­
direct measure of support for this contention.
The remaining three items in the variable set which 
were rated by the loan officers as providing at least a modest 
increase in the ability of the auditor to retain his apparent
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independence were the mandatory use of audit committees, re­
quiring that auditors report on the preferability of the cli­
ent's accounting policies, and the establishment of an arbi­
tration board to settle auditor-client disputes.
Results of the Normative Criterion 
Rating Task
Tables III and IV summarize the results of the nor­
mative rating task which was carried out by the same sub­
jects as those which performed the initial rating task. (See 
page 63 for the five-point scale which the subjects used in 
this second rating procedure.) Table III reflects the mean re­
sponses by variable of the entire sample for each subject 
class. Notice, that once again a subset of the partner sample 
consisting of just the audit partners was formed for analytical 
purposes. In Table IV the five-point scale used by subjects 
was collapsed into an equal length scale centered at zero.
By doing this it is much easier to quickly isolate those ac­
tions on which the subjects had an overall positive rating 
versus those on which they had a composite negative mean re­
sponse. Tables III and IV also report parenthetically the 
relative ordinal rankings of the group means for each subject 
sample.
As in the case of the previous rating task. Hotelling's
2
T statistic was employed to determine if there was a statis­
tically significant difference between the location of the
TABLE III
Comparison of the group means and the relative ordinal rankings of 
those means for all partner subjects, loan officers, and 
audit partners — normative evaluative criterion.
* - .01 significance level 
+ - .001 significance level
Item # Description
Reported Desirability Ratings; 
Group Means (Relative Rankings)
Test of Differences 
In Group Means
1. Restricting the amount of management consulting services provided hy 
an auditing firm to audit clients to a maximum of 10% of the total 
annual audit fee.
2. Giving the SEC total responsibility for the external audit function. 
Auditors of financial statements of puhllcly-held companies would 
be government employees much like 1RS auditors.
3. Requiring that any proposed auditor adjustments not Incorporated by 
the client In its financial statements be disclosed within the 
footnotes to the statements.
4. Prohibition of executive search services by auditing firms.
5. Selection of auditors for SEC registrants by the SEC with fee nego­
tiations within guidelines established by the SEC.
6. Requiring auditors to report on the preferability of all the client's 
accounting policies.
7. Requiring that the nature and amount of consulting services provided 
by the auditor to the client be disclosed within the client's finan­
cial statements.
8. Establishment of an arbitration board to settle disputes between 
auditors and clients Involving financial reporting Issues.
All
Partners
Loan
Officers
Audit
Partners
Loan Officers 
vs. All 
Partners
Loan Officers 
vs. Audit 
Partners
1.49 (13) 2.64 (13) 1.46 (12) + +
1.06 (16) 1.64 (16) 1.06 (16) * *
1.55 (12) 3.93 (1) 1.54 (11) + +
2.28 (5) 2.89 (9) 2.40 (3)
1.23 (15) 2.07 (15) 1.14 (15) + +
1.85 (9) 3.18 (5) 1.77 (9) + +
1.85 (9) 3.29 (3) 1.71 (10) + +
1.94 (8) 2.98 (8) 2.00 (8) + +
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TABLE III, Cont'd
Reported Desirability Ratings: Test of Differences
Group Means (Relative Rankings) In Group Means
Loan Officers Loan Officers
All Loan Audit vs. Alt vs. Audit
Item 1 Description Psrtners Officers Partners Partners Partners
9. A ban on any form of advertising by auditing firms. 2.28 (5) 2.33 (14) 2.23 (6)
10. Requiring the mandatory use of audit committees composed of non­
employee and non-management members of the client's board of
directors. 3.45 (1) 3.18 (5) 3.67 (1)
11. Required disclosure In client financial statements of all major 
audltor-cllent dlsagreeaœnts occurring In the eighteen months
prior to an auditing firm's dismissal. 2.13 (7) 3.27 (4) 2.11 (7) + +
12. Prohibiting an auditing firm from accepting an engagement If the 
total revenue from the prospective client would be greater than
10% of the auditing firm's total revenues. 2.40 (4) 2.71 (10) 2.26 (5)
13. Re-lnstatement of the AICPA's ethical standard prohibiting client
solicitation. 2.81 (2) 2.69 (11) 2.80 (2)
14. Requiring that audit fee negotiations be the complete responsi­
bility of the client's audit conalttee rather than the client's
management. 2.43 (3) 3.00 (7) 2.34 (4) *
15. Mandatory rotation of all audit engagement personnel every three
years. 1.68 (11) 3.67 (2) 1.46 (12) + +
16. Annual publication by the SEC of suggested audit fees per hour by
staff level, e.g., staff, senior, etc. , 1.40 (14) 2.69 (11) 1.31 (14) + +
VO
VO
TABLE IV
Group means from Table III after collapsing 
the normative scale Into a flve-polnt, 
bl-polar scale centered at zero.
* - .01 significance level 
+ - .001 significance level
Item # Description
1. Restricting the amount of management consulting services provided by 
an auditing firm to audit clients to a maximum of 10% of the total 
annual audit fee.
2. Giving the SEG total responsibility for the external audit function. 
Auditors of financial statements of publicly-held companies would 
be government employees much like 1RS auditors.
3. Requiring that any proposed auditor adjustments not Incorporated by 
the client in Its financial statements be disclosed within the 
footnotes to the statements.
4. Prohibition of executive search services by auditing firms.
5. Selection of auditors for SEC registrants by the SEC with fee nego­
tiations within guidelines establlbhed by the SEC.
6. Requiring auditors to report on the preferability of all the client's 
accounting policies.
7. Requiring that the nature and amount of consulting services provided 
by the auditor to the client be disclosed within the client's finan­
cial statements.
8. Establlshement of an arbitration board to settle disputes between 
auditors and clients Involving financial reporting Issues.
Reported Desirability Ratings: Test of Differences 
In Group Means
All
Partners
Loan
Officers
Audit
Partners
Loan Officers 
vs. All 
Partners
Loan Officers 
vs. Audit 
Partners
-1.51 (13) -.36 (13) -1.54 (12) + +
-1.94 (16) -1.36 (16) -1.94 (16) * *
-1.45
-.72
(12)
(5)
.93 (1) 
-.11 (9)
-1.46 (11) 
-.60 (3)
+ +
-1.77 (15) -.93 (15) -1.86 (15) + +
-1.15 (9) .18 (5) -1.23 (9) + +
-1.15 (9) .29 (3) -1.29 (10) + +
-1.06 (8) -.02 (8) -1.00 (8) + +
O
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TABLE IV, Cont'd
Item f Description
9. A ban on any form of advertising by auditing firms.
10. Requiring the mandatory use of audit r.omnittees composed of non­
employee and non-management members of the client's board of 
directors.
11. Required disclosure in client financial statemanta of all major 
auditor-client disagreements occurring in the eighteen months 
prior to an auditing firm's dismissal.
12. Prohibiting an auditing firm from accepting an engagement if the 
total revenue from the prospective client would be greater than 
10% of the auditing firm's total revenues.
13. Re-instatemant of the AICPA's ethical standard prohibiting client 
solicitation.
14. Requiring that audit fee negotiations be the complete responsi­
bility of the client's audit committee rather than the client's 
management.
15. Mandatory rotation of all audit engagement personnel every three 
years.
16. Annual publication by the SEC of suggested audit fees per hour by 
staff level, e.g., staff, senior, etc.
Reported Desirability Ratings: 
Group Means (Relative Rankings)
Test of Differences 
in Group Means
All 
Partners
Loan
Officers
Audit 
Partners
Loan Officers 
vs. All 
Partners
Loan Officers 
vs. Audit 
Partners
-.72 (5) -.67 (14) -.77 (6) .
.45 (1) .18 (5) .67 (1)
-.87 (7) .27 (4) -.89 (7) + +
-.60 (4) -.29 (10) -.74 (5)
-.19 (2) -.31 (11) -.20 (2)
-.57 (3) .00 (7) -.66 (4) *
-1.32 (11) .67 (2) -1.54 (12) + +
-1.60 (14) -.31 (11) -1.69 (14) + +
O
H
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vectors of mean responses for the loan officers and partners. 
Again, this statistic proved to be highly significant (p < .001) 
for both the pairing of loan officers and the entire partner 
sample and the pairing of loan officers and just the audit 
partners. Also significance levels of .01 and .001 were again 
used in evaluating the results of t-tests in which the mean 
responses for each subject group were compared with the respec­
tive mean responses of the other group.
Analysis of Normative Criterion 
Rating Task Results 
Cross-sample Comparisons of Subject Groups' Ratings. . 
The partner subjects tended to rate the sixteen variables con­
siderably lower than the loan officers on the normative cri­
terion. As shown by Table III, in all cases where there was 
a statistically significant difference between the two mean 
scores, the higher rating always belonged to the loan officers. 
Of the six items where significant differences were not found, 
the loan officers' mean rating was higher in all but two cases. 
The two items rated more highly by partners than by loan offi­
cers were the mandatory requirement to use audit committees 
and the re-instatement of the AICPA's prohibition on client 
solicitation. In fact, the audit committee requirement is the 
only variable which received a positive mean score by the part­
ner subjects. As indicated before, the adoption of this action 
would probably prove to be significantly less onerous for pub­
lic accounting firms than most of the other proposals since
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the NYSE already requires the use of audit committees. Con­
cerning reinforcing the ban on client solicitation, the part­
ner group was slightly against that proposal, but less so than 
the loan officers.
Of the items in Table IV on which significant differences 
were found between loan officers and audit partners, five were 
rated positively by loan officers and negatively by audit 
partners, five were rated negatively by both groups but each 
significantly more negatively by audit partners, and on the 
final variable the loan officers were exactly neutral but the 
audit partners were unfavorably disposed.
The largest absolute difference between these latter 
two groups was on the item calling for the disclosure in fi­
nancial statement footnotes of auditor adjustments not accept­
ed by the client. The audit partners were very adamant in 
calling for the rejection of this proposal. Disclosing such 
adjustments could possibly place their firms in a difficult 
position of being forced to explain why they were able to 
issue an unqualified opinion when their clients refused to 
incorporate certain of their proposed adjustments into the 
financial statements. An alternative explanation for the 
audit partners' stance on this issue is that they believe that 
all material auditor-proposed adjustments are being incorpor­
ated in client financial statements. Consequently, this mea­
sure would simply result in the disclosure of immaterial 
'passed' adjustments, a move which might confuse financial
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statement readers.
There was also a substantial absolute difference be­
tween the two subject groups on the issue of the mandatory 
rotation of audit engagement personnel. Loan officers were 
moderately in favor of this action's adoption while audit 
partners were even more strongly against this item than they 
were against the disclosure of 'passed' adjustments. Loan 
officers probably perceived that rotating auditors would 
periodically bring fresh new perspectives to the audit. Audi­
tors who work on an engagement for several years may become 
too 'close' to the job and client employees and, consequently, 
lose a certain degree of their impartiality and objectivity. 
With regard to the audit partners' reaction, since this re­
quirement would likely cause a considerable increase in the 
time and cost of administering an audit practice, their 
high negative mean rating is easily understood.
Loan officers were favorably predisposed toward being 
informed of the nature and amount of consulting services pro­
vided by auditing firms to their clients while the auditor 
subjects were clearly against such disclosures. These sub­
jects would also like to be informed of all major disagree­
ments occurring in the eighteen months prior to an auditing 
firm's dismissal whereas audit partners apparently do not 
believe disclosure of such disputes is necessary, a position 
somewhat supported by the Fried and Schiff (1981) empirical
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study referred to previously. The final action on which 
the two groups had a diametrically opposed view was the pro­
posal requiring auditors to report on the preferability of 
the client's accounting policies.
Loan officers were indifferent with respect to dele­
gating the responsibility for audit fee negotiations to the 
audit committee. However, surprisingly, the audit partners 
were moderately against this proposal. This is surprising 
since the audit partners were in favor of the mandatory ap­
pointment of audit committees. A second item on which the 
loan officers were essentially neutral was with respect to the 
creation of an arbitration board to settle disputes between 
auditors and their clients. The audit partners were firmly 
against this proposal, perhaps because they do not want to be 
placed in a situation where they would have to publicly take 
a position opposed to that of a client.
Three of the four remaining proposals on which signif­
icant differences existed, each of which were rated negative­
ly by both subject groups, involved policies requiring a higher 
degree of SEC intervention in the financial reporting process. 
The largest absolute ranking, positive or negative, given by 
either subject class in either rating task was the negative 
rating given by auditors to the proposal to place the audit 
function totally under government jurisdiction. Rated almost 
as negatively by these same subjects was the suggestion to 
have the SEC match up auditors and auditees and establish
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guidelines for audit fee negotiations. Finally, the audit 
partners were firmly against the proposal to have the SEC sim­
ply publish suggested audit fees per hour by staff level. In 
each of the above cases, the loan officers were also in disfavor 
of the action's adoption but not as adamantly as were the 
audit partners. ^
The final variable on which there was a significant 
difference of opinion between loan officers and audit partners 
was the proposed restriction on the amount of management ad­
visory services which auditing firms could provide to their 
clients. This is another item for which the auditors ex­
pressed firm disapproval while the loan officers rejected it 
but without any great enthusiasm.
Of the five remaining actions for which significant 
differences were not found, all were rated negatively by both 
subject classes. Generally, the partners were more in disfa­
vor of the proposals than were the loan officers. The one ex­
ception to this rule being with respect to the re-instatement 
of the ethical ban on client solicitation. Both groups were 
mildly against this alternative but the loan officers' mean 
rating was slightly more negative than that of the audit part­
ners.
An In-depth Analysis of the Loan Officers' Normative 
Ratings. The preceding analyses have concentrated on compar­
ing and contrasting the normative ratings of the two subject 
groups. As has been emphasized repeatedly, the major objective
107
of this study is to determine how user groups would structure 
the auditor's role in order to provide for, at least in their 
perceptions, the optimal level of auditor independence.
The two actions which loan officers would most like to 
see adopted are also the two alternatives which they ranked 
highest in the positive-scale rating task. Loan officers want 
to see the disclosure of proposed adjustments by the auditor 
which are rejected by the client as well as the mandatory rota­
tion of individuals assigned to an audit. The third most highly 
ranked item by loan officers was the variable calling for the 
disclosure of the nature and amount of consulting services pro­
vided by auditing firms to their clients. For several years, 
the SEC has required registrants to disclose this information, 
however, this reporting rule has been eliminated as a part of 
new SEC commissioner Shad's program to cull out many of the • 
SEC's ASRs*. Shad's motivation was to eliminate many of the 
unnecessary and/or ineffectual policies. Given the results of 
the current study, the elimination of this requirement may need 
réévaluation.
As in the case of the disclosure of MAS activities, the 
next three most highly ranked actions by loan officers were 
given rather modest absolute ratings. The fourth item, re­
quired financial statement disclosure of major disagreements 
occurring between the auditing firm and client prior to the
^See "News Reports", Journal of Accountancy, October,
1981, p. 7.
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auditing firm's dismissal, is essentially required currently 
by the SEC. This information is not reported in registrant 
financial statements but is required to be disclosed in an 
8-K report to the public. Loan officers would also like to 
be informed of whether or not the client is using the most 
appropriate accounting policies. Finally, the loan officers 
agreed with the audit partners on the desirability of formally 
requiring the establishment of audit committees to serve as 
liasions between client management and auditing firms. Of 
course, there was a noticeable difference in the mean rating 
given this variable by the two groups as audit partners were 
much more in favor of its adoption than were the loan officers.
With respect to the actions ranked seventh, eighth, and 
ninth, the loan officers were either exactly neutral or prac­
tically so with regard to their implementation. It was noted 
previously that the loan officers really did not care either 
way whether audit fee negotiations are made the responsibility 
of the audit committee or whether an arbitration board is es­
tablished to settle disputes between auditors and their cli­
ents. The third item which the loan officers were essentially 
indifferent toward was the prohibition of executive search 
services. This result is quite surprising since the provision 
of this service by auditing firms caused somewhat of a brouhaha 
in recent years within the financial community (Cohen Commis­
sion, 1978, pp. 100-101). The argument was that by recruiting 
executives for their clients, the large accounting firms were
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essentially placing individuals in these organizations that 
were somewhat obligated or indebted to them. At the very 
least, such a practice causes the executives of auditees and 
their auditing firms to have a closer relationship than other­
wise, a fact which can lead to the impairment of an auditing 
firm's ^  facto if not apparent independence. Milano's (1981) 
study found that both CPAs and financial statement users be­
lieved that banning executive search services by auditing firms 
would strengthen the letter's apparent independence, however, 
both groups doubted that the marginal benefits provided by this 
action would be greater than the marginal costs of its imple­
mentation. The results of this study tend to confirm the gen­
eral apathy expressed toward this issue by Milano's subjects.
The loan officers disapproved of each of the remaining 
seven proposals. As mentioned before, the loan officers agreed 
with the audit partners' rejection of the action which would 
place the audit function totally under the auspices of the SEC. 
The above action was given the lowest mean rating by loan of­
ficers in the normative rating task while the next lowest rat­
ing belonged to the closely related alternative which would 
delegate to the SEC the responsibility for assigning audit 
firms to publicly-traded companies. Even though a ban on ad­
vertising would provide some limited degree of protection for 
auditing firms' independence, according to the loan officers' 
positive-scale ratings, these subjects were against re-instat- 
ing such a prohibition. The amount of advertising within the
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discipline is somewhat of a barometer of the degree of com­
petition which prevails. Apparently, the loan officer sub­
jects are willing to forego a measure of auditor independence 
in order to protect auditing firms' right to compete via the 
advertising media.
The proposal ranked thirteenth in the normative rating 
task, according to the loan officers' mean ratings, was the 
prohibition concerning the amount of MAS revenue which an au­
diting firm could generate in an engagement. The evaluation 
of this item as well as the other proposed standard relating 
to the MAS issue sheds considerable light on the long-standing 
controversy surrounding the provision of consulting services 
by auditing firms. It seems apparent that financial statement 
users are concerned with the effect which the simultaneous 
provision of MAS and auditing services may have on an auditing 
firm's independence. Shockley (1981) demonstrated that the 
provision of a significant amount of MAS to an audit client 
impairs the auditing firm's apparent independence. The re­
sults of the current study indicate that even though the pro­
vision of MAS may impair independence, financial statement 
users are willing to forfeit some degree of auditor objectiv­
ity in order to protect the letter's right to provide such 
consulting services. Obviously, one is required to speculate 
as to how users would trade-off these two variables, but re­
gardless, by requiring the disclosure of the nature and amount 
of consulting services provided by an auditing firm to its
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client, financial statement users will have sufficient evi­
dence to make those trade-offs. If the users feel too much 
independence is being sacrificed, then they can take the ap­
propriate actions via the appropriate channels to remedy the 
situation.
With respect to the items ranked tenth, eleventh, and 
twelfth in Table III, loan officers were only mildly against 
their implementation. Again, the tendency of the loan offi­
cers to grant auditing firms a high level of freedom in the 
marketplace was evident by the negative rating given to the 
proposal to ban client solicitation. Even though auditing 
firms are providing a professional service, loan officers are 
not about to deny them their economic freedoms. The loan of­
ficers also appear to be generally in disfavor of those ac­
tions mandating more SEC involvement in the financial report­
ing process as evidenced again by the negative rating given 
the suggestion to have the SEC annually publish audit fee 
guidelines.
Finally, the loan officers are slightly against re­
stricting auditing firms' right to accept clients which would 
contribute a disproportionate amount to their total revenue. 
Shockley's study found that relatively small auditing firms 
face a greater risk of having their apparent independence 
jeopardized than do large firms. Generalizing from that study 
to the current study, one would expect the above prohibition 
to be rated by user groups as an action which would promote
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auditors' independence, and such was the case as reflected by 
the rating loan officers gave this action on the positive- 
scale criterion. Nonetheless, loan officers supported the 
right of the small auditing firms to take on relatively large 
clients. This instance clearly points to the need to evaluate 
actions intended to alleviate pressures on the independence of 
auditors from both positive and normative perspectives. If 
the above policy alternative had been assessed on only a posi­
tive criterion, one might have come away with the opinion that 
loan officers support its adoption, a conclusion contrary to 
their evaluation of the item on the normative criterion.
The Second Research Technique 
In the preceding tasks auditor independence was studied 
in a non-contextual manner. The data resulting from those 
tasks gives us a better understanding of how financial state­
ment users would structure the auditor's role in order to pro­
vide for an improved level of auditor independence. In this 
section, this phenomenon was studied in a context-specific 
manner. Subjects were given defined sets of circumstances in 
which the auditor's independence appeared to be threatened and 
then were asked to report the likelihood of an auditor behaving 
in a compromising or non-independent manner. An attempt was 
also made to determine which variables or structural conditions 
of the audit context made it more or less likely that an audi­
tor's apparent independence would be negatively affected. To 
accomplish this latter objective, key variables thought to
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influence users' perceptions of auditor independence were varied 
systematically within the situations presented to the subjects.
An advantage of studying auditor independence in both a 
situation-specific and a non-contextual manner is that the re­
sults can be contrasted and compared to determine if the two ap­
proaches yield general agreement concerning the determinants of 
this phenomenon. If such is the case, then the results of each 
method serve as support for the other and provide a higher over­
all degree of credibility. If the independent results of each 
method do not agree, then further ananlysis would be needed to 
determine why the subjects evaluated independence in a different 
manner when it was presented under differing sets of circumstances.
Response Rate and Demographics
The instrument used in this half of the research design 
was mailed to seventy loan officers of Oklahoma banks. The usable 
response rate for these subjects was 61.4% (forty-three respon­
dents) . In a similar study, Shockley obtained a 62.3% response 
rate from partners of several Big Eight accounting firms while 
from loan officers and chartered financial analysts his response 
rates were 67.2% and 60.9%, respectively. Accordingly, the re­
sponse rate of this study compares favorably with those of 
Shockley's. With respect to the loan officer subjects, the mean 
length of employment within the banking profession was 17.0 years 
with a minimum of two years and a maximum of thirty-six years.
The average amount of commercial lending experience was 12.2 years 
with a minimum of one year and a maximum of thirty-six years.
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Overview of Empirical Results 
Analysis of the Combined ANOVA Model. Table V presents 
the overall analysis of variance (ANOVA) results for the com­
bined subject sample. Past ANOVA studies published in the ac­
counting literature have generally used a significance level of 
.05 to indicate a moderately strong relationship between inde­
pendent and dependent variables while a significance level of 
.01 has been used to indicate a strong relationship.^ Employ­
ing a significance level of .01, four of the main effects and 
one of the interactions in Table V would be considered to have 
a significant impact on subjects' responses to the hypothetical 
scenarios. Using a level of .05, no additional main effects or 
interactions would surpass the significance threshold.
Table V does not disclose the directional effects of 
the four independent variables; however, the direction of each 
variable's impact is obviously discernible by analyzing Table 
VI which presents the marginal means for the dependent variable® 
by treatment level of each significant independent variable.
The presence of a materiality dispute (Level 1) had a much
Kerlinger (1973, pp. 160-170) discusses levels of sta­
tistical significance and why the .01 and .05 levels are most 
commonly applied in behavioral research.
®As noted in Chapter IV, the dependent variable was the 
subject's perceived likelihood of the conflict episode being 
resolved in favor of the client's position. This variable 
was used as a surrogate measure to represent the degree to 
which the subjects' believed the hypothetical audit firm's 
independence would be impaired as a result of the conflict 
dispute.
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df
Main Effects
I Conflict issue 
C Competition 
F Financial condition 
M MAS
0 Ordering variable
111.01
14.04
156.18
15.59
.51
.000 * 
.000 * 
.000 * 
.000 * 
.476
Interactions
IC
IF
IM
10
CF
CM
CO
FM
FO
MO
.40
12.57
2.35
.58
.00
.05
.41
.05
.30
1.59
.530
.000
.126
.446
.980
.821
.522
.821
.585
.208
TABLE V
Analysis of variance for all main effects and interactions. 
* - Significance level of .01 or less
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Independent Variable Treatment Level
1* 2
Conflict issue 3.92 2.70
Competition 3.52 3.09
Financial condition 4.03 2.58
MAS 3.53 3.08
TABLE VI
Marginal means for treatment levels of independent variables.
* - The table below summarizes the treatment levels of each inde­
pendent variable.
Treatment Level
Conflict issue
Competition 
Financial condition 
MAS
Materiality Disclosure 
dispute dispute
High Low
Good Poor
40% of audit None 
fee
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higher negative impact on the subjects' perceptions of the 
auditing firm's ability to retain its apparent independence
than did the presence of a disclosure dispute (Level 2). Sub­
jects perceived that the more intense the degree of competi­
tion in the audit market the more likely that the auditing 
firm would submit to the client's demands in a conflict epi­
sode while the provision of a substantial amount of MAS to 
the client had a similar effect. Finally, the healthier the 
financial condition of the client involved in a dispute with 
its auditors, the more likely subjects were to doubt the lat­
ter 's ability to obtain their preferred resolution to the con­
flict episode.
The final independent variable was the nominal, two- 
level ordering variable. As discussed in Chapter III, one- 
half of the research instruments began with the materiality 
dispute scenario while the other one-half began with the con­
flict episode involving the disclosure dispute. Additionally, 
the ordering of the cases in each scenario as well as the or­
der of each of the four variables in each case was determined
randomly in each version of the instrument. To determine 
whether the different orderings caused a response set bias, 
a variable representing the two orderings was incorporated 
into the ANOVA model. As indicated by the p-level of this 
variable in Table V, the ordering of the conflict disputes 
within the two versions of the research instrument did not 
materially affect subjects' responses.
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Of the ten two-way interactions specified in the com­
bined ANOVA model, Table V reports that only one was found 
to be significant at the .01 level. Figure III illustrates 
the interaction of the financial condition and conflict issue 
variables. When the materiality dispute treatment level of 
the conflict issue variable was coupled with the healthy 
status of the financial condition factor, the resulting up­
ward effect on the subjects' responses was more than that 
which could be ascribed to the independent effects of these 
two variables. Table VII reports the marginal means of all 
sixteen cases included in the research instrument. In the 
four instances where the good financial condition and materi­
ality dispute treatment levels were paired together (cases #1, 
2, 5 and 6), the resulting dependent variable means were the 
largest of the sixteen cases, another indication of the sig­
nificant interaction of these two independent variables.
The total amount of the variation in the loan officers' 
responses explained by the ANOVA model was 31.97% as reflected 
by Table VIII. Certainly, that percentage is modest; however, 
it is quite comparable to the s of previous ANOVA studies
published in the accounting literature. Shockley's overall 
2
R in the closely related study involving auditor independence
was .28. In the 1977 Hofstedt and Hughes study of materiality, 
2
the R was .39. The 1978 ANOVA study by Gustavson and Schultz
which investigated the variables affecting actuaries' percep-
2
tions of auditor's legal liability had an R of .301.
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5.0
Likeli­
hood of 
Conflict 
Issue 
Being 
Resolved 
in Favor 
of Client's 
Position
4.0
3.0
2.0
Good Financial 
Condition
Poor Financial 
Condition
 1----
Disclosure
Dispute
Materiality 
. Dispute
FIGUPi: III
Significant interaction effect in composite ANOVA model; 
financial condition-conflict issue.
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Conflict Financial
Case # Issue Competition Condition MAS Mean
1 1* 1 1 1 5.40
2 1 1 1 2 4.70
3 1 1 2 1 3.53
4 1 1 2 2 3.04
5 1 2 1 1 4.91
6 1 2 1 2 4.37
7 1 2 2 1 3.09
8 1 2 2 2 2.28
9 2 1 1 1 3.53
10 2 1 1 2 3.35
11 2 1 2 1 2.49
12 2 1 2 2 2.14
13 2 2 1 1 3.14
14 2 2 1 2 2.84
15 2 2 2 1 2.19
16 2 2 2 2 1.91
TABLE VII
Dependent variable means by case.
* - The table below summarizes the treatment levels of each independent 
variable.
Treatment Level
Conflict issue
Competition 
Financial condition 
MAS
Materiality 
dispute 
High 
Good 
40% of audit 
fee
Disclosure
dispute
Low
Poor
None
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Main Effects
% of Variance 
Explained
Relative % of 
Variance Explained
I Conflict issue 
C Competition 
F Financial condition 
M MAS
0 Ordering variable
111.01
14.04
156.18
15.59
.51
11.24
1.42
15.82
1.58
.05
35.16
4.44
49.47
4.94
.16
Interactions
IC
IF
IM
10
CF
CM
CO
FM
FO
MO
.40
12.57
2.35
.58
.00
.05
.41
.05
.30
1.59
.04
1.27
.24
.06
.00
.01
.04
.01
.03
.16
31.97
.13
3.97
.75
.19
.00
.03
.13
.03
.10
.50
100.00
TABLE VIII
Amount of variance explained by each main effect and interaction 
specified in the composite ANOVA model.
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2
Even in those cases where the R for the combined ANOVA 
model is relatively small, the variance explained by the indi­
vidual models can be quite substantial. A good case in point
would be the Gustavson and Schultz study which had an overall 
2
R of .301. For individual subjects in that study, the vari­
ance explained ranged from a minimum of .864 to a maximum of 
1.00. This result points to the low level of consensus among 
subjects as to which independent variables were relevant in 
their decisions and to disagreements as to how the variables 
should have been weighted. Later on, we will look at the 
ANOVA models of individual subjects in this study and compare 
the results to those of the above studies.
Table VIII reports the amount of variance in the sub­
jects' combined responses which was explained by each main ef­
fect and interaction. It is apparent that the most important 
variable used by loan officers in formulating their judgments 
was the financial condition variable. That factor accounted 
for almost one-half of the total explained variation in the 
subjects' responses. The other variable which explained a 
large percentage of the variance in loan officers' judgments 
was the conflict issue factor. Even though the competition 
and the MAS variables were found to be statistically signifi­
cant in the composite ANOVA model, they accounted for rela­
tively little of the variance in the subjects' responses.
Analysis of the Individual ANOVA Models. As mentioned 
above, it can be quite misleading to focus entirely on the
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combined ANOVA model of a study such as this. Shockley's
analysis (p. 796) of his research data indicated that even 
2
though the R of a composite model may be quite small, when 
one looks at the ability of the model to predict the direction 
of the individual subjects' responses, its utility can be 
greatly enhanced. In Table IX the number of significant main 
effects and interactions for the individual ANOVA models is 
reported. Even though the amount of variance explained in 
the combined ANOVA model for any one main effect or interac­
tion was quite modest. Table IX shows that for the financial 
condition and conflict issue variables there was substantial 
agreement among subjects as to their importance. In almost 
89% of the individual models the financial condition variable 
figures prominently in the subjects' judgments while the cor­
responding percentage for the conflict issue variable was 79%. 
Slightly less than one-half of the loan officers believed that 
the degree of competition in the audit market would be a de­
termining factor in how conflict episodes are resolved. Fi­
nally, the relatively modest impact which the MAS variable had 
in the combined ANOVA model is reaffirmed by the fact that it 
was found to be significant in just slightly more than one- 
third of the individual models. One minor anomaly in these 
results concerns the fact that even though the competition 
variable accounted for less variance in the composite model, 
it was a significant factor more frequently in the individ­
ual decision models of the subjects. With respect to the
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Number of Significant 
Effects in Individual 
Models (n=43)_____
Main Effects .01’ .05'
I Conflict issue 
C Competition 
F Financial condition 
M MAS
28
9
31
7
6
12
5
8
Interactions
IC
IF
IM
CF
CM
FM
2
11
5
1
0
0
5
13
3 
5 
2
4
TABLE IX
Number of main effects and interactions reaching signifi­
cance in the individual ANOVA models.
* - Levels of Significance
125
interaction effects, only the conflict issue-financial condi­
tion factor was an important decision variable in several of 
the subjects' models.
One note of caution is necessary with regard to the 
interpretation of the results reported in Table IX. Because 
a variable was found to be statistically significant in an 
individual model does not mean that the subject agreed with 
the directional impact ascribed to that factor by the compos­
ite model. For this reason, the individual ANOVA models were 
analyzed to determine if in fact there were any subjects who 
disagreed with the directional effects of the independent var­
iables reported in the combined ANOVA model which in all cases 
agreed with the hypothesized directional effects. Table X 
shows that only a few of the subjects disagreed with the group 
judgments and research hypotheses in this regard. Practically 
all of the disagreement was confined to the conflict issue var­
iable. Four of the subjects who rated that variable as a sig­
nificant factor believed that the disclosure dispute was a 
more threatening situation to the auditors' independence than 
the materiality controversy, a conclusion contrary to the re­
sult reported by the composite ANOVA model.
2
Table XI reports the distribution of R for the indiv­
idual ANOVA models of the loan officers considering first, 
only the four main effects and the sole interaction which were 
found to be significant in the composite model, and in the 
second case, considering all independent variables and
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Hypothesis
Conflict
issue
Competition
Financial
condition
MAS
Total
Number of 
Significant* 
Effects Con­
sistent with 
Research 
Hypotheses
30
18
37
16
101
Number of 
Significant* 
Effects Incon­
sistent with 
Research 
Hypotheses
4
1
1
0
6
Total
Significant
Effects
34
19
38
16
107
TABLE X
Number of significant main effects consistent and incon­
tent with research hypotheses.
* - .05 significance level or higher
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Amount of
Variance
Explained
100%
95-99
90-94
85-89
80-84
70-79
60-69
0
Mean
Significant* 
Main Effects 
and Inter- 
actions only
3
4 
8 
6 
6 
8 
7 
1
81.3%
All Main 
Effects and 
Interactions
5
22
12
3
0
0
0
1
93.6%
TABLE XT
Amount of variance explained by individual ANOVA models. 
* - .05 significance level or higher
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2
interactions. As reported earlier, the R for the combined 
ANOVA model is quite modest, however. Table XI illustrates 
that a subject-by-subject analysis presents somewhat of a dif­
ferent picture. The average amount of variance explained in 
the individual loan officers' judgments is just slightly less 
than 94% when all interactions and independent variables are 
considered while the corresponding figure for just the signi­
ficant main effects and interaction is still an impressive 81%.
2
The above R s are informative by themselves in that
they immediately indicate how effective the respective models
were in explaining subjects' decisions. However, much more
2
can be learned by comparing these R s to the related figures 
reported in previous ANOVA studies. Shockley calculated the
2
variance explained for individual subjects by summing the R 
measures for variables which were significant in the compos­
ite model. The percentages of variance explained in his study 
for Big Eight CPAs, local and regional CPAs, bank loan offi­
cers, and financial analysts were 69.6, 56.4, 64.0, and 71.0,
respectively ( p. 795) . In Gustavson and Schultz, all vari-
2
ables were considered in arriving at the R s for the individ­
ual models. As reported before, these amounts ranged from a 
low of .868 to a high of unity (p. 635). Finally, Joyce com­
puted variance explained for individual subjects in the same
2
manner as Shockley and arrived at an average R of .78 (p. 47).
2
Obviously, the R amounts for the subjects of this study are 
at least as impressive as those reported in the previous ANOVA
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studies. Overall, the relatively high amounts of variance 
explained by the loan officers' individual models seem to 
indicate that the contextual variables presented to the sub­
jects in the hypothetical scenarios were very relevant to 
their decision processes.
Empirical Results and the 
Research Hypotheses 
Research Hypothesis No. 1. In chapter III, four speci­
fic research hypotheses were posited with respect to this part 
of the research. The first hypothesis concerned the degree 
of competition in the audit market.
H,: Financial statement users will perceive that conflict
episodes are more likely to be resolved in favor of 
the client's position when the environment in which 
the audit firm is operating is characterized by a 
high rather than a low level of competition.
As shown by Tables V and VI, the competition variable proved 
to be significant in the predicted direction at a .01 signifi­
cance level. However, it is important to look not only at 
statistical significance but also the practical significance 
of this particular result. Table VIII indicates that less 
than 1.5% of the total variance in the loan officers' judg­
ments was accounted for by the competition variable. In Table 
VI the marginal means for the two treatment levels of the com­
petition variable are reported and even though there is a sta­
tistically significant difference between these figures, the 
absolute difference is rather modest. Given all of this evi­
dence it is difficult to make a definitive statement concerning
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the acceptance or rejection of the initial research hypo­
thesis other than to say that a high degree of competition in 
an audit context slightly increases the likelihood that loan 
officers will perceive that conflict episodes will be resolved 
in favor of the client's wishes.
The relative weakness of the competition variable is 
rather surprising given the earlier findings of the Shockley 
study. In the combined ANOVA model for all subjects in that 
study the degree of competition was found to be a highly sig­
nificant determinant of perceived auditor independence. In 
fact, the competition variable explained more variance in the 
overall model than any other main effect or interaction. With 
respect to the commercial loan officers of Shockley's study, 
the level of competition in the hypothetical scenarios was 
the second most important determinant of perceived indepen­
dence. In trying to explain the different results of these 
two studies with respect to this variable one must look at 
the dependent variable that was being measured in each case.
In the previous study, Shockley addressed the impairment of 
independence problem in a strictly general, unspecified con­
text. Essentially, he was asking his subjects to assess the 
degree to which each of his independent variables would affect 
the auditing discipline's ability to retain a profession-wide 
appearance of independence. On a macro-level, the competition 
issue is a very relevant variable in determining whether the 
integrity of the profession's role, vis-a-vis impairment of
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apparent independence, is being damaged. However, in a very 
specific context, such as those used in this study, the com­
petition issue is somewhat removed. It is a background' vari­
able which is considered by subjects but apparently not weighed 
heavily in their final decision process.
An important underlying theme of the Cohen Commis­
sion' s report was that the increasing level of competition in 
the audit market is exacerbating the impairment of the inde­
pendence problem with which the auditing profession is faced. 
The results of this study should not be taken as evidence 
that the competition variable is no longer relevant to that 
issue. As Shockley's research has shown, financial statement 
users do believe that the integrity of the auditor's role is 
being prejudiced as a result of the increasing competitive­
ness of the auditor's economic environment. The current 
study simply shows that when financial statement users are 
faced with the need to decide in a specific case whether an 
auditing firm's independence is being impaired, the competi­
tion variable is too far removed from the decision context to 
have any substantial bearing on their final judgments.
Research Hypothesis No. 2. The second research hypo­
thesis related to the longstanding controversy of how the au­
ditor's independence is affected by the simultaneous provi­
sion of both auditing and consulting services.
H_: Financial statement users will perceive that conflict
episodes are more likely to be resolved in favor of 
the client's position when the audit firm provides
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management advisory services to the client as op­
posed to providing no such services.
Of course, in order to operationalize the above variable in 
the research instrument some "significant" level of MAS had 
to be selected. The level selected was an amount equal to 
40% of the annual audit fee, the approximate amount of MAS 
that Reckers and Stagliano (1981) found was provided to one 
hundred randomly selected SEC registrants by their auditing 
firms. As shown by Table V the MAS variable was significant 
at a .01 level in the composite ANOVA model. Even though the 
factor was statistically significant, again we have a situa­
tion where the practical significance of this result is open 
to question. The amount of variance in the combined ANOVA 
model which this factor explained was quite nominal, just 
slightly more than 1.5%. In approximately one-third of the 
individual models the MAS variable was found to be either 
highly significant or moderately significant as reflected in 
Table IX. As in the previous case, the direction of the MAS 
variable predicted in the experimental hypothesis was con­
firmed by the research results. The above evidence seems suf­
ficient to again conclude that the existence of this factor in 
an audit context slightly increases the likelihood of finan­
cial statement users perceiving that conflict disputes will 
be resolved in favor of the client.
The next issue to address is how well the above finding 
coincides with the previously accumulated evidence concerning
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the MAS controversy. In the Shockley study, the MAS variable 
was significant for the class of commercial loan officers, 
however, in terms of explanatory power, its impact was essen­
tially trivial as it accounted for less than h of 1% of the 
variance in those subjects' judgments. Accordingly, the 
results of the current study confirm those of the Shockley 
study. The amount of MAS provided to clients by their au­
diting firms is a factor that financial statement users con­
sider in evaluating the letter's independence in both a gen­
eric as well as a situation-specific context, but it is not 
a major factor in that process within either context.
The findings of this study with respect to the MAS 
variable are both somewhat supportive of the conclusions 
reached in the recent study by Reckers and Stagliano and, at 
the same time, somewhat inconsistent. For the sophisticated 
financial statement user group of Reckers' study the composite 
confidence level in the ability of an auditing firm to main­
tain its independence when providing significant MAS to a 
client was 70%. Surprisingly, almost exactly that same per­
centage, 65%, of the loan officer subjects in this study did 
not treat the MAS variable as a significant factor in the hy­
pothetical scenarios. Of course, those two percentages are 
not directly comparable but they do indicate some degree of 
consensus in the two subject groups' judgments. The real 
difference between the results of this study aind that of 
Reckers and Stagliano is not due to a substantial disparity
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in the empirical findings, rather the difference is due to 
how the two studies' findings were interpreted. Reckers and 
Stagliano subjectively concluded that the 70% confidence level 
of their subjects was sufficient evidence to reject the pos­
sibility of an impairment of independence problem occurring 
when an auditing firm provides substantial MAS to a client.
In using the conventional approach to determine statistical 
significance in an ANOVA design, this researcher arrived at 
a conclusion somewhat opposed to that of Reckers and Stag­
liano. So the problem is not to explain a disparity in the 
empirical results of the two studies, but rather to determine 
which analytical mode is most appropriate. One reasonable 
conclusion seems to be that which was arrived at above: the
amount of MAS provided is a factor but only a minor one which 
users employ in evaluating an auditing firm's independence. 
Later, when the results of the two halves of this research 
design are compared and contrasted, more insight on this 
relationship will hopefully be provided.
Research Hypothesis No. 3. Research hypothesis #3 
raised the issue of how the relative financial condition of a 
client impacts financial statement users' perceptions of the 
likelihood of conflict episodes being resolved in favor of 
the client's preferred alternative.
H-: Financial statement users will perceive that conflict
episodes are more likely to be resolved in favor of 
the client's position when the client is in a healthy 
as opposed to a poor financial condition.
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In this particular case, there is no controversy whatsoever 
concerning whether the hypothesis should be accepted or re­
jected. All of the following empirical evidence indicates 
that it should be accepted. 1) Table V shows that in the 
loan officers' combined ANOVA model this variable was highly 
significant and the most significant of the main effects and 
interactions. 2) Table VIII reflects that the financial con­
dition variable accounted for almost one-half of the explained 
variance in the combined loan officers' ANOVA model. 3) Table 
VI confirms the predicted direction of this variable's effect 
and demonstrates a relatively large absolute difference in 
the marginal means for its two treatment levels. Finally, 4) 
Table X illustrates that almost 89% of the loan officer sub­
jects considered this variable to be a determining factor in 
their personal decision models.
In the Gustavson and Schultz study, the financial con­
dition of the client was found to be a key determinant of the 
magnitude of the risk of legal liability that an auditing firm 
had to assume. A client in relatively poor financial health 
significantly increased the likelihood that an auditing firm 
would be expected to incur legal liability. One can build de­
fensible arguments both supporting the view that a good finan­
cial condition would diminish as well as increase the chances 
of an auditing firm retaining its apparent independence. The 
loan officers obviously opted for the first argument. In their 
view, an auditing firm is much more likely to acquiesce to a
136
client's demands in a conflict episode when the client is in a 
relatively good financial condition. One possible rationale 
for this position being taken by the loan officers is that they 
perceive audit firms to consciously weigh the risks of compro­
mising behavior. In the case of a client in solid financial 
condition, the chances of the auditing firm being asked to 
account for a questionable decision is so remote that the ex­
pected losses from such an action would be trivial. Thus, 
following this line of reasoning, audit firms would be more 
likely to capitulate to a client's demands in a conflict epi­
sode when the client is sound financially.
This argument is not a new one and is closely related
to the economic analysis of the auditor's role presented by
DeAngelo (1980). She presumes that there is no such thing as 
de facto independence since the auditor is strictly an econom­
ic creature. In any free choice situation, such as that pre­
sented to the auditor in a confrontation with the client, the 
auditor will simply weigh the marginal revenues of each behav­
ioral alternative against the marginal costs and choose the 
option that maximizes his economic wealth without regard to 
professional ethics.
Hopefully, financial statement users do not hold as
harsh a view of the auditor as DeAngelo. Nevertheless, the
financial condition of the client is one factor in the audi- 
tor-client relationship which is very difficult to control for 
purposes of ensuring the apparent independence of the auditor.
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The most appropriate actions to take in this regard seem to 
be simply the imposition of tough sanctions in those cases 
where the auditor is shown to have behaved in a compromising 
manner which is exactly the conclusion to which DeAngelo's 
argument would eventually bring us.
Research Hypothesis No. 4 . The final research hypo­
thesis is centered around the issue which was the focal point 
of the Goldman and Bariev (1974) article as well as that of 
Nichols and Price (1976). The issue being: Does the degree
of routinism in the auditor's role increase or decrease the 
auditor's ability to withstand pressure exerted by the client 
to act in a manner inconsistent with professional standards?
H.: Financial statement users will perceive that conflict
episodes are more likely to be resolved in favor of 
the client's position when the issue at the center 
of the dispute is not precisely treated by technical 
standards as opposed to the situation where the cen­
tral issue is dealt with very specifically in the 
technical standards.
This hypothesis was operationalized by choosing two types of 
conflict disputes which commonly occur between an auditing 
firm and its client. The dispute employed in the initial hy­
pothetical scenario involved a disagreement over the materi­
ality of a financial statement adjustment proposed by the au­
diting firm. Materiality is an attribute of financial data 
that has been very difficult for the profession to operation­
al lÿ define in the technical standards. Currently, those 
standards provide only limited guidance to practitioners in 
determining the materiality of financial statement amounts.
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As a result, auditors and their clients often find themselves 
in disagreements concerning whether a given amount is mater­
ial, and consequently, must be reported in the financial state­
ments. In the second hypothetical scenario, the conflict is­
sue centered around the disclosure of an event occurring sub­
sequent to the fiscal year-end. In this case the technical 
standards are very explicit with regard to how such an item 
should be treated. The client's supposed position in this 
latter context was obviously contrary to the prescribed dic­
tates of the technical standards.
The empirical results clearly call for the acceptance 
of this final research hypothesis. Table V shows that the con­
flict issue variable was the second most highly significant 
of the four primary independent variables. This factor also 
accounted for a rather substantial amount of the total ex­
plained variation in the subjects' responses as indicated 
by Table VIII.
Nichols and Price asserted that the primary source of 
the auditor's power in conflict episodes with the client is 
the degree of routinism in the audit engagement. Consequent­
ly, they argued that by reducing the amount of subjective 
judgment necessary in the auditor's role,the letter's power 
in confrontations with the client would be increased. With 
a more symmetrical balance of power in the audit context, 
there would be less likelihood of the client attempting to 
influence the auditor's professional judgment. According to
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Goldman and Bariev's analysis, the major source of auditor's 
power is professional expertise. By reducing the need to ex­
ercise his subjective judgment, the primary source of the audi­
tor's power would be diminished.
The empirical results of this study provide some measure 
of support for the position taken by Nichols and Price. The 
loan officers perceived a significantly higher likelihood 
that the client would prevail in the scenario involving the 
disclosure of the subsequent event. In the latter situation, 
if the auditor agrees to the alternative preferred by the 
client, he has taken a position directly contrary to the pro­
fessional standards, an action which could result in a sub­
stantial opportunity cost if it is brought to the attention 
of regulatory authorities. Apparently, the loan officers 
concluded that the auditor would be reluctant to incur such 
a large opportunity cost.
Validity and Reliability of 
the Research Results 
In the last section of Chapter IV, the validity and 
reliability considerations of this research design were dis­
cussed. This section summarizes the actions which were taken 
in attempts to ensure the reliability and the validity of the 
research results. Additionally, those tests which were per­
formed to measure the degree to which this research effort 
captured those characteristics are reported.
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A Review of the Internal Validity 
of the Research Results 
Generally, the degree of internal validity that a parti­
cular study possesses is subjectively measured by comparing the 
actions which were taken by the researcher to provide for this 
attribute to the practices generally employed for that purpose 
in the researcher's discipline. In this case, the steps which 
were taken to provide for internal validity were discussed in 
Chapter IV. These measures included strict uniformity in the 
manner in which the research instruments of each method were ad­
ministered. To the greatest extent possible, social desirability 
bias was eliminated by wording the instruments in a neutral man­
ner. Finally, the two instruments were pre-tested on subjects 
of the relevant populations.
Degree of External Validity Captured 
in Research Results 
With regard to the external validity of this study, 
one must first question the representativeness of the sub­
ject groups selected from each universe. If the subject 
groups are not deemed to be representative of the universe 
from which they were selected, it would be inappropriate to 
generalize the findings of the study to the other members of 
the subject population. In this study, the intent was to 
sample two classes of subjects, financial statement users and 
partners of large national accounting firms. The latter group 
is a fairly homogenous and well-defined class and even though
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the sample of this study was drawn from a rather small subset 
of that class, i.e., partners engaged in public accounting in 
the state of Oklahoma, the generalizability of the research 
results should not be limited to any significant degree. How­
ever, in the case of the class of financial statement users, 
that universe consists of an extremely large and diverse set 
of individuals. Thus, in order to operationalize the research 
design, certain homogenous subsets of the universe of finan­
cial statement users were identified as possible surrogate 
classes for the entire population. Of course, the external 
validity of the study could have been improved by selecting 
sanples from several such subsets, however, time and resource 
constraints precluded that possibility.
According to a recent pronouncement of the FASB, fi­
nancial information should be addressed to relatively sophi­
sticated user groups. A readily accessible user group which 
regularly is faced with complicated financial transactions 
and reports is commercial loan officers. Consequently, the 
members of this user group which are employed with Oklahoma 
banks were chosen as the sampling frame from which to select 
subjects for this study.
In evaluating the results of the two research tech­
niques, one must keep in mind the bias that may have been 
introduced into the results solely as a result of the choice 
of the surrogate class for financial statement users. As 
indicated earlier in this chapter, the loan officers'
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reluctance to impose more regulatory structure on the auditor's 
role may have been a function of the relatively high degree of 
governmental regulation which they have to deal with on a day- 
to-day basis in the banking profession. Additionally, one must 
consider the self-selection process that results in individuals 
choosing one career role over another. It seems rational to 
assume that individuals with a deep-rooted belief in a laissez 
faire economic system would be attracted to the banking profe's- 
sion where a large measure of risk taking and entreprenurial 
ability is required in order to succeed. If such is the case, 
then this would explain the general inclination of the loan of­
ficer subjects to negatively react to those proposed actions in­
cluded in the variable set of the initial research method which 
would impinge upon the economic liberties of auditing firms.
Another self-selection process which could threaten the 
external validity of any survey study is the individual sub­
jects' decisions of whether or not to participate in the study. 
It is possible that the research tasks appealed to a certain 
subset of the original subject sample with a very different 
biographical and/or psychological profile from the remaining 
members of the sample. As in most survey studies, the subject 
samples of the two research methods used in this research de­
sign were selected randomly, a practice which increases the 
likelihood of obtaining a sample representative of the profile 
of the sampling frame. However, if response bias occurs, the 
benefits of random sampling are destroyed.
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The test used to check for response bias in this study 
is identical to that employed by Shockley. First, a determi­
nation was made of the number of individuals in each subject 
group that responded to the second requests to participate in 
the two research techniques. For the initial research tech­
nique, thirteen of the partners and nineteen of the loan offi­
cers answered the second request letters. For the second re­
search technique, thirteen of the loan officers responded to 
the second requests. In each of the above cases, an equal 
number of the earliest respondents was selected from the re­
spective subject groups, thus, three pairings of equal-sized 
subject groups were formed. For each of these three pairings 
multiple t-tests were performed to determine if there were 
statistically significant differences between the two subject 
groups on any of the data items. The assumption here is that 
the subjects who responded to the second requests are the best 
available surrogates for the group of non-respondents. If nu­
merous significant differences exist between the two groups, 
then the presumption is that some degree of response bias in­
fluenced the research results.
Tables XII through XVI summarize the results of the 
response bias tests. Tables XII and XIII present the response 
bias test results for the normative criterion rating rask 
of the first research technique while the following two tables 
reflect the comparable tests for the positive criterion rating 
task. The test results for the loan officer subjects parti- 
pating in the second research technique are reported in Table
First Second
Requests Requests
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2.79 2.53 1. Restricting the amount of management consulting ser­
vices provided by an auditing firm to audit clients 
to a maximum of 10% of the total annual audit fee.
1.37 2.11 2. Giving the SEC total responsibility for the external
audit function. Auditors of financial statements of 
publicly-held companies would be government employees 
much like 1RS auditors.
3.79 3.95 3. Requiring that any proposed auditor adjustments not
incorporated by the client in its financial statements 
be disclosed within the footnotes to the statements.
2.74 2.95 4. Prohibition of executive search services by auditing
firms.
1.84 2.37 5. Selection of auditors for SEC registrants by the SEC
with fee negotiations within guidelines established 
by the SEC.
3.37 3.00 6. Requiring auditors to report on the preferability of
all the client's accounting policies.
3.42 3.21 7. Requiring that the nature and amount of consulting ser­
vices provided by the auditor to the client be disclosed 
within the client's financial statements.
3.00 3.00 8. Establishment of an arbitration board to settle dis­
putes between auditors and clients involving finan­
cial reporting issues.
2.37 2.42 9. A ban on any form of advertising by auditing firms.
2.79 3.21 10. Requiring the mandatory use of audit committees com­
posed of non-employee and non-management members of 
the client's board of directors.
3.05 3.47 11. Required disclosure in client financial statements of
all major audit-client disagreements occurring in the 
eighteen months prior to an auditing firm's dismissal.
2.79 2.68 12. Prohibiting an auditing firm from accepting an engage­
ment if the total revenue from the prospective client 
would be greater than 10% of the auditing firm's total 
revenues.
2.63 2.68 13. Re-instatement of the AICPA's ethical standard pro­
hibiting client solicitation.
2.95 2.95 14. Requiring that audit fee negotiations be the complete
responsibility of the client's audit committee rather 
than the client's management.
3.74 3.63 15. Mandatory rotation of all audit engagement personnel
every three years.
2.84 2.58 16. Annual publication by the SEC of suggested audit fees
per hour by staff level, e.g., staff, senior, etct
TABLE XII
Results of response bias test for loan officers; normative criterion.
Note: No statistically significant differences exist between the above
pairs of means at a .05 significance level.
First Second
Requests Requests
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1.18 1.27 1. Restricting the amount of management consulting ser­
vices provided by an auditing firm to audit clients 
to a maximum of 10% of the total annual audit fee.
1.00 1.09 2. Giving the SEC total responsibility for the external
audit function. Auditors of financial statements of 
publicly-held companies would be government employees 
much like 1RS auditors.
1.45 1.45 3. Requiring that any proposed auditor adjustments not
incorporated by the client in its financial statements 
be disclosed within the footnotes to the statements.
2.36 2.27 4. Prohibition of executive search services by auditing
firms.
1.00 1.55 5. Selection of auditors for SEC registrants by the SEC
with fee negotiations within guidelines established 
by the SEC.
1.82 1.91 6. Requiring auditors to report on the preferability of
all the client's accounting policies.
1.55 1.64 7. Requiring that the nature and amount of consulting ser­
vices provided by the auditor to the client be disclosed 
within the client's financial statements.
1.82 1.91 8. Establishment of an arbitration board to settle dis­
putes between auditors and clients involving finan­
cial reporting issues.
2.09 2.18 9. A ban on any form of advertising by auditing firms.
■^ .82 3.45 10. Requiring the mandatory use of audit committees com­
posed of non-employee and non-management members of 
the client's board of directors.
2.27 1.73 11. Required disclosure in client financial statements of
all major audit-client disagreements occurring in the 
eighteen months prior to an auditing firm's dismissal.
2.36 1.91 12. Prohibiting an auditing firm from accepting an engage­
ment if the total revenue from the prospective client 
would be greater than 10% of the auditing firm's total 
revenues.
2 .Q1 3.18 13. Re-instatement of the AICPA's ethical standard pro­
hibiting client solicitation.
2.45 2.18 14. Requiring that audit fee negotiations be the complete
responsibility of the client's audit committee rather 
than the client's management.
1.82 1.73 15. Mandatory rotation of all audit engagement personnel
every three years.
1 .18 1 .45 16. Annual publication by the SEC of suggested audit fees
per hour by staff level, e.g., staff, senior, etc,
TABLE XIII
Results of response bias test for partners: normative criterion.
Note: No statistically significant differences exist between the
above pairs of means at a .05 significance level.
First Second
Requests Requests
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2.00 2.26 1. Restricting the amount of management consulting ser­
vices provided by an auditing firm to audit clients 
to a maximum of 10% of the total annual audit fee.
1.79 2.00 2. Giving the SEC total responsibility for the external
audit function. Auditors of financial statements of 
publicly-held companies would be government employees 
* much like 1RS auditors.
3.16 3.79 3. Requiring that any proposed auditor adjustments not
Incorporated by the client In Its financial statements 
be disclosed within the footnotes to the statements.
2.26 2.00 4. Prohibition of executive search services by auditing
firms.
2.63 2.32 5. Selection of auditors for SEC registrants by the SEC
with fee negotiations within guidelines established 
by the SEC.
3.00 3.00 6. Requiring auditors to report on the preferability of
all the client's accounting policies.
2.79 2.42 7. Requiring that the nature and amount of consulting ser­
vices provided by the auditor to the client be disclosed 
within the client's financial statements.
2.68 2.84 8. Establishment of an arbitration board to settle dis­
putes between auditors and clients Involving finan­
cial reporting Issues.
1.68 1.84 9. A ban on any form of advertising by auditing firms.
3.11 2.79 10. Requiring the mandatory use of audit committees com­
posed of non-employee and non-management members of 
the client's board of directors.
2.84 3.42 11. Required disclosure In client financial statements of
all major audlt-cllent disagreements occurring In the 
eighteen months prior to an auditing firm's dismissal. 
2.47 2.74 12. Prohibiting an auditing firm from accepting an engage­
ment If the total revenue from the prospective client 
would be greater than 10% of the auditing firm's total 
revenues.
2.11 2.84 13. Re-instatement of the AICPA's ethical standard pro­
hibiting client solicitation.
2.37 2.53 14. Requiring that audit fee negotiations be the complete
responsibility of the client's audit committee rather 
than the client's management.
3.42 3.26 15. Mandatory rotation of all audit engagement personnel
every three years.
1.95 2.11 16. Annual publication by the SEC of suggested audit fees
per hour by staff level, e.g., staff, senior, etci
TABLE XIV
Results of response bias test for loan officers: positive criterion.
* - .05 significance level
First Second
Requests Requests
1.18
2.73
1.27
1.91
1.64
1.82
1.27
1.45
1.09
3.18
1.91
2.55
1.55
2.45
2.27
1.00
1.27 1.
2.36 2.
1.82 3.
2.27 4.
1.64 5.
1.91 6.
1.36 7.
2.09 8.
1.36 9.
3.64 10. 
1.82 11. 
2.45 12.
1.91 13. 
2.54 14.
2.45 15. 
1.45* 16.
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Restricting the amount of management consulting ser­
vices provided by an auditing firm to audit clients 
to a maximum of 10% of the total annual audit fee.
Giving the SEC total responsibility for the external 
audit function. Auditors of financial statements of 
publicly-held companies would be government employees 
much like 1RS auditors.
Requiring that any proposed auditor adjustments not 
incorporated by the client in its financial statements 
be disclosed within the footnotes to the statements. 
Prohibition of executive search services by auditing 
firms.
Selection of auditors for SEC registrants by the SEC 
with fee negotiations within guidelines established 
by the SEC.
Requiring auditors to report on the preferability of 
all the client's accounting policies.
Requiring that the nature and amount of consulting ser­
vices provided by the auditor to the client be disclosed 
within the client's financial statements.
Establishment of an arbitration board to settle dis­
putes between auditors and clients involving finan­
cial reporting issues.
A ban on any form of advertising by auditing firms. 
Requiring the mandatory use of audit committees com­
posed of non-employee and non-management members of 
the client's board of directors.
Required disclosure in client financial statements of 
all major audit-client disagreements occurring in the 
eighteen months prior to an auditing firm's dismissal. 
Prohibiting an auditing firm from accepting an engage­
ment if the total revenue from the prospective client 
would be greater than 10% of the auditing firm's total 
revenues.
Re-instatement of the AICPA's ethical standard pro­
hibiting client solicitation.
Requiring that audit fee negotiations be the complete 
responsibility of the client's audit committee rather 
than the client's management.
Mandatory rotation of all audit engagement personnel 
every three years.
Annual publication by the SEC of suggested audit fees 
per hour by staff level, e.g., staff, senior, etc*
TABLE XV
Results of response bias test for partners : positive criterion.
* - .05 significance level
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First Second
Case* Requests Requests
1 5.43 4.71
2 4.57 4.43
3 3.21 3.36
4 2.64 2.79
5 4.43 4.36
6 4.07 4.14
7 2.57 2.71
8 2.14 2.07
9 4.07 3.00
10 3.57 2.86
11 2.86 2.14
12 2.43 1.86
13 3.43 2.64
14 3.00 2.50
15 2.50 1.93
16 2.00 1.79
TABLE XVI
Results of the response bias test 
for the second research technique.
* - See Table VII for the combinations of treatment 
levels included in each case.
Note; No statistically significant differences exist 
between the above pairs of means at a .05 level.
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XVI. There obviously is no evidence of response bias influ­
encing the results of the normative criterion rating task. 
Tables XII and XIII indicate that there were no significant 
differences between the two subject groups on any of the 
thirty-two data items. In Tables XIV and XV there were two 
data items on which significant differences were found to 
exist between the first and second request groups. Since 
sixty-four paired comparisons were made in testing for re­
sponse bias in the first research method, the finding of two 
significant differences at a .05 level does not seem unlike­
ly. The larger the number of comparisons made, the more like­
ly it is that significant differences will be found in a few 
cases. Given these results, it seems safe to conclude that 
the amount of response bias which influenced the results of 
the two rating tasks was minimal.
With respect to the second research method. Table XVI 
reports the sixteen paired comparisons which were made to test 
for response bias. There is no evidence of response bias 
since there were no statistically significant differences at 
the .05 level.
Measures of the Reliability 
of Research Results 
As noted in Chapter IV, there are several available 
methods for analyzing the degree of interrater reliability in 
an ANOVA design. Again, since the second half of the study 
employed a research design very similar to that of Shockley's^
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his approach to evaluating this attribute was used. Essen­
tially, interrater reliability is a measure of the degree of 
consensus between subjects concerning the relative importance 
of the independent variables incorporated in the research de­
sign. A low degree of consensus leads one to question whether 
the predictor variables provided to subjects to assess the 
criterion variable were highly relevant for that purpose. The 
first step in analyzing the degree of consensus among subjects 
in an ANOVA design is to calculate the R . This statistic 
simply reports the total percentage of the variation in sub­
jects' responses which was accounted for by the composite 
ANOVA model. Generally, the level of R is quite modest, a
result which does not reflect positively on the degree of
2
consensus among subjects. In this study the R was 31.97%,
2
while Shockley achieved an R of 28.0%. However, for several
reasons it can be misleading to concentrate entirely upon the
2
composite model's R in assessing the degree of consensus
among subjects.
Shockley noted that the primary reason for the substan­
tial loss of explanatory power when shifting from an analysis 
of the individual ANOVA models to that of the combined model 
is the averaging across individuals inherent in the latter 
case. This averaging process results in substantial losses 
of explanatory power due to individual differences among sub­
jects. These differences are generally attributable to three
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factors: 1) differences among subjects in the variables consid­
ered important, 2) differences in the weights ascribed the 
variables, and 3) differences in the perceived direction of 
the variables' effect. The most damaging of these possibili­
ties is the latter one (Shockley, p. 795). If the subjects 
did not agree to any great extent on the directional effect 
of the independent variables, then any further analysis would 
be essentially meaningless. In this study there is little 
evidence of any significant disagreement among subjects in 
this regard. Table X shows that in only a few cases did in­
dividual subjects use independent variables in a direction 
opposed to that suggested by the composite model. Thus, the 
primary reasons for the loss of explanatory power when analyz­
ing the combined ANOVA model of this'study were disagreements 
among subjects as to which variables were important and disa­
greements concerning the relative importance of these same 
variables.
In order to gauge the severity of the first of the
2
above two possibilities, the average R for each individual 
subject's model was computed considering only those main ef­
fects and interactions which were found to be significant in
the composite ANOVA model. Table XI reports the distribution 
2
of these R s and the mean which was 81%. The comparable means 
for the four subject classes of Shockley's study ranged from 
59.4% to 71.0%. Since over 80% of the variance in subjects' 
responses was explained by the significant factors in the
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combined model, it seems apparent that there was considerable 
consensus among subjects as to the importance of those vari­
ables. Accordingly, the lack of consensus in the composite 
model appears to be attributable to differences in how the 
subjects weighted the individual significant variables, a con­
clusion which is not as negative a reflection on the judgment 
consensus of subjects as would be the two other possibilities 
mentioned by Shockley.
The other dimension of reliability which was measured 
in this study was test-retest reliability. The primary mo­
tivation for evaluating this characteristic of a behavioral 
study is to determine the degree of conscientiousness with 
which subjects approached the research tasks. Of course, 
in order to measure this attribute the researcher must ob­
tain two sets of responses from a group of research sub­
jects. In the initial research technique, twenty-seven of 
the ninety-two respondents indicated a desire to receive a 
synopsis of the research results. Given these subjects' inte­
rest in the study, it was concluded that they would likely be 
more willing to complete the research instrument a second time 
than would the other respondents. Accordingly, each of these 
individuals was mailed an identical version of the instrument 
approximately two months after the initial requests were 
mailed. Eleven responses were received from this one mailing. 
Nine of these respondents completed the instrument as instruc­
ted while the other two subjects simply returned it uncompleted
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and stated that their responses would not change. For each 
of the nine respondents who completed the instrument a sec­
ond time, the correlation between their two sets of responses 
was calculated. For the total group the correlation was .78 
while the correlations for the individuals were .33, .46, .56, 
.65, .76, .77, .83, .99, and 1.00. The above figures compare 
favorably with those reported in the ANOVA studies by Ashton 
(1974) and Joyce (1976). In Ashton's study the mean correla­
tion for the test-retest procedure was .81 with a range from 
.43 to .96 while Joyce had a mean of .86 with a range from 
.085 to 1.00.
The above approach was also used to determine the de­
gree of test-retest reliability in the second research tech­
nique. Of the forty-three respondents to the instrument used 
in that task, seventeen individuals indicated a desire to re­
ceive a synopsis of the research results. Each of these sub­
jects was asked to complete the instrument a second time. Six 
responses were received from one mailing. The mean correla­
tion between these subjects' responses as a group was .83.
On an individual basis, the correlations were .75, .82, .91, 
.96, .97, and 1.00. Again, these results are very consistent 
with those of the Ashton and Joyce studies.
There remain certain cautions which should be taken in 
interpreting the above results. First, it seems somewhat sus­
picious to have a subject with complete judgment stability 
over time. It is quite possible, if not likely, that the two
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subjects in this study whose two vectors of responses corre­
lated exactly may have kept a copy of their original instru­
ment and simply filled in their original responses on the 
second instrument. Second, the manner in which the subjects 
were selected may have influenced the results of this latter 
test.. The subjects who asked to receive a synopsis of the 
research conclusions may have been more likely to conscien­
tiously complete the instruments in the first case, a fact 
which may have inflated the above judgment stability statis­
tics somewhat.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The overriding objective of this study has been to 
obtain a broader and more in-depth understanding of the pheno­
menon of perceived auditor independence. The primary means 
employed toward this end was an empirical research design 
consisting of two research techniques. The first part of 
this study was designed to clarify many of the contradictory 
results of previous studies of perceived independence. Two 
samples of subjects, commercial loan officers and partners 
of national accounting firms, were asked to evaluate sixteen 
actions which have been proposed in recent years to promote 
the perceived independence of external auditors. The sub­
jects were instructed to rate the items in two independent 
tasks, the first involving a non-normative or positive rating 
criterion while the second required the subjects to use a 
normative criterion. In the first case, the subjects were 
asked to evaluate the actions on the basis of the degree to 
which each would, if adopted, strengthen auditor independence. 
The normative rating task essentially required the subjects to
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express how strongly they were in favor (or disfavor) of 
each action's adoption.
Another problem noted during the review of the rele­
vant literature was that auditor independence has not been 
studied in a context-specific manner. The potential for im­
pairment of auditor independence arises in very specific sit­
uations and it seems that interesting insights could be ob­
tained by examining such situations rather than simply study­
ing the phenomenon in a non-contextual manner. One such situ­
ation in which the auditor's independence is threatened is 
within conflict episodes with the client.
A research task was designed and carried out to deter­
mine the extent to which loan officers believe that auditors' 
professional judgment may be compromised in conflict episodes 
and also to determine which factors in the audit context make 
it more or less likely that such a situation will result. 
Based upon a review of the professional literature, the fol­
lowing four features of the audit context were selected for 
this latter purpose: the relative degree of competition in
the audit market, whether or not a substantial amount of con­
sulting services was provided by the auditing firm to the 
client, the relative financial condition of the client, and 
the degree of subjectivity required to interpret the focal 
issue of the controversy.
The results of both research techniques shed consid­
erable light on many of the unresolved issues surrounding
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the auditor independence construct. However, in interpreting 
the results one must keep in mind the particular biases that 
each subject class may have brought with them to the experi­
mental context. For example, partners' responses may have 
been influenced by a motivation to retain the status quo. It 
seems likely that the partners would not want to see the adop­
tion of additional rules and technical guidelines which would, 
in most cases, complicate their professional roles. On the 
other hand, it is important to realize that the loan officers 
may also have prejudices and predispositions which influenced 
their responses. Accordingly, the results of this study should 
not be generalized to groups other than those represented in 
this research design.
Review of the Results of Research Technique No. 1
In Chapter III, three specific research questions were 
raised with regard to the first section of this research pro­
ject;
1. Which structural changes in the auditor's role do
relevant parties consider the most significant deter­
minants of perceived auditor independence?
2. Which structural changes in the auditor's role do
relevant parties believe should be adopted?
3. How much consensus exists between an important finan­
cial statement user group and partners of national 
accounting firms on the issues raised in the two pre­
vious research questions?
Turning to the third research question, the empirical 
results tend to indicate a substantial amount of disparity be­
tween the two groups. In each of the ratings tasks the pattern
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of dissimilarity between the partners and loan officers' 
ratings was easily discernible. The audit partners were 
much more skeptical of the ability of the proposed actions 
to 'legislate' auditor independence and, as a result, were 
much less likely to suggest that the recommended actions 
be adopted. One exception to this generalization was with 
respect to the use of audit committees. The partners were 
rather positive about the required use of such committees in 
an audit context on both of the evaluative criteria. In 
fact, on the normative criterion, this alternative was the 
only one which the partners as a whole believed should be 
adopted.
In both rating tasks, the largest difference between 
the two groups was reflected on the item calling for the dis­
closure in the financial statements of auditor-proposed ad­
justments not accepted by the client. The loan officers be­
lieved that such an action would promote the auditor's inde­
pendence and were rather firm in advocating the adoption of 
this policy alternative. On the other hand, the partners 
were adamant in expressing their disfavor with this action 
on the normative criterion and gave it a very low rating on 
its ability to strengthen auditor independence.
The general inability of the partners and loan offi­
cers to agree on which actions should be taken to promote 
auditor independence is not a positive reflection upon the 
financial reporting process or the auditing discipline. It
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seems that the stature of the auditing profession could be 
enhanced if the opinions of user groups were given more con­
sideration in the standard-setting processes. Additionally, 
such a move would be a first step in satisfying many of the 
concerns expressed in recent years by critics of the profession.
With respect to the first two research questions, the 
results of this study for the first time present a rather com­
prehensive picture of financial statement users' views on how 
auditor independence could be strengthened and what actions 
should be taken to achieve this end. Fortunately, there ap­
peared to be a substantial amount of agreement on the ratings 
of the sixteen actions by the loan officers when employing 
the two different evaluative criteria. .The items which were 
rated as being highly likely of improving the auditor's 
ability to remain independent were also generally ranked 
high on the normative criterion of whether or not the loan 
officers wanted to see the action adopted.
Of the six items that the loan officers would like 
to see implemented, four would simply require more or new 
disclosures concerning the auditor-client relationship.
Only two of the six actions would actually require an expli­
cit change in how the audit engagement is performed. Loan 
officers would require that audit engagement personnel be 
rotated every three years and would also like to see t!ie 
mandatory use of audit committees composed of non-employee 
and non-management members of the client's board of directors.
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In reviewing those policies which the loan officers 
rejected it is quite easy to discern two apparent trends. 
First, the loan officers tended to be very negative with 
regard to those proposed actions which would require the 
further encroachment of governmental regulatory bodies into 
the affairs of the accounting and auditing profession. Sec­
ond, the loan officers were very hesitant to call for the 
adoption of any policy which would infringe on the economic 
liberty of auditing firms.
Overall, the results of the first research technique 
are quite reassuring. If one assumes that commercial loan 
officers are fairly representative of the universe of fi­
nancial statement users, then it seems obvious that no really 
drastic measures are necessary in order to improve the appear­
ance of independence of external auditors. In fact, the most 
appropriate policy to follow in this regard is already being 
embraced by the SEC. For many years that body has espoused 
the policy of full and fair disclosure in the financial re­
porting process. The loan officers do not believe it is 
necessary to totally restructure the auditor's role in order 
to provide the latter with a more pressure-free environment 
in which to carry out the attestation function. The loan 
officers are, in several cases, willing to forego actions 
which they believe would strengthen the auditor's indepen­
dence in order to keep from infringing on his economic liber­
ties. What these individuals do demand is that they be kept
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informed of all facets of the auditor-client relationship.
Given this information, they can decide for themselves when 
the auditor's independence appears to be endangered.
Review of the Results of Research Technique No. 2
The loan officer subjects of the second research tech­
nique provided many interesting insights concerning auditor- 
client conflict. The two features of the audit context which 
these individuals thought substantially increased the likeli­
hood of such conflict episodes being resolved in favor of the 
client were the relative financial condition of the client 
and the degree of subjectivity required to interpret the fo­
cal issue of the controversy. The loan officers perceived 
that the client in a healthy financial condition has a mode­
rately better chance of prevailing in a dispute than a client 
in relatively poor financial condition. With respect to the 
other important determinant of these situations, the subjects 
believed that the auditing firm was more likely to defer to 
the client's wishes in the materiality rather than the sub­
sequent event controversy.
The primary difference between the conflict episodes 
presented to the subjects was the degree of subjectivity which 
was required in each to interpret the basic source of the dis­
pute. Concerning the situation involving the subsequent event, 
the technical standards explicitly require that such an item 
be disclosed in the financial statements of the reporting
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entity. Thus, in that conflict episode, the hypothetical 
client was essentially asking the auditing firm to agree 
with a position contrary to the dictates of reporting and 
accounting guidelines. The subjects did not perceive that 
the client would be likely to induce the auditing firm to 
agree with such an untenable position. In the other scenario, 
the technical standards provided very little in the way of 
guidance to resolve the issue at the heart of that contro­
versy. The loan officer subjects of this study generally 
believed that the client in this latter case would be more 
successful in eventually obtaining the auditing firm's ap­
proval of their preferred alternative, i.e., rejection of the 
proposed adjustment for unrecorded liabilities on the grounds 
that the amount was immaterial.
The important issue to face now is how to deal with the 
above two variables in the audit context in order to decrease 
the likelihood that auditing firms will be pressured to submit 
to the demands of their clients in conflict episodes. The fi­
nancial condition of the client is a variable which is not 
subject to a large degree of control by regulatory authorities, 
Rather than attempting to control this variable, a surrogate 
measure would be to follow De Angelo's (1980) argument and 
impose strict sanctions against auditing firms which sub­
jugate their professional judgment to the wishes of their 
clients. With respect to the second issue, the profession 
should make an effort to develop more objective criteria
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for determining the materiality of financial statement amounts. 
This recommendation applies not only to this issue, but to 
the technical standards of the profession in general.
Nichols and Price argued that this latter move would 
bring about a more symmetrical distribution of power in the 
auditor-client relationship. With more objective specifica­
tion of technical standards, auditors would not be required 
to use as much subjective judgment in carrying out the audit 
function. Naturally, this would decrease the frequency of 
disagreements arising between auditing firms and their clients. 
The position taken by Goldman and Bariev was that by reducing 
the degree of subjective judgment which the auditor must em­
ploy in carrying out the audit function, the power base of 
the auditor would be diminished. The degree of expertise 
in the auditor's role is the primary source of his power, 
according to these researchers, and thus, specifically de­
fining auditing and accounting principles would essentially 
reduce the auditor's function to that of a mechanic.
Certainly, these two sets of researchers' positions 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Each position is 
probably at least partially valid. Nichols and Price's : 
suggestion would increase the degree of legitimate power which 
the auditor could exercise in the audit context but, at the 
same time, it would tend to reduce the degree of profession­
alism within the auditor's role. Goldman and Bariev's recom­
mendation would likely increase the status of the auditor as
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a professional possessing an in-depth knowledge of financial 
issues. However, the ability of the auditor to exercise his 
professional role would be further constrained by the in­
creased pressure exerted by management to interpret specific 
financial reporting issues in such a way as to show their 
company in a more favorable light. Regardless of which of 
the above two positions is considered the most valid, if im­
plemented, each would benefit greatly by the imposition of 
strict sanctions against auditing firms for failing to follow 
prescribed technical standards and against the management of 
reporting entities for attempting to influence their auditors' 
professional behavior.
With respect to the second part of this study, the re­
commendations that have been suggested are obviously very 
general in nature. It seems that prior to taking specific 
action with regard to the points which have been raised above 
the profession first needs to determine exactly what role it 
wants to serve in the financial reporting process. Do audit­
ing firms want their employees to be perceived as highly 
trained professionals who have a thorough understanding of 
complicated financial accounting and reporting standards, or 
would they rather define the auditor's role as narrowly as 
possible?
Certainly, this latter alternative is not an appealing 
one and it does not seem that members of the auditing disci­
pline would consciously choose such a course. However, many
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of the decisions which have been made in recent years seem to 
point the profession along that route. Just recently a pro­
posed reporting standard which would have entirely revamped 
the auditor's reporting responsibilities was rejected by the
7
Auditing Standards Board. That standard would have required 
auditors to report on their clients' financial condition and 
results of operations in much more detail. The uniform au­
ditors' report would have been abandoned and in its place au­
diting firms would have had the responsibility of designing 
a unique reporting format for each of their clients. Some 
auditing firms may have been fearful that the adoption of this 
new standard would substantially increase the risk of legal 
liability being imposed against them. As Mautz and Sharaf 
(1961) warned, moves such as this to limit the auditor's pro­
fessional responsibilities may ultimately result in the audi­
tor relinquishing his function to other professional roles.
Research Techniques No. 1 and 2 ;
Correlating the Results 
The two halves of this research project were oriented 
around the central theme of the need to strengthen financial 
statement users' perceptions of auditor independence. Al­
though the approaches taken in each case were quite dissimilar,
7
See D.R. Carmichael, "Late Developments - ASB opts 
to keep current auditor's report," Journal of Accountancy, 
April, 1981, p. 3.
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the results yielded can still be profitably compared and con­
trasted. Hopefully, some degree of synergism was obtained as 
a result of employing this two-dimensional design.
Many of the sixteen policy alternatives used in the two 
rating tasks of the first research technique related directly 
or indirectly to the degree of competition in the audit mar­
kets, one of the four primary independent variables of the 
second research technique. The results of the rating tasks 
clearly illustrated that the loan officer subjects were very 
hesitant to call for the adoption of any policy action which 
would limit auditing firms' right to freely compete in the 
marketplace. Such was the case even though the bankers be­
lieved that the implementation of certain of these competition- 
related actions would modestly increase the ability of audi­
tors to retain their apparent independence. In the second 
part of the research the empirical data demonstrated that the 
level of competition was a factor, albeit a relatively weak 
one, in loan officer's judgments concerning the outcomes of 
auditor-client conflict episodes. The subjects expressed 
their beliefs that the high degree of competitiveness in au­
dit markets makes it less likely that an auditing firm will 
appear to be independent or would be expected to act in a pro­
fessionally autonomous manner, but that does not imply that 
they would necessarily deny the auditor the right to compete.
The second variable incorporated in the hypothetical 
scenarios concerned the amount of consulting services provided
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by the auditing firm to its client. The MAS factor was found 
to be a significant variable in the loan officers' decisions 
even though, as in the case of the competition variable, it 
accounted for only a small amount of the explained variation 
in those decisions. In the rating tasks it was found that the 
loan officers leaned more toward the disclosure of MAS activ­
ities rather than toward prohibiting or restricting these an­
cillary services of auditing firms. As in the case of the 
competition-related actions, the subjects expressed their 
views that limiting the right of auditing firms to provide MAS 
would most likely strengthen auditor independence, however, 
when it came to normatively supporting such measures the sub­
jects were not at all favorably predisposed. Apparently, fi­
nancial statement users simply want to be informed of the 
amount of MAS being provided by auditing firms to their cli­
ents. As long as this information is available, user groups 
can employ their own judgment, not to determine whether such 
activities impair independence; the empirical data seems to 
have established that fact. Rather, user groups can employ 
such information to determine the degree to which independence 
has been impaired, and finally, to decide whether actions 
should be taken to remedy the situation.
The action which the loan officers wanted implemented 
more than any other according to the ANOVA design was the 
mandatory financial statement disclosure of adjustments pro­
posed by the auditing firm but not accepted by the client.
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Such a high degree of subjective judgment is required in 
many financial reporting decisions that substantial differen­
ces of opinion can occur between auditors and their clients 
in the process of preparing financial statements. In most 
such situations the client has a vested interest in the re­
porting alternative which would present its financial condi­
tion in the best possible light to the public, and consequent­
ly, the auditor may be subjected to lobbying attempts by the 
client to influence his professional behavior. In the loan 
officers' evaluation of the hypothetical scenarios they were 
quite skeptical of the ability of the auditor to withstand 
such pressure in the conflict episode involving the material­
ity dispute. The key issue in that particular dispute was 
the necessity of the client incorporating in its financial 
statements an adjustment for an amount of unrecorded liabili­
ties discovered by the auditing firm in its year-end examina­
tion. There is a two-step remedy for overcoming the problem 
of clients exerting pressure on their auditors to overlook 
such proposed adjustments. First, would be the adoption of 
the alternative highly regarded by the loan officers in the 
rating tasks, i.e., requiring that all 'passed' adjustments 
be disclosed in the financial statements. The second measure 
would be to implement and enforce harsh sanctions against au­
diting firms not complying with the rules of professional con­
duct.
Another result of the first research technique which is
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interesting in relation to the second research technique con­
cerns the disclosure of major disagreements occurring in the 
eighteen months prior to an auditing firm's dismissal. That 
action was rated third most highly by the loan officers on 
the positive rating criterion and fourth highest on the norma­
tive criterion. These results indicate that the issue of au­
ditor-client conflict is an important one to financial state­
ment users, a result which provides a higher level of valid­
ity for the second half of the research design. The loan 
officer subjects also expressed a desire for the auditor to 
report on the preferability of the client's accounting poli-; 
cies. If such disclosures were mandated, then a major source 
of auditor-client conflict would more than likely be elimin­
ated. Clients would likely be averse to having the fact dis­
closed that they are not using the most preferable accounting 
policies, and thus, would have an incentive to adopt such 
policies.
Recommendations for Future Research 
As in most cases, this study raised just as many ques­
tions as it resolved and suggests a number of areas for future 
researchers to explore. One of the most obvious ways in which 
this study could be extended would be to obtain the views of 
other financial statement user groups on the issues addressed 
in this study. As emphasized several times, the other major 
user groups may not necessarily share the opinions expressed 
by the commercial loan officers who participated in this
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research project.
Another very meaningful question to examine in this 
research context is exactly how promulgatory bodies establish 
a set of policy guidelines with respect to such global issues 
in the accounting and auditing disciplines as independence, 
materiality, etc. One of the presumptions of this study was 
that the partners of national accounting firms have a dispro­
portionate influence in the standard-setting processes. That 
presumption or accusation has been made by several individuals 
and organizations but its veracity should be thoroughly re­
searched before it is accepted. The manner in which rules and 
policies are supposed to be formulated is quite specifically 
defined by the quasi-legal and legal promulgatory bodies 
within the profession, however, are the rules and policies 
actually established in the prescribed manner? Are there 
powerful lobbying forces operating within the above processes, 
and if so, are they successful in having their demands satis­
fied? For instance, it seems quite surprising that the pro­
posed reporting standard referred to previously was not adopted 
since there seemed to be a large ground swell of support for it 
in the financial community. If this was in fact the case, then 
the utilitarian philosophy that supposedly prevails in the 
standard-setting processes should have resulted in that stan­
dard's adoption. It seems imperative that all of the idiosyn- 
cracies of the promulgatory processes be identified. Once a 
firm understanding of all aspects of such has been obtained.
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then suggestions for changing the system in order to make it 
more responsive to the needs of user groups can be made.
Another general recommendation for future research 
with respect to auditor independence is the utilization of 
qualitative research methodologies to investigate the critical 
factors which can lead to auditors losing their impartiality 
and objectivity. The use of qualitative research techniques 
such as case studies, participant observation, and personal 
interviews is widely accepted and esteemed in most behavioral 
disciplines. However, such procedures are not highly regarded 
by accounting and auditing researchers. Especially in the 
case of auditing, qualitative methods would seem to be very 
promising tools to employ since a number of the most important 
problems in this discipline are behavioral in nature. For 
instance, a case study approach should yield interesting in­
sights concerning the impairment of auditor independence which 
would not be available from employing the more conventional 
research methods. There have been only a very limited number 
of 'audit failures' in the last few decades. In many of these 
instances, a contributing factor has been a lack of impartial­
ity on the part of the auditing firm. By using a case study 
approach to investigate these isolated incidents, it is pos­
sible that certain variables or environmental conditions would 
be identified which were common to each situation. Of course, 
this type of information would be invaluable to policy makers 
charged with developing a framework of guidelines to promote 
the independence of external auditors.
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The above recommendations are obviously very general 
in nature, however, there are other specific research issues 
and questions which the results of this research suggest. The 
focus of the first research technique was primarily upon the 
response of loan officer subjects, however, the analysis of 
the partners' responses pointed out several interesting ave­
nues of research. For instance, the loan officers were heav­
ily in favor of the disclosure of 'passed' adjustments in 
client financial statements while the audit partners were 
strongly against such a proposal. One has to speculate as 
to why the partners held such a view. Is it because they do 
not want user groups to perceive that audit firms are being 
coerced into overlooking deficiencies or errors in financial 
statements? Or, conversely, do the audit partners feel that 
such disclosures would simply confuse rather than enlighten 
financial statement readers?
Another interesting issue to examine is exactly why 
audit partners are opposed to reporting on the preferability 
of their client's accounting policies. The loan officers 
were in favor of this action's adoption more than likely be­
cause financial statement readers would benefit from having 
an objective assessment of the preferability of firms' ac­
counting policies disclosed. Such a move would also appear 
to benefit auditing firms by extending their role in the fi­
nancial reporting process, and thus, enhancing their stature 
in the financial community.
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Both subject groups were in favor of the mandatory 
use of audit committees, however, there has been only a very 
limited amount of empirical research concerning the effective­
ness of such committees to date. In the context of the second 
part of this research, it would be interesting to explore how 
the use of an audit committee impacts the balance of power in 
the audit dyad. Does the existence of an audit committee re­
duce the frequency and volatility of auditor-client conflict?
A natural source of data to be used in resolving this question 
would be members of corporate audit committees. In a related 
vein, Mautz and Neary (1979) implied that the effectiveness 
of such committees may be diminishing with the increased work­
load being imposed upon their members. Can that presumption 
be supported empirically, and if so, what are the implications 
for auditors' independence?
One of the advantages of studying the independence con­
struct is the large number of research issues it provides.
This feature of the auditor's role has direct or indirect im­
plications to a wide range of contexts including such areas as 
the planning of the audit, the interpretation of audit results, 
and the reporting of these results to the investing and lending 
public. As long as the auditor's role survives, it appears 
there will be no dearth of independence and independence-re­
lated issues to investigate.
To paraphrase Professor Stamp (1978), an auditor who is 
no longer independent is no longer an auditor. The importance
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of independence is so pervasive as to be the one character­
istic of the auditor's role which is essential to his being 
able to retain his integral function in the financial report­
ing process. In recent years the confidence of financial 
statement users in the integrity of the auditor's profes­
sional role has been shaken considerably. This research has 
examined a number of the issues contributing to the contro­
versy surrounding the auditor's current problems. Possibly, 
this study's results will provide some measure of input to 
the resolution of these problems. At the very least, it is 
hoped that these findings spur regulatory bodies to expand 
their efforts to find the necessary corrective actions in 
order to assure that the auditor will maintain his important 
position in the financial reporting process.
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1. Restriction on the amount of MAS which auditing firms 
can provide. The MAS controversy has been discussed 
very widely in the professional literature. A few of 
the more prominent works in recent years which have 
addressed this issue are Shockley (1981), Firth (1981), 
and Milano (1979).
2. Giving the SEC total responsibility for the external 
audit function. This alternative was discussed by Dykx­
hoorn and Sinning (1981, p. 174) . Chenok (1978) alluded 
to this possibility but did not endorse its adoption.
3. Disclosure of auditor-proposed adjustments not accepted 
by the client. No evidence could be found in the pro­
fessional literature to support this action; however, 
intuitively, it seems that such a requirement would most 
likely have at least a modest positive impact on the per­
ceived independence of auditors. If auditors know that 
'passed adjustments' which they have approved will come 
under the scrutiny of financial statement readers, 
management pressure to disregard such may not be as 
effective as it would be otherwise.
4. Prohibition of executive.search services by .auditing firms, 
The Cohen Commission (1978, p. 174) recommended stringent 
restrictions on the scope of executive search services 
provided by auditing firms. The Commission argued that 
such a move would strengthen third parties' perceptions
of auditor independence.
5. Selection of auditing firms for SEC registrants by the 
SEC with fee negotiations within guidelines established 
by the SEC. Dykxhoorn and Sinning in their overview of 
auditor independence in the West German economy mentioned 
that certain parties in that country had discussed the 
possibility of establishing an 'SEC-type' agency which 
would have the additional responsibility of assigning 
auditors to firms and/or paying the audit fees directly 
to the audit firms.
6. Requiring that auditing firms report on the preferability 
of their clients' accounting policies. A few years ago, 
a significant controversy over this issue arose in the 
financial community. The Cohen Commission expressed its 
view that auditors should evaluate the accounting prin­
ciples employed by clients and make a determination of 
whether they are preferable to other alternatives avail­
able (p. 20). SEC Commissioner Williams endorsed that 
position (1977, p. 44) but the AICPA has largely ignored 
the issue.
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7. Disclosure of the nature and amount of auditor-provided 
MAS in the client's financial statements. Reckers and 
Stagliano (1981) carried out an empirical study related 
to this requirement which was established by ASR #250. 
These researchers concluded that financial statement 
users' confidence in the auditor's ability to remain 
independent was not greatly affected by the ASR #250 
disclosures, however, their empirical data did not to­
tally support this conclusion.
8. Establishment of an arbitration board to settle auditor 
client disputes^ Berryman (1974, p. 13) did not direct 
call for such a board, but he did speculate about the 
need to consider an institutionalized procedure for 
periodically reviewing auditors' professional behavior.
9. A ban on advertising by auditing firms. Advertising is 
another topic that has been very widely discussed in th 
professional literature relative to auditor independenc' 
The Cohen Commission briefly alluded to the relationshi; 
between advertising and independence (p. 109-110).
10. Required use of audit committees. Milano's study found 
that the use of audit committees tended to increase the 
level of auditors' perceived independence. Several 
other parties including Mautz and Neary (1979), Wolnize 
(1980), and Neumann (1981) have discussed the relative 
merits of audit committees.
11. Required financial statement disclosure of all major 
auditor-client disagreements occurring in the eighteen 
months prior to an auditing firm's dismissal. In 1974 
the SEC issued a requirement that registrants changing 
audit firms had to file an 8-k report informing the 
public of such, and disclosing any disagreements over 
auditing or accounting issues between them and their 
auditors in the preceding eighteen months. ASR #247 
issued in 1978 went a step further by requiring that 
the registrant disclose whether the change in auditors 
was approved by the audit committee and board of di­
rectors. Fried and Schiff (1981) found that such dis­
closures had only a minimal impact on stock market 
prices of firms filing such 8-ks.
12. Prohibiting auditing firms from accepting an engagement 
if the total revenue from the prospective client would 
be greater than 10% of the auditing firmes total annual 
revenues. Shockley found that small auditing firms fac 
a higher risk of having their professional independence 
jeopardized than do large firms. This proposed alterna 
tive is one way in which Shockley's finding could be 
operationalized in the form of an ethical or government 
regulation.
184
13. Re-instatement of the AICPA's ban on client solicitation. 
This action is one alternative that could be used to off­
set the excessive level of competition that the Cohen 
Commission feels is threatening auditors' perceived in­
dependence .
14. Requiring that audit fee negotiations be the complete 
responsibility of the client's audit committee. Milano 
found that, generally, relevant parties in the financial 
reporting process feel this move would improve auditors' 
perceived independence.
15. Mandatory rotation of all audit engagement personnel 
every three years. This is one of the more widely dis­
cussed policies for strengthening auditing firms' inde­
pendence. See Shockley and Dawkins (1978).
16. Annual publication by the SEC of suggested audit fees 
per hour by staff level. DeAngelo (1980) and the Cohen 
Commission both discussed the issue of 'low-balling' 
and its relationship to auditor independence. This 
particular action could possibly diminish the tendency 
of firms to bid much lower than competitors on audit 
engagements offered in competitive bidding scenarios.
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Alexander Grant & Company 
Arthur Andersen & Company 
Arthur Young & Company 
Coopers & Lybrand 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells 
Ernst & Whinney 
Main Hurdman
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company 
Price Waterhouse & Company 
Touche Ross St Company
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*Vniversity'of Oklahoma
Office of ttie  Dean
College of Business Administration
Dear Sir:
As a loan officer, you are in an excellent position to help us analyze the 
independence of external auditors such as those who report upon the financial 
statements of your customers. We ask you to contribute 20-25 minutes of your 
time to assist us in more clearly defining those features of the auditor-client 
relationship which are most important in assuring that the auditor's independence 
is safeguarded.
Along with this letter is an enclosure the first page of which is completion 
instructions. Please take the time to respond to each item called for by the 
enclosure and return it to us in the enclosed postage paid envelope. Your 
responses will be held in strict confidentiality.
If you so desire, we will mail you a summary of the research results.
To indicate that you wish to receive this synopsis, print your name and 
address on the enclosed 4 x 6  card.
Sincerely,
Lawrence McKibbin 
Dean
Enclosures
307 West Brooks, Norman, Oklahoma 73019 (405) 325-3611
Tfie
Universily (fOkùifumui
DIVISION OF ACCOUNTING
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
307 Vl/est Brooks, Room 200 
Norman, Oklahoma 73019 
(405) 325-4221
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As a partner in a national accounting firm, you are in an excellent position 
to help us analyze the independence of external auditors. We ask you to contribute 
15-20 minutes of your time to assist us in more clearly defining those features of 
the auditor-client relationship which are most important in assuring that an auditor's 
independence is safeguarded.
Included with this letter is an enclosure which asks your opinion on several 
possible actions which could be taken or have been taken to strengthen auditors' 
independence. Please take the time to respond to each item called for by the 
enclosure and return it to us in the enclosed postage paid envelope
Your responses will be held in strict confidentiality. If you so desire, we 
will mail you a summary of the research results. To indicate that you wish to 
receive this synopsis, print your name and address on the enclosed 4 x 6  card.
Thank you very much for your assistance,
Bart Ward, Ph.D., CPA 
Associate Professor
Enclosures
a
University of OkCafioma
DIVISION OF ACCOUNTING 
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
307 West Brooks, Room 200 
Norman, Oklahoma 73019 
(405) 325-4221
Three weeks ago you received a copy of an instrument that is being used 
in a research project here at OU. Enclosed is another copy of this instrument. 
Would you be so kind as to complete this questionaire and return it in the 
enclosed postage-paid envelope. This task will require only 15-20 minutes.
All responses will be held in strict confidentiality.
Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,
/ M  i  I IaIo-h/
Bart H.^Ward, Ph.D, CPA 
Associate Professor
Enclosures
TASK n 191
Instructions: The sixteen proposals which follow have been discussed in the
professional literature as potential means for strengthening the independence 
of external auditors. Please rate each item based solely upon the degree to 
which you believe it would promote the independence of the external auditor.
A factor that you should not consider in this task is your personal feeling
as to whether or not the particular item should be adopted or retained, which
ever the case may be. Use the following scale.
5 - Actions contributing a very high degree of assurance 
that auditors' independence will be safeguarded.-
4 - Actions contributing a high degree of assurance that 
auditors' independence will be safeguarded.
3 - Actions contributing a modest degree of assurance that 
auditors' independence will be safeguarded.
2 - Actions contributing a very modest degree of assurance 
that auditors' independence will be safeguarded.
1 - Actions contributing no assurance that auditors' 
independence will be safeguarded.
1. Mandatory rotation of all audit engagement personnel every three years.
2. Required disclosure in client financial statements of all major auditor- 
client disagreements occurring in the eighteen months prior to an auditing 
firm's dismissal.
3. Requiring auditors to report on the preferability of all the client's 
accounting policies.
4. Selection of auditors for SEC registrants by the SEC with fee negotiations 
within guidelines established by the SEC.
5. Annual publication by the SEC of suggested audit fees per hour by staff 
level, e.g., staff, senior, manager, etc.
6. Requiring the mandatory use of audit committees composed of non-employee 
and non-management members of the client's board of directors.
7. Prohibition of executive search services by auditing firms.
8. Establishment of an arbitration board to settle disputes between 
auditors and clients involving financial reporting issues.
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9. Giving the SEC total responsibility for the external audit function. 
Auditors of financial statements of publicly-held companies would be 
government employees much like 1RS auditors.
10. Requiring that audit fee negotiations be the complete responsibility 
of the client's audit committee rather than the client's management.
11. Requiring that the nature and amount of consulting services provided
by the auditor to the client be disclosed within the client's financial 
statements.
12. A ban on any form of advertising by auditing firms.
13. Restricting the amount of management consulting services provided 
by an auditing firm to audit clients to a maximum of 10% of the 
total annual audit fee.
14. Requiring that any proposed auditor adjustment not incorporated by 
the client in its financial statements be disclosed within the 
footnotes to the statements.
15. Prohibiting an auditing firm from accepting an engagement if the 
total revenue from the prospective client would be greater than 
10% of the auditing firm's total annual revenues.
16. Re-instatement of the AICPA's ethical standard prohibiting client 
solicitation.
TASK #2
Instructions: Please rate the above sixteen items again, using the following
five-point scale.
5 - 1  feel very strongly that this particular action should be 
adopted or retained.
4 - 1  feel that this particular action should be adopted or 
retained.
3 - I am neutral with respect to whether or not this particular 
action should be adopted or retained.
2 - 1  feel that this particular action should not be adopted or 
retained.
1 - I feel very strongly that this particular action should not 
be adopted or retained.
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1. Restricting the amount of management consulting services provided by 
an auditing firm to audit clients to a maximum of 10% of the total 
annual audit fee.
2. Giving the SEC total responsibility for the external audit function. 
Auditors of financial statements of publicly-held companies would be 
government employees much like 1RS auditors.
3. Requiring that any proposed auditor adjustments not incorporated by
the client in its financial statements be disclosed within the footnotes 
to the statements.
4. Prohibition of executive search services by auditing firms.
5. Selection of auditors for SEC registrants by the SEC with fee 
negotiations within guidelines established by the SEC.
6. Requiring auditors to report on the preferability of all the client's 
accounting policies.
7. Requiring that the nature and amount of consulting services provided
by the auditor to the client be disclosed within the client's financial 
statements.
8. Establishment of an arbitration board to settle disputes between 
auditors and clients involving financial reporting issues.
9. A ban on any form of advertising by auditing firms.
10. Requiring the mandatory use of audit committees composed of non-employee 
and non-management members of the client's board of directors.
11. Required disclosure in client financial statements of all major audit- 
client disagreements occurring in the eighteen months prior to an 
auditing firm's dismissal,
12. Prohibiting an auditing firm from accepting an engagement if the total 
revenue from the prospective client would be greater than 10% of the 
auditing firm's total annual revenues.
13. Re-instatement of the AICPA’s ethical standard prohibiting client 
solicitation.
14. Requiring that audit fee negotiations be the complete responsibility 
of the client's audit committee rather than the client's management.
15. Mandatory rotation of all audit engagement personnel every three years.
16. Annual publication by the SEC of suggested audit fees per hour by 
staff level, e.g., staff, senior, manager, etc.
Note: See reverge for supplementary questions.
194
Supplementary Questions
1. In total, how many years of experience do you have in the banking industry?
2. How many years of experience do you have in commercial lending?
Thank you again for your assistance.
Supplementary Questions
1. In which of the following functional areas do you work? (Circle one)
Auditing - Consulting - Taxes
2. How many years of experience do you have in the practice of public accounting?
3..How many years experience, if any, do you have in accounting other than in 
public practice?
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Tfie 
Universily of OkCafioma
DIVISION OF ACCOUNTING
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
307 West Brooks, Room 200 
Norman, Oklahoma 73019 
(405) 325-4221
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As an executive member of the banking industry, you are in an excellent 
position to evaluate the apparent independence of public accountants such as 
those who report upon the financial statements of your customers. Your help 
in an important research project being carried out here at OU concerning the 
above issue would be greatly appreciated. Would you be so kind as to complete 
the attached research instrument and return it in the enclosed stamped envelope. 
This task will require only 15-18 minutes.
Your responses will be held in strict confidentiality. If you so desire, 
a summary of the research results will be mailed to you. To indicate that you 
wish to receive this synopsis, print your name and address on the enclosed 
4 x 6  card.
Sincerely,
Bart H. Ward, Ph.D, CPA 
Associate Professor
Enclosures
Wr/ie
University o f OkCafioma
DIVISION OF ACCOUNTING
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
307 West Brooks, Room 200 
Norman, Oklahoma 73019 
(405) 325-4221
Three weeks ago you received a copy of an instrument that is being used 
in a research project here at OU. Enclosed is another copy of this instrument. 
Would you be so kind as to complete this questionaire and return it in the 
enclosed postage-paid envelope. This task will require only 15-20 minutes.
All responses will be held in strict confidentiality.
Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,
Bart H. Ward, 
Associate Professor
Enclosures
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INSTRUCTIONS
Attached are narrative descriptions of two fairly common disputes that 
could occur between an audit firm and one of its clients. Scenario A on 
page 1 and Scenario B on page 6 provide brief background descriptions of 
the two disputes. Following each of these scenarios are eight independent 
cases which describe certain additional details of the respective disputes. 
Your task is to record your personal perception of the chance (likelihood) 
that the dispute will be resolved in favor of the client.
In addition to completing the research tasks, please respond to the 
following supplemental questions.
Supplementary Questions
1. In which of the following functional areas do you work? (Circle one) 
Auditing - Consulting - Taxes
2. How many years of experience do you have in the practice of public 
accounting?
3. How many years experience, if any, do you have in accounting other 
than in public practice?
SCENARIO A 200
Jackson Manufacturing is a publicly-owned producer of electronic equipment 
used in hospitals and medical laboratories. Jackson is audited by a local 
office of a national public accounting firm. In the current year's audit, a 
dispute between Jackson and their auditors has arisen over the materiality of 
certain unrecorded liabilities discovered by the auditors. The unrecorded 
liabilities consist primarily of expenses incurred in 1981 that were neither 
paid nor recorded in Jackson’s accounting records until 1982. Jackson’s 
controller argues that the total amount of the unrecorded liabilities is 
immaterial and that it is therefore unnecessary to adjust the financial 
statements in this regard. The auditors feel the amount is material and 
that the 1981 financial statements should be adjusted accordingly. Technical 
accounting standards provide very little guidance in determining the materiality 
of given amounts in financial statements, and thus, Jackson’s management believes 
they themselves should know as well as anyone what their financial statement 
readers would or would not deem to be a material amount. Other available facts 
include:
Case #1
Jackson’s overall financial condition is quite good. All of the firm's 
solvency and profitabilité ratios compare favorably to industry averages. 
Net income has shown a modest but steady growth pattern over the last 
five years.
Jackson’s auditors are also currently working on a large management 
consulting project involving Jackson’s cost accounting system. The 
consulting engagement will most likely not be completed for another 
twelve months. The total fee for this project is expected to be equal 
to approximately 40% of the current year’s audit fee.
The immediate audit market within which Jackson’s auditors compete is 
characterized by a number of large auditing firms that are aggressively 
pursuing practice development (expansion) programs.
In your view, given the above information, how likely is it that the unrecorded 
liabilities will be ignored for purposes of the financial statements as well 
as the auditor’s report, which is the alternative that Jackson’s management 
desires. Record your answer by circling the most appropriate number on the 
following equal-interval scale.
Very Very
Low High
Likelihood 1_______ 2 3 4 5 6_______ 7 Likelihood
Case #2
Jackson's overall financial condition is quite good. All of the 
firm's solvency and profitability ratios compare favorably to 
industry averages. Net income has shown a modest but steady 
growth pattern over the last five years.
Jackson's auditors are also currently working on a large 
management consulting project involving Jackson's cost 
accounting system. The consulting engagement will most 
likely not be completed for another twelve months. The 
total fee for this project is expected to be equal to approx­
imately 40% of the current year's audit fee.
The other major auditing firms in the immediate area in which 
Jackson's auditing firm operates are not aggressive competitors.
Given the above information, how likely is it that the unrecorded liabilities 
will be ignored.
Very Very
Low High
Likelihood 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Likelihood
Case #3
Jackson's auditors are also currently working on a large management 
consulting project involving Jackson's cost accounting system.
The consulting engagement will most likely not be completed for 
another twelve months. The total fee for this project is expected 
to be equal to approximately 40% of the current year's audit fee.
- The other major auditing firms in the immediate area in which 
Jackson's auditing firm operates are not aggressive competitors.
Jackson's overall financial condition is poor. The last few 
years have brought considerable deterioration in their solvency 
and profitability positions. Net income has shown a modest but 
steady decline over the last five years.
Given the above information, how likely is it that the unrecorded liabilities 
will be ignored.
Very Very
Low High
Likelihood 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 Likelihood
Case H 202
- The immediate audit market within which Jackson's auditors compete 
is characterized by a number of large auditing firms that are 
aggressively pursuing practice development (expansion) programs.
Jackson's overall financial condition is quite good. All of the 
firm's solvency and profitability ratios compare favorably to 
industry averages. Net income has shown a modest but steady 
growth pattern over the last five years.
Jackson's auditing firm will not provide any consulting services 
to Jackson in the coming twelve months.
Given the above information, how likely is it that the unrecorded liabilities 
will be ignored,.
Very Very
Low High
Likelihood 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Likelihood
Case If5
Jackson's auditing firm will not provide any consulting services 
to Jackson in the coming twelve months.
- The immediate audit market within which Jackson's auditors compete 
is characterized by a number of large auditing firms that are 
aggressively pursuing practice development (expansion) programs.
- Jackson's overall financial condition is poor. The last few 
years have brought considerable deterioration in their solvency 
and profitability positions. Net income has shown a modest but 
steady decline over the last five years.
Given the above information, how likely is it that the unrecorded liabilities 
will be ignored,
Very Very
Low High
Likelihood 1______2 3 4 5 6 7 Likelihood
Case //6 203 -
Jackson's overall financial condition is poor. The last few years 
have brought considerable deterioration in their solvency and 
profitability positions. Net income has shown a modest but steady 
decline over the last five years.
The other major auditing firms in the immediate area in which 
Jackson's auditing firm operates are not aggressive competitors.
- Jackson's auditing firm will not provide any consulting services 
to Jackson in the coming twelve months.
Given the above information, how likely is it that the unrecorded liabilities 
will be ignored.
Very Very
Low High
Likelihood 1 2 3 4 5 6 " 7 Likelihood
Case #7
The other major auditing firms in the immediate area in which 
Jackson's auditing firm operates are not aggressive competitors.
- Jackson's overall financial condition is quite good. All of the
firms's solvency and profitability ratios compare favorably to 
industry averages. Net income has shown a modest but steady
growth pattern over the last five years.
- Jackson's auditing firm will not provide any consulting services
to Jackson in the coming twelve months.
Given the above information, how likely is it that the unrecorded liabilities 
will be ignored.
Very Very
Low High
Likelihood 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 Likelihood
Case Its 204
The immediate audit market within which Jackson's auditors compete 
is characterized by a number of large auditing firms that are 
aggressively pursuing practice development (.expansion) programs.
Jackson's overall financial condition is poor. The last few 
years have brought considerable deterioration in their solvency 
and profitability positions. Net income has shovm a modest but 
steady decline over the last five years.
Jackson's auditors are also currently working oh a large management 
consulting project involving Jackson's cost accounting system. The 
consulting engagement will most likely not be completed for another 
twelve months. The total fee for this project is expected to be 
equal to approximately 40% of the current year's audit fee.
Given the above information, how likely is it that the unrecorded liabilities 
will be ignored.
Very Very
Low High
Likelihood 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Likelihood
SCENARIO B 205
Lewis Equipment Company is a publicly-owned manufacturer of electric 
pumps. In the current year's audit a dispute has arisen between Lewis and 
their auditors, a large national accounting firm. The dispute centers over 
whether a material loss on an account receivable, which occurred after the 
end of the fiscal year, should be disclosed in the footnotes of the Lewis 
financial statements. At the fiscal year-end, there was no evidence avail­
able which indicated that this particular customer would default. The 
customer's default was the result of extensive damage to their physical 
facilities resulting from a fire occurring after year-end. The technical 
standards of the profession are quite explicit with regard to the above 
situation. The standards support the audit firm's contention that the 
loss of the receivable should be disclosed in the footnotes of the Lewis 
financial statements. Nonetheless, the controller of Lewis disagrees with 
the standards and asserts that since the event occurred after the end of 
the fiscal year it does not have to be disclosed in any manner. Other 
available facts include:
Case //I
- Lewis' auditors are also currently working on a large management 
consulting project involving Lewis' cost accounting system. The 
consulting engagement will most likely not be completed for another 
twelve months. The total fee for this project is expected to be 
equal to approximately 40% of the current year's audit fee.
- The other major auditing firms in the immediate area in which Lewis' 
auditing firm operates are not aggressive competitors.
- Lewis' overall financial condition is poor. The last few years 
have brought considerable deterioration in their solvency and 
profitability positions. Net income has shown a modest but 
steady decline over the last five years.
Given the above information, how likely is it that the loss of the receivable 
will be ignored for purposes of the financial statements and the auditor's report, 
which is the alternative that Lewis' management desires. Record your answer 
by circling the most appropriate number on the following equal-interval scale.
Very Very
Low High
Likelihood 1______2______ 3 4 5 6 7 Likelihood
Case #2: 206
The immediate audit market within which Lewis' auditors compete is 
characterized by a number of large auditing firms that are aggres­
sively pursuing practice development (expansion) programs.
- Lewis' auditing firm will not provide any consulting services to 
Lewis in the coming twelve months.
Lewis' overall financial condition is poor. The last few years have 
brought considerable deterioration in their solvency and profitability 
positions. Net income has shown a modest but steady decline over the 
last five years.
Given the above information, how likely is it that the loss of the receivable 
will not be disclosed.
Very Very
Low High
Likelihood 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 Likelihood
Case #3:
Lewis' overall financial condition is quite good. All of the firm's 
solvency and profitability ratios compare favorably to industry 
averages. Net income has shown a modest but steady growth pattern 
over the last five years.
- The other major auditing firms in the immediate area in which Lewis’ 
auditing firm operates are not aggressive competitors.
- Lewis' auditors are also currently working on a large management 
consulting project involving Lewis' cost accounting system. The 
consulting engagement will most likely not be completed for another 
twelve months. The total fee for this project is expected to be 
equal to approximately 40% of the current year's audit fee.
Given the above information, how likely is it that the loss of the receivable 
will not be disclosed,
Very Very
Low High
Likelihood 1______2 3  4 5 6 7 Likelihood
n, 207Case //4:
- The other major auditing firms in the immediate area in which Lewis' 
auditing firm operates are not aggressive competitors.
Lewis' overall financial condition is quite good. All of the firm's 
solvency and profitability ratios compare favorably to industry 
averages. Net income has shown a modest but steady growth pattern 
over the last five years.
Lewis' auditing firm will not provide any consulting services to 
Lewis in the coming twelve months.
Given the above information, how likely is it that the loss of the receivable 
will not be disclosed.
Very Very
Low High
Likelihood 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Likelihood
Case #5;
- Lewis' overall financial condition is poor. The last few years have 
brought considerable deterioration in their solvency and profitability 
positions. Net income has shown a modest but steady decline over the 
last five years.
- The immediate audit market within which Lewis' auditors compete is 
characterized by a number of large auditing firms that are aggres-
.. sively pursuing practice development (expansion) programs.
Lewis' auditors are also currently working on a large management 
consulting project involving Lewis' cost accounting system. The 
consulting engagement will most likely not be completed for another 
twelve months-. The total fee for this project is expected to be 
equal to approximately 40% of the current year's audit fee.
Given the above information, how likely is it that the loss of the receivable 
will not be disclosed •
Very Very
Low High
Likelihood 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 Likelihood
Case //6 208
Lewis' overall financial condition is quite good. All of the firm's 
solvency and profitability ratios compare favorably to industry averages. 
Net income has shown a modest but steady growth pattern over the last 
five years.
Lewis' auditing firm will not provide any consulting services to Lewis 
in the coming twelve months.
The immediate audit market within which Lewis' auditors compete is 
characterized by a number of large auditing firms that are aggres­
sively pursuing practice development (expansion)'programs.
Given the above information, how likely is it that thé loss of the receivable 
will not be disclosed.
Very Very
Low High
Likelihood 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 Likelihood
Case
- The immediate audit market within which Lewis' auditors compete is 
characterized by a number of large auditing firms that are aggres­
sively pursuing practice development (expansion) programs.
- Lewis' auditors are also currently working on a large management 
consulting project involving Lewis' cost accounting system. The 
consulting engagement will most likely not be completed for another 
twelve months. The total fee for this project is expected to be 
equal to approximately 40% of the current year's audit fee.
- Lewis' overall financial condition is quite good. All of the firm's 
solvency and profitability ratios compare favorably to industry 
averages. Net income has shown a modest but steady growth pattern 
over the last five years.
Given the above information, how_likely is it that the loss of the receivable 
will not be disclosed.
Very Very
Low High
Likelihood 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 Likelihood
Case //8: 209
The other major auditing firms in the immediate area in which Lewis’ 
auditing firm operates are not aggressive competitors.
Lewis' auditing firm will not provide any consulting services to
Lewis in the coming twelve months.
Lewis' overall financial condition is poor. The last few years have 
brought considerable deterioration in their solvency and profitability
positions. Net income has shown a modest but steady decline over the
last five years.
Given the above information, how likely is it that the loss of the receivable 
will not be disclosed.
Very Very
Low High
Likelihood 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 Likelihood
